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ABSTRACT 
 
Risks posed by geohazards to urban centres are constantly increasing, due to the 
continuous increase in population and associated infrastructure. A major risk to North 
Island urban centres is impacts from volcanic ashfall. This study analyses the 
vulnerabilities of selected New Zealand lifelines infrastructure to volcanic ash, to 
better understand and mitigate these risks. Telecommunications and wastewater 
networks are assessed, as is the vulnerability of Auckland Airport and grounded 
aircraft. The ability of vehicles to drive on ash covered roads is also tested, to 
determine the extent to which emergency services, utility providers and the public 
will be able to travel during and immediately after ashfall. Finally, air-conditioners 
have been identified as a significant vulnerability during ashfall, due to the high 
dependence on cooling for infrastructure and lifelines providers. These are examined 
to quantify the effects of ashfall on their performance. 
 
Each of the selected infrastructure types is assessed through a review of past impacts 
of ashfall, and experimentation either in the field or under laboratory conditions. 
Where appropriate, mitigation options that reduce identified vulnerabilities are 
considered. In most cases these options are operational rather than physical 
engineering solutions, and indicate pre-planning and response requirements. 
 
Key recommended mitigation options include the acquirement or strategic relocation 
of resources prior to ashfall, regular cleaning and maintenance of essential air 
conditioners during ashfall to enable their continued use, access to appropriate 
vehicles for utility providers to reach infrastructure, and discharge of untreated 
wastewater into Waitemata harbour at Orakei during ashfall on Auckland, to preserve 
the ability to continue treating wastewater at the Mangere treatment plant. 
 v
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 
 
Airside The area of an airport beyond the terminals used by aircraft for 
loading, unloading, takeoffs and landings 
AVF Auckland Volcanic Field 
DAC  Dirección de la Aviación Civil: The Ecuadorian civil aviation 
Authority 
EMAAP Quito Water Supply Agency (Ecuador) 
ENAC: Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile: The Italian national civil 
aviation authority. 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (USA). 
GNS Science Geological and Nuclear Sciences (New Zealand) 
IGEPN  Instituto Geofisico, Escuela Politecnica Nacional (Ecuador):The 
institute of geophysics, national polytechnic school 
INGV Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia: The Italian national 
institute of geophysics and volcanology 
NAS Naval air station 
NIWA National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (New Zealand)  
NOTAM Notice to Airmen 
NVO  Nucleo di valutazione operative. Nucleus of operative assessment: 
The crisis team at Fontanarossa airport. 
PAHO Pan American Health Organisation 
Pitot tubes Instruments of the outside of an aircraft cockpit that measure airspeed 
SAC Società Aeroporto Catania. The company that operates Fontanarossa 
airport 
SIGMET Significant Meteorological Information, a meteorological advisory 
containing information about the safety of all aircraft 
SMEC Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation 
Tephra Ash and lapilli. Ash grainsize is < 2mm, lapilli is 2 – 64 mm. Tephra 
refers to both. In this work the terms ash and tephra are usually used 
interchangeably  
TVZ Taupo Volcanic Zone 
USGS United States Geological Survey 
VAAC Volcanic ash advisory centre  
VAAS Volcanic ash advisory system (NZ) 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Volcanic eruptions have the capacity to cause widespread damage and destruction. 
Communities throughout history have been subjected to the sometimes disruptive, 
sometimes catastrophic impacts of volcanism (Cashman & Giordano, 2008). This is in 
part because historically the fertile farmland associated with volcanoes has made them 
attractive places to live, despite the hazards (Annen & Wagner, 2003). Urbanisation in 
the last 250 years has led to increased global exposure to natural hazards, as 
concentrations of population and infrastructure in hazard zones have a greater 
potential for disasters than more dispersed rural communities (Chester et al., 2001). In 
terms of volcanism this has been evidenced particularly by the deaths in 1985 of 
>23,000 people in living in Armero, Colombia buried by lahars from Nevado de Ruiz 
(Voight, 1996). Losses due to volcanic activity in the 1990s included the devastation 
of two cities (Rabaul and Plymouth), the deaths of between 560 and 1,300 people, the 
displacement of more than 520,000 people and over one billion U.S. dollars in 
financial losses, (Annen & Wagner, 2003). In the last decade more eruptions have 
affected urban areas in several countries, perhaps most significantly the destruction of 
Chaiten town, Chile by the 2008 eruption of Chaiten Volcano (La Nacion, 2009). 
 
Despite these recurring impacts, several towns and cities are located within kilometres 
of frequently erupting volcanoes, for example Kagoshima, Japan (>10 km from 
Sakurajima Volcano); Catania, Italy (centred 25 km from the summit of Etna); Quito, 
Ecuador (~ 10 km from the summit of Guagua Pichincha); Ambato, Ecuador (~30 km 
from Tungurahua). Many more are situated close to or on top of volcanoes that may 
not have erupted in recent history, but are still active; In New Zealand Auckland is a 
prime example of this, as is Rotorua. Immediate proximity to a volcano is not 
requisite to be threatened by volcanism; centres located hundreds of kilometres from 
volcanoes may be subject to impacts from volcanic ash.  
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Volcanic ash may travel vast distances; eruptions can have impacts on the other side 
of the world. Ash clouds from The 1991 Mt Hudson eruptions in Chile were identified 
over Australia (Barton et al., 1992), and ash likely to be from the 2002 Reventador 
eruption in Ecuador was encountered by aircraft over Micronesia (Tupper et al., 
2006). Ash from the 1991 Pinatubo eruption circled the globe, traces were even found 
in Antarctica (Cole-Dai et al., 1997). Since ash may travel so far, most instances of 
ashfall impacting urban centres involve minor thicknesses of ash. Occurrences of 
more than a few millimetres of ashfall impacting urban areas are rare. Even those 
cities existing close to frequently erupting volcanoes have in most cases received only 
light ashfall, e.g. Kagoshima, Japan (Durand et al., 2001); Catania, Italy, (Barnard, 
2004); Quito, Ecuador (Leonard et al., 2005). Each of these centres has experienced 
light ashfall (up to a few millimetres) on more than one occasion in the last decade. 
The few existing examples of heavier ashfall impacting urban areas are often 
accompanied by other volcanic hazards, such as lahars or pyroclastic flows. Examples 
include Rabaul township during the 1994 Rabaul eruption, (Blong & McKee, 1995) 
Plymouth during the 1995 (onwards) eruptions of Soufriere hills, (Young et al., 1998) 
and Chaiten township during the 2008-present day eruption of Chaiten Volcano (T. 
Wilson, pers. comm., 2009).  
 
1.2 Context 
 
The reliance of communities on lifeline utilities (lifelines) to maintain their 
economies, health, safety and quality of life is greater now than ever before. 
Electricity, water supplies, wastewater, communications and transportation networks 
are all essential to urban centres. Without the continued operation of these lifelines, 
urban life ceases to be sustainable. Continuity of lifelines operations during 
emergencies is essential to preserving quality of life. Maintaining these essential 
services not only benefits the community directly but in some cases may even negate 
the need for evacuations. The elevated community risk exposure to secondary hazards 
such as diseases, and water contamination through infrastructure failure may be the 
cause for such evacuations rather than the primary (volcanic) hazard realisation. In 
order to achieve continuity of lifelines, infrastructure providers need to develop 
effective risk management strategies to cope with foreseeable hazards. Holistic risk 
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management relies on a cyclic process that encapsulates the identification, analysis 
and evaluation of any risks as risk assessment (figure 1.1). However, risk assessment 
is only one part of the process. Its role is to quantify the risk within the given context 
and to inform decision makers and stakeholders of the risk exposure profile so that 
appropriate treatments can be implemented. To be effective, the risk management 
process also requires continuous review as treatment, communication inputs and 
situational changes impact the level of risk tolerance and likelihood of risk realisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Generalised risk management process – Overview (after AS/NZS 4360:2004). 
By living close to or on an active volcano we tacitly accept the risk posed by that 
volcano. The nature of the geological setting of New Zealand necessitates this in a 
large part of the North Island. Preventing eruptions is not possible, but exercising 
some control over the amount of risk they pose is, through effective hazard 
management.  
 
The numerous natural hazards existing in New Zealand require extensive hazard 
management planning and legislation. Regional Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Groups, local authorities and emergency services are responsible for 
implementing local risk management and civil defence emergency management 
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(ODESC, 2007). Their responsibilities are set out in the Resource Management Act 
(RMA) (1991), the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (CDEM) (2002), the 
Building Act (2004), and to some extent the Local Government Act (2002). The RMA 
requires territorial authorities and regional councils to avoid or mitigate natural 
hazards. The CDEM act specifies the responsibilities of government departments, 
lifeline utilities and emergency services in the context of the 4Rs of emergency 
management (reduction, readiness, response and recovery). It seeks to achieve 
acceptable levels of risk for communities, and required the formation of CDEM 
groups. These 16 regional groups seek to identify gaps in hazard knowledge and 
inefficiencies in mitigation (ODESC, 2007). Supporting these CDEM groups are other 
organisations such as the National Engineering Lifelines Committee (NELC), (whose 
members include EQC, MCDEM, NIWA, GNS Science and various lifelines 
providers) and various regional engineering lifelines groups, such as the Auckland 
Engineering lifelines group (AELG).  
 
This multi-agency approach to emergency management illustrates the importance 
placed on hazard and emergency management in New Zealand. The legislative 
requirements to prepare for and mitigate against potential hazardous events 
necessitate a good knowledge not only of the hazards themselves, but the extent of the 
risk they pose. Effective management of any risk requires a quantitative estimate of 
the degree of that risk and the associated hazard. In terms of geohazards (including 
volcanism), risk is a function of hazard, exposure, vulnerability and probability. All of 
these aspects need to be defined to be able to quantify risk. The research in this thesis 
has focussed on the vulnerability aspect of this equation. Other applicable research 
into geohazards and risk is conducted both overseas and in New Zealand. Locally this 
is performed largely by crown research institutes (CRI’s) such as NIWA and GNS, 
and by New Zealand’s universities, often in conjunction with those CRI’s. Current 
work includes the Riskscape and DEVORA (Determining Volcanic Risk in Auckland) 
projects. Riskscape is a “multi-hazard decision support tool”, which in part offers 
identification of and quantification of risks and potential losses from different hazard 
events (NIWA 2008). The DEVORA research programme, a collaboration between 
GNS Science and Auckland University’s Institute of Earth Science and Engineering, 
seeks to assess volcanic hazard and risk in Auckland. The research conducted for this 
thesis will feed not only into these projects but will be directly available to be used by 
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the infrastructure providers concerned. In this way this thesis is adding to a greater 
body of extant and continuing work. 
 
This thesis seeks to assess risks posed to lifelines infrastructure from volcanic ashfall, 
through a vulnerability analysis of selected infrastructure to volcanic ash. The analysis 
acts to identify which aspects of infrastructure are vulnerable, and analyses these 
vulnerabilities to determine potential consequences. This in turn will arm 
infrastructure providers with the necessary tools to fully evaluate the risks posed by 
volcanic ash to their respective networks. Recommended mitigation strategies are 
given where appropriate to facilitate this process. The application of this knowledge 
will increase the organisational resilience of lifelines providers, which will in turn 
increase the resilience of the community. Analyses of ashfall impacts are conducted 
on the following lifelines and infrastructural types: 
 
• Telecommunications 
• Air conditioning systems 
• Aviation infrastructure and grounded aircraft 
• Road transportation (vehicle mobility) 
• Wastewater systems 
 
Notable lifelines omitted from this research are electrical distribution networks and 
water supplies. This is because this work complements parallel streams of research by 
other researchers into lifelines vulnerability. Current research in New Zealand on how 
ash impacts electrical distribution networks is being conducted at both Massey 
University (by Ian Chapman) and at the University of Canterbury (by John 
Wardman). Water supply vulnerability to ashfall has recently been addressed through 
literature review and modelling (Stewart et al., 2006), and more specifically as a study 
on potential impacts of ashfall on water supplies in Auckland (Johnston et al., 2004). 
The infrastructure types selected for this research were chosen because they represent 
essential lifelines and services in New Zealand, about which there is insufficient 
knowledge to quantify risk. Assessing the vulnerability of these types of infrastructure 
to volcanic ash is a vital prerequisite for enabling risk management practices to be put 
into place by infrastructure providers and local or regional authorities. While this 
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research focuses on the physical vulnerability of New Zealand infrastructure to 
volcanic ash, most results are applicable internationally, as much infrastructure is 
essentially the same worldwide. 
 
1.3 Hazards caused by volcanic ash  
 
Volcanic ash is hazardous for several reasons. It consists of very small fragments (<2 
mm diameter) of volcanic rock and glass. Because of this small size it is difficult to 
prevent it getting into buildings, vehicles, and machinery. The hard nature of volcanic 
ash renders it extremely abrasive, whether it is from a mafic or more silicic source. As 
its small size makes it very penetrative, it can cause much damage by abrading 
moving parts on machinery. It is also respirable, creating a health hazard, potentially 
more so for asthmatics (Horwell & Baxter, 2006). 
 
Ash is heavy, and it can be produced and deposited in large volumes. The weight of 
thick deposits of ash may exceed design loads of structures. Furthermore it may 
absorb up to 50% of it own volume in water, increasing its weight significantly. This 
can lead to building and/or roof collapse, something that has featured in many 
historical eruptions, e.g. Tarawera 1886 (Keam, 1988), Pinatubo 1991 (Casadevall et 
al., 1996), Rabaul 1994 (Blong & McKee, 1995). Roof collapse may occur with as 
little as ~15 cm of ash, damage may occur with even less. Figure 1.2 illustrates roof 
collapse in Rabaul, 1994. 
 
Figure 1.2: Collapsed police barracks in Rabaul, 1994, after being covered by >600 mm of 
ash (Blong & McKee, 1995). 
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Additionally, large volumes of ash can create blockages and obstructions. The usual 
movement of air may be restricted as ash blocks air intakes and filters on machinery, 
vehicles and air handling units (e.g. air conditioners). Water movement is also 
restricted by blocked drains and sewers. This can lead to roofs leaking if ash clogs 
downpipes and spoutings. Flooding and/or sewage overflows from blocked up 
wastewater systems are another potential hazard caused by ashfall. Thick deposits 
(over a few centimetres) can block roads to traffic, especially on hilly areas. 
 
Aerosols attached to freshly erupted grains of ash are potentially extremely acidic, 
creating corrosion risks to exposed metals. This affects machinery, vehicles and many 
rooftops. The same acidic properties can contaminate water supplies if reservoirs are 
above ground.  
 
As well as the problems caused by abrasion, loading, blockages and corrosion, the 
slipperiness of small grains of volcanic ash constitutes a hazard in itself. This has in 
the past caused traffic accidents due to loss of traction (e.g. Barnard, 2004).
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1.4 Volcanism in New Zealand 
 
New Zealand’s geographic location on the boundary of the Pacific and Australian 
plates makes it a very active place geologically. The North Island hosts several active 
volcanoes, most of which could potentially deposit ash over any parts of the North 
Island, or in rare cases even the South Island (figure 1.3). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Volcanic centres of the North Island. The Grey circular icons indicate  
Volcanoes that have been active in the last 150 years (modified from Cole & Nairn, 1975) 
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The most frequent source of volcanic ash in the New Zealand over the last 150 years 
is the Tongariro Volcanic Centre (Cole & Nairn, 1975; Guffanti et al., 2008) 
Predominant wind directions in the North Island are from west to east, therefore the 
cities and towns of the eastern North Island have historically had the greatest risk 
realisation, experiencing ashfall from this source. However, the greatest damage 
potential from ashfall exists in New Zealand’s largest city, Auckland. Auckland’s risk 
is in part due to the potential economic consequences of ashfall on the city, but also 
because Auckland itself is situated on an active basaltic volcanic field (the Auckland 
Volcanic Field, or AVF). Moreover the active volcanic centres of the Taupo Volcanic 
Zone have all deposited ash on Auckland in the past (Sandiford et al., 2001). 
Auckland is also at risk from Taranaki Volcano; the probability of tephra-induced 
building damage occurring in Auckland from this volcano may be greater than from a 
local eruption, due to the higher probability of an eruption from Taranaki (Magill & 
Blong, 2005). Local eruptions in Auckland, while statistically less frequent have the 
capacity to cause far more damage. The Rangitoto eruption was not only the most 
recent, occurring approximately 600 years ago, but the largest in this volcanic field 
(Magill et al., 2005). Should a similar magnitude eruption occur in the future, 
Auckland city would be subject to a range of volcanic hazards, such as ballistic ejecta, 
lava flows and base surges. A probabilistic tephra fall simulation for Auckland has 
calculated maximum tephra thicknesses of 150 mm for the AVF, 12 mm for andesitic 
centres and 830 mm for rhyolitic centres (Magill et al., 2006). Eruptions from the 
AVF could happen without much warning – precursory activity may only be detected 
days before an eruption (Sherburn et al., 2007). Because Auckland is New Zealand’s 
largest city, it is the most important economically. Having the potential to be 
subjected to volcanic ashfall from multiple sources with little warning, it represents a 
significant national vulnerability. Consequently, where this research assesses site 
specific infrastructural vulnerability Auckland is used as a case study.  
 
1.5 Infrastructural vulnerability to ashfall 
 
Few eruptions have had their impacts as frequently analysed as the 1980 eruption of  
Mt St Helens (e.g. Tyler and Reynertson, 1981; Schuster, 1981, Blong, 1984; Labadie 
1994, Johnston 1997b, Fairchild, 2005). These studies have provided useful data on 
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ashfall impacts, but much infrastructure has changed in the last ~30 years. Since that 
time ashfall from the Pinatubo 1991 eruption, the 1994 Rabaul eruption and more 
recently the 2008 Chaiten eruption have had significant impacts on lifelines 
infrastructure. Many of the impacts from these eruptions have also been described 
(e.g. Blong & McKee, 1995; Casadevall et al., 1996; Wilson et al., 2009). Despite 
these examples (and a number of less devastating eruptions) the dataset upon which 
we can draw to determine future impacts is not exhaustive and, as illustrated by the 
Mt St Helens example, is sometimes out of date. Not all impacts are addressed in the 
literature; for instance very little has been written about the impacts of ashfall on 
sewerage systems since the accounts of the destruction of Yakima’s treatment plant 
following the 1980 Mt St Helens eruption (Day & Fisher, 1980; Johnston 1997b). 
Many of the hazards posed by volcanic ashfall to urban lifelines infrastructure are 
thus not well quantified.  
 
1.6 Research methodology  
 
To assess the vulnerability of the selected types of infrastructure to volcanic ash a 
literature review was carried out first, to establish past effects of ashfall on 
infrastructure. This identified potential vulnerabilities, but also indicated that there 
was a dearth of published data on the impacts of ash on particular lifelines 
infrastructure. An assessment of the infrastructure itself was performed next, to 
determine what exactly was at risk in New Zealand. This was followed by fieldwork 
in areas that had recently been impacted by ashfall. The main areas chosen for this 
work were Catania, Italy, and Quito, Ecuador. Both of these cities had experienced 
ashfall on multiple occasions in the decade prior to this. To a large extent the 
fieldwork involved conducting interviews with infrastructure providers and local 
scientists to ascertain the effects of ashfall on specific types of infrastructure. Some 
testing was also carried out on ash covered areas of Mt Etna. 
 
In addition to fieldwork, laboratory experiments simulated the effects of ashfall on 
components of infrastructure, as without these there was insufficient data to 
accurately assess the vulnerability of some infrastructural components. A prerequisite 
for the simulation of ashfall was obtaining fine volcanic ash. As the fine components 
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of ash are usually washed away by rainfall shortly after deposition, fine ash was not 
available in large quantities in New Zealand; there were no magmatic eruptions in 
New Zealand during the course of writing this thesis. Some small samples of fresh ash 
from overseas volcanoes were used in some cases, but for experiments that required 
several litres of ash a proxy was used. This was created from unweathered samples of 
local Port Hills basalt. Descriptions of this process are given in chapter 3. The 
resultant ‘ash’ proved to have a similar grainsize, grain shape and hardness as fresh 
samples of ash. This enabled testing of pumps and air-conditioning units. Corrosive 
properties of fresh ash on infrastructure were tested in most instances by fluids 
sampled from the September 2007 lahars of Mt Ruapehu, which were generated by a 
small hydrothermal explosion (BGVN, 2007). 
 
1.7 Summary 
 
Historic eruptions indicate lifeline infrastructure is vulnerable to volcanic ash, 
however quantifiable information about these impacts is lacking. The relatively small 
frequency of ashfall impacting urban areas has resulted in a small dataset of 
infrastructural impacts. Furthermore advances in technology in the last few decades 
have led to societal reliance on infrastructure that has not previously been subjected to 
volcanic ashfall. Urban centres near active volcanoes are subject to a substantial risk 
of being impacted by ashfall.  
 
Through a combination of literature review, fieldwork, interviews and laboratory 
testing, this thesis aims to identify the vulnerabilities of selected New Zealand 
lifelines infrastructure to volcanic ashfall. Chapter 2 identifies and assesses risks 
posed to telecommunications infrastructure. Chapter 3 quantifies risks to air-
conditioning units by testing them in simulated volcanic ashfall. This research came 
about as a direct result of vulnerabilities identified in telecommunications 
infrastructure. Chapters 4 and 5 address transportation, looking at aspects of the 
aviation sector and mobility of vehicles on ash covered roads. Lastly an analysis of 
the vulnerability of Auckland’s wastewater system to ashfall is conducted. The 
information gained from this research will make possible the emplacement of 
improved mitigation strategies to manage the risks posed by volcanic ashfall. The 
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concurrent studies into water and electricity supply during volcanic eruptions 
compliment this work, such that the outcome of the combined research will be an 
increase in the resilience of New Zealand communities to volcanic ashfall.  
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CHAPTER 2: TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND 
VOLCANIC ASH IN NZ. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
2.1.1Background 
 
Telecommunications in New Zealand were first affected by volcanic activity in 1886, 
during the 10 June eruption of Tarawera. Ashfall from the eruption brought down 
telegraph poles and lines between Rotorua and Maketu. A lineman from Rotorua 
estimated that each pole was supporting “50 pounds of mud”, and described the lines 
as being “as thick as a candle with mud” (NZ Herald, 14 June 1886). Lightning strikes 
associated with the electrical disturbances created by the eruption also caused damage 
to telegraph lines between Maketu and Opotiki, temporarily cutting this link 
(Auckland Evening Star, 15 June 1886, p.2). 
  
Telecommunications equipment over 120 years later has evolved considerably; 
multiple means of communication give us alternatives if one type of communication 
fails. In this sense our ability to maintain communication with distal centres/people 
can be considered more robust than in the 19th century. However the increased 
amount of infrastructure now required to maintain communications means more 
equipment is at risk. Although some of this equipment is seemingly well protected, 
the vulnerability of telecommunications infrastructure to volcanic ash has increased 
over time. This can be attributed to its more advanced nature (more components may 
fail), the interdependency of this equipment on other lifelines (power, road access for 
maintenance/repair etc) and the huge increase in the amount of infrastructure present. 
Reliance on telecommunications has grown in keeping with the increase in 
technology.  
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2.1.2 Telecommunications Infrastructure in New Zealand 
 
Landline connections, whether voice or data (fax/internet), are established by means 
of copper wires connected from end users (houses, businesses etc) to roadside 
cabinets. Roadside cabinets have in the past been used to bring underground cables 
from a group of end users to the surface, to enable connections to exchanges and 
maintenance in a dry accessible environment. Currently Telecom NZ is upgrading and 
installing 3600 new cabinets via their subsidiary business ‘Chorus’. The new cabinets 
contain a new broadband electronics platform (ISAM) which provides customers with 
an ADSL2+ broadband connection. Each cabinet serves up to 300 customers. 
(Telecom, 2008). Because of the heat generated by this equipment, these cabinets 
require artificial cooling, and contain a small heat exchange (air-conditioning unit) 
(Chorus 2008b). Subsurface fibre optic cables connect these cabinets to exchanges. 
(Chorus, 2008a). Figure 2.1 illustrates how cabinets connect houses to exchanges. 
 
Figure 2.1: Connections through cabinets (Chorus, 2008a). 
 
Exchanges themselves connect thousands of customers, typically whole suburbs in 
urban areas. Exchanges now house not only Telecom digital switchgear and ADSL2+ 
equipment, but are also used by other internet service providers, in some case housed 
in separate rooms, but sharing the same space in others. Most exchanges are 
unmanned, and run remotely. Exchange buildings are not built to a specific pattern; 
  27
they vary widely from weatherboard buildings with corrugated iron roofs, to purpose 
built concrete tilt-slab buildings, to floors within multi-storey office blocks.  
 
Further links beyond the exchanges are made by both cables and microwave 
transmissions. Where cables are buried underground, no impact from volcanic ash is 
likely. However, roadside cabinets, exchanges, pole supported telephone lines, 
microwave towers and dishes will be exposed to ashfall should such an event occur.  
 
This chapter focuses on the vulnerability of telecommunications network equipment 
in New Zealand to ashfall. It seeks to determine the risk ashfall could pose via 
impacting telecommunications equipment, or otherwise causing communications 
failures.
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2.2 Previous occurrences of ashfall impacting telecommunications 
 
A common impact to modern communication systems during any disaster is 
overloading of phone networks due to numerous people trying to contact each other at 
the same time. Examples of this occurring during an eruption include the overloading 
of the Yakima exchange during the 1980 Mt St Helens eruption (Blong, 1984), 
various local exchanges following the Ruapehu 1995 eruption (Johnston 1997a), and 
the main exchange in Quito following the 2002 Reventador eruption (Rivera, M, pers. 
comm., 2004). 
 
Actual physical infrastructural damage is not as common as exchange overloads, but 
can include line breakages, exchanges overheating and even the complete collapse of 
exchange buildings. One of the earliest examples is the damage to telegraph lines 
caused by the 1886 eruption of Mt Tarawera mentioned in section 2.1. There have 
since been several instances of damage to telecommunications infrastructure. The 
most dramatic of these is the collapse of the almost new telephone exchange roof due 
to severe ash loading during the 1994 Rabaul eruption (Blong & McKee 1995). This 
was due to extreme loading, as almost 1 metre of tephra was deposited on it (Blong 
2003). The interior equipment in the exchange was subsequently destroyed.  
 
Breakages of telephone and power lines due to a heavy accumulation of volcanic ash 
occurred in Rabaul in 1994 (SMEC 1999, Blong & McKee 1995). Telephone lines 
were also possibly broken in Chile Chico after the 1991 Hudson eruption, though this 
report remains unconfirmed (Wilson et al., in review). Further impacts of ash or 
tephra on communication systems include impacts of volcanic ash on radio and 
microwave transmissions. These are addressed in section 2.3.6. Even light ashfall is 
thought to have occasionally caused disruptions. Approximately 1 mm of ash 
reportedly set off high temperature alarms in Telecom exchanges as far away as 
Ruatoria (~280km) during the 1995 and 1996 Ruapehu eruptions (Johnston et al., 
2008). 
 
In addition to the impacts listed above there are also several instances of areas being 
affected by ashfall with little or no effect on communications systems (or even air-
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conditioning units). For example in Japan’s Kagoshima city, regular light ashfall from 
Sakurajima volcano is experienced. In the city most communication and electric 
cables are mounted on poles. These are insulated to normal Japanese standards, and 
appear to be unaffected by the regular light ashfall (Lorden, 2001). Exchanges also 
appear to be unaffected, there are no reports of communications outages and local 
scientists and infrastructure providers could not recall any when asked if they had 
occurred (Durand et. al., 2001).  
 
These instances of impacts (and lack thereof) are important, as they indicate there are 
vulnerabilities in communications systems that need to be addressed. The low 
frequency of significant volcanic eruptions affecting urban areas from the late 20th 
century until the current day has resulted in a fairly small dataset, with apparent 
contradictions present – some telephone exchanges function normally during light 
ashfall while others appear to overheat and can result in shutdowns. These 
contradictions are addressed in chapter 3 by conducting experimental work on 
Telecom New Zealand exchange building air-conditioning units. 
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2.3 Infrastructural Vulnerabilities  
 
2.3.1 Tephra Loading 
 
2.3.1.1 Telephone lines 
 
Telephone lines themselves are vulnerable to volcanic ash, simply because of the 
potential for line breakage. In the same way that breakages occurred in 1886 after ash 
and mud from the Tarawera eruption was deposited on telegraph lines, contemporary 
phone lines are subject to breakages after loading by volcanic ash. This may occur 
directly on the lines themselves, or by trees/branches falling onto them. While this 
type of disruption is more commonly associated with snow loading, the mechanism is 
the same. The amount of ash required to bring down trees in this way depends on 
many variables: tree type, the condition of the trees, the orientation of the branches, 
whether the ash is wet or dry and the amount of wind. However even without trees or 
other objects falling on lines, the weight of ash alone may be sufficient to break lines.  
 
Whether ash loading alone is sufficient to break telephone lines depends on how 
much ash accumulates. This in turn depends on weather conditions. Dry ash is 
unlikely to accumulate sufficiently to cause line breakages, but damp ash may. Light 
rain is therefore a potential problem, as it does not remove ash, but adds to the weight. 
Tests on power insulators and ash adherence after the 1980 Mt St Helens eruption 
indicated ash would readily stick to wet surfaces, and that it took heavy rain to 
remove it; light rain did not remove much at all (Nellis & Hendrix, 1980). 
Furthermore ash could accumulate on the underside of wet surfaces. The same 
principles apply to ash accumulating on power or phone lines. Subsequent ashfall will 
exacerbate the problem if wet ash is already adhering to lines, as the ash present will 
provide a larger damp surface area for more ash to accumulate on.  
 
Wind will have an effect on how much ash adheres to phone lines, both in terms of 
removal, and deposition from remobilised ash. Winds up to 55 km/h have been found 
to remove up to 95% of dry ash (Nellis & Hendrix 1980).  
 
  31
Most urban telephone lines or cables are now located underground, overhead lines are 
more often found in rural areas. 
 
2.3.1.2 Rural exchanges and roadside cabinets 
 
Rural exchanges and roadside cabinets have a similar construction – essentially a steel 
or 2.5 mm thick aluminium box mounted on a steel plinth. These are unlikely to be 
damaged by tephra loading due to their sturdy construction, unless indirectly damaged 
by other objects such as falling trees collapsing under ash loading (figure 2.2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Rural exchange 24RU cabinet (left) and new roadside cabinet (right). 
 
2.3.1.3 Cell phone exchanges and towers, microwave transmission towers 
 
Many of New Zealand’s cell phone exchanges are housed in converted shipping 
containers. These are unlikely to be affected by ash loading due to their steel 
construction. Other purpose built cabinets are also robustly constructed of galvanized 
steel, and are again unlikely to be affected in this way, unless tephra loading extreme 
enough to destroy almost all other nearby buildings occurs. The lack of any 
significant horizontal surface area on cell towers and microwave transmission towers 
mean that tephra loading is unlikely to be an issue in this regard (figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3: Left to right, microwave transmitter dishes and single cell site plus long 
wavelength antenna; Single cell site tower; 2G and 3G Telecom cell tower. 
 
2.3.1.4 Urban telephone exchanges  
 
While not as strong as the aluminium or steel containers and cabinets that house cell 
and small rural exchanges, urban exchanges are usually housed in robust buildings. 
Building type varies immensely; there is no standard type of exchange building. 
Construction types include weatherboard, brick or concrete purpose-built exchange 
buildings and even space in multi-storey office-blocks (figure 2.4). 
 
 
Figure 2.4: New Zealand urban telephone exchange buildings. Top 2 photos © James Pole 
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Despite these differences most exchange buildings in New Zealand would require 
significant ashfall to cause collapse of the buildings or roofs – such as the 900 mm or 
so that caused the collapse of the exchange at Rabaul in 1994 (Blong and McKee 
1995). A study on building vulnerability by Spence et al., (2005) reviewed tephra 
damage to buildings from several late 20th century eruptions, including Rabaul, 
Pinatubo and Eldfell (Heimay). This study resulted in a proposed set of European 
tephra fall roof vulnerability curves (figure 2.5). Table 2.1 describes the roof types 
classified in figure 2.5. These descriptions of roof types enable them to be used 
anywhere, giving an indication of possible damage to New Zealand roofs as a 
consequence of ashfall. 
 
Roof Class Description Typical design 
load range 
Mean collapse 
Load 
WE (weak) Sheet roofs, old or in poor condition. 
Tiled roof, old or in poor condition. 
Masonry vaulted roof. 
Pre-design 
code, or no 
design code. 
2.0 kPa 
MW (medium 
weak) 
Sheet roof on timber; average quality; average 
or good quality tiled roof 
on timber rafters or trusses. 
Steel or pre-cast reinforced concrete joists and 
flat terrace roof. 
1–2 kPa 3.0 kPa 
MS (medium 
strong) 
Flat reinforced concrete roof not all above 
characteristics; sloping reinforced 
concrete roof. 
Sheet roof on timber rafters or trusses, good 
quality and condition, designed 
for cyclone areas. 
2–3 kPa 4.5 kPa 
 
ST (strong) Flat reinforced concrete roof designed for 
access; recent, good quality 
construction, younger than 20 years. 
>3.0 kPa 7.0 kPa 
 
Table 2.1: Proposed classification of European roof types for tephra fall resistance (from 
Spence at al 2005) 
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Figure 2.5: Tephra fall roof vulnerability curves for the European roof classes described in 
table 2.1. From left to right, classes WE, MW,MS and ST. (From Spence et al., 2005) 
 
The depth of ash required to generate these kinds of pressures depends on the density 
of the ash, in turn determined by how vesicular it is, it’s mineralogy, grain shape, 
grain size, and the moisture content of the ash. This means densities can have a wide 
range. For example the Rabaul eruption included tephra from both Tavurvur and 
Vulcan, wet tephra density from Vulcan was 800 to 1000 kg/m3, Tavurvur was 1700 
to 1900 kg/m3. Tephra from Pinatubo (1991) had a density of 1200 to 1600 kg/m3 dry 
and 1500 to 2000 kg/m3 wet (Spence et al., 2005). These densities then need to be 
converted into tephra load to enable consistency. Tephra load (Pa) = ρgh,  
 
g=Gravitational acceleration (9.80665 m/s2), h=Tephra thickness or depth (m), and 
ρ=Tephra density (kg/m3). (Spence et al., 2005) 
 
Therefore the densities mentioned above would represent a range of pressure for a 
cubic metre of ash from 7.9 kPa (800 kg/m3) to 19.6 kPa (2000 kg/m3).  
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Using these figures, for a roof in the MS category listed in table 2.1 (a category which 
includes many NZ roofs), the mean collapse load can be estimated to be 4.5 kPa. If 
subjected to wet ash towards the heavy end of the scale, with a density of 2000 kg/m3 
this would represent around a 23 cm deep thickness of ash. These figures are to be 
treated with caution, as it may not take this much ash to cause collapses. Factors 
influencing this include the fact that ash can drift, causing a higher load on some parts 
of a roof than others, it can also slide from higher pitched roofs and impact lower 
roofs. Wide span roofs are more subject to collapse than smaller structures, more 
steeply pitched roofs fare better than flatter roofs (Blong & McKee, 1995). Structural 
failure may also occur to supporting columns or walls (Spence et al., 2005). 
Furthermore it does not take a complete failure and collapse of a roof for partial areas 
of buckling or a small collapse to allow ingress of ash into building interiors (Blong & 
McKee, 1995). This can also result in the entry of water into buildings during rainfall.  
 
Most exchange buildings in New Zealand fall under the MS or ST categories, and do 
not tend to have large span roofs. Some older weatherboard buildings used as 
exchanges may be closer to falling under the MW category. It would require a 
significant distal eruption or one close to an exchange - e.g. an eruption in Auckland, 
to cause roof or structural collapse in urban telephone exchange buildings, however 
ingress of ash could occur to less robust exchanges with much less ash. For example, 
assume an older exchange building constructed of timber frame, weatherboard and 
corrugated iron that fell under the MW category. A load of 2.5 kPa would generate a 
20% chance of roof collapse. This represents an ash thickness of just over 12 cm 
using a heavy wet ash with a density of 2000 kg/m3. Even if the roof survived largely 
intact, only small amounts of buckling would be required to cause leaks. This could in 
turn be catastrophic for electronic equipment housed within. For this reason it would 
be advisable to clean exchange rooftops once ash thicknesses exceeded a few 
centimetres. This procedure necessitates extreme caution, due to both the slipperiness 
of the ash, and the addition of the weight of cleaners on a potentially overloaded roof.  
 
  36
2.3.2 Ash ingress to exchanges 
 
Without structural or roof damage occurring to exchange buildings, and provided 
backup fresh-air intakes are not used or doors and windows are not left open for any 
length of time, only very small amounts of ash are likely to enter these well sealed 
buildings. However should any of these occurrences happen, there would be a strong 
possibility of equipment failure, depending on the quantity of ash getting in. Fine 
particulates less than 2.5 microns in diameter are especially problematic. 
Accumulations of particles may bridge gaps between conductors. If these particles are 
damp, or humidity is sufficient to rise above the deliquescence point of attached salts, 
the moisture may cause current leakage, (possibly leading to cross-talk and line noise 
in analogue systems) or even electrical shorts (Weschler and Shields, 1991). The 
addition of moisture to ash has been found to be problematic in tests performed with 
other computer equipment. Dry ash is less conductive, but the increased conductivity 
of wet ash results in more failures (Gordon et al. 2005). Contacts and connectors 
covered in fine coatings of ash may also result in failures, if relays “mate” as ash 
bridges connect them. Corrosion of components is likely to be a problem, as is 
connector wear if any cables are inserted or removed (Weschler and Shields, 1991). 
The removal and insertion of cables is no longer usual practice in modern (unmanned) 
exchanges as it was in older manned exchanges, where cables were manually moved 
around to connect calls. 
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2.3.3 Air conditioning and cooling 
 
The most important vulnerability associated with exchanges, less extreme than 
building or roof collapse, but much more likely to be problematic is the need for 
cooling. All exchange types need cooling, but fresh air vents are not sufficient to 
achieve this. Some older rural exchanges (cabinets) have used fresh air fans in the 
past, but these are being replaced with air-to-air heat exchanges (air conditioners). 
Cell phone exchanges, urban exchanges and new roadside cabinets all require air 
conditioning, in some cases augmented by fresh air fans if air conditioners cannot 
provide sufficient cooling. The vulnerability of air-conditioning units to volcanic ash, 
and the effectiveness of any fresh air filtration systems is therefore a critical factor in 
determining how robust exchanges are when it comes to volcanic ash. The 
performance of air conditioners in ashfall is examined in chapter 3, using equipment 
sourced from urban telephone exchanges.  
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2.3.3.1 Cell phone exchanges 
 
While tephra loading is unlikely to be an issue for cell phone exchanges, the need for 
air-conditioning is. Exchanges routinely have blockages occurring in the air-
conditioning intakes and condensers, due to dust and any airborne matter blowing 
around as a matter of course. These are regularly serviced and cope with small 
amounts of dust and debris. The amount of material (ash) potentially received during 
an eruption will far exceed usual amounts of dust and debris.  
 
Cell sites typically have two split system air-conditioning units present, one of which 
acts as a backup (figure 2.6). Each unit has a cooling capacity of about 6KW, which 
equals the amount of internal heat produced within the exchange. Normal operating 
temperatures are below 25OC. Once internal temperatures exceed this amount the 
second unit starts up (D. Johns, pers. comm., 2009). This means that under normal 
circumstances the available cooling capacity is 12KW, or 200% of internal heat 
generation. Until the efficiency of both units drops below 50%, the two air 
conditioners running simultaneously should be able to maintain production of 
sufficient cool air to enable the exchange to keep running.  
 
 Figure 2.6: Cell phone exchange air conditioners.  
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Testing of air-conditioning units (as described in chapter 3) indicates that even in 
heavy ashfall, the performance of such units will not necessarily drop below this 
amount. This will depend on compressors restarting automatically after shutdowns 
due to overloads. Even if compressors do restart automatically, should overloads in 
the two air conditioners occur simultaneously, internal temperatures may rise above 
30OC within minutes. Compressor overloading is likely to occur sporadically after an 
ashfall exceeding 30 to 50 mm (section 3.5.8). This will depend on weather 
conditions, and may be sooner if ambient temperatures are significantly higher than 
22OC. Once internal temperatures reach 30OC, which will likely happen if the air-
conditioning units fail, fresh air fans turn on and draw outside air into the exchanges 
(D. Johns, pers. comm., 2008). There is no remote dial up to stop this occurring; they 
can only be disabled on site. The outcome of an intake of ash-laden air into exchange 
interiors will be potentially catastrophic for internal equipment, especially if moisture 
is also to enter the interior. This will cause the ash to become conductive (Gordon et 
al, 2005), resulting in bridged connections, short-circuits and otherwise damaging 
internal components. Communications failure through the site is very likely in this 
situation. Alternatively, disabling the fresh air intakes will protect equipment, but 
internal temperatures will continue to rise. At 35OC a second high temperature alarm 
is triggered, but this does not affect the exchange in any way; there is no automatic 
shut down (D. Johns, pers. comm., 2009). As temperatures rise above 35OC fault 
connection errors in data transfer begin to increase and data transfer speeds slow 
down. Above ~55OC there is a risk of damage or failure to chips, capacitors, 
conductors and semi conductors. In most instances power supply rectifiers will keep 
functioning at temperatures as high as 55 OC or 60OC for several days, but eventually 
they may be damaged operating at these temperatures. Some damage may not be 
evident for days, weeks or even months, but in a worst-case scenario rectifiers will 
fail during elevated temperatures, resulting in power loss to the exchange. Batteries 
will supply power for 2 - 8 hours, depending on the site. It is not only the performance 
of the air conditioner and ambient temperature that will affect internal temperatures; 
high loads, or call volumes will also increase temperature. Quiet exchanges may thus 
sustain less damage than busy exchanges. The servicing or cleaning of air conditioner 
units during ashfall to prevent condenser blockages occurring will help to prevent 
disruptions, but the practicalities of getting staff to cell sites to do this during an 
eruption makes such action problematic. Once ashfall has ceased, it will still be 
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necessary to increase servicing of air conditioners, as long as ash is present on the 
ground. Wind and/or human activity (vehicles etc) will remobilize ash, making it 
likely that more ash will be entrained into condensers.  
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2.3.3.2 Urban exchanges 
 
Other than fresh-air intakes, used as backup in the event of air-conditioning failure, 
urban telephone exchange buildings in New Zealand are generally well sealed, having 
very little influx from outside air. Provided doors and windows remain closed, ash is 
unlikely to get into the buildings in significant quantities - unless the fresh air-intakes 
are used, or structural/roof damage occurs. Significant amounts of heat are generated 
with the buildings though, due to the amount of electronic equipment housed within. 
This same equipment needs to be kept cool; the normal operating range is between 15 
and 30O C. Cooling is achieved by means of constant air-conditioning, using multiple 
air-conditioning units. Without this input telephone exchange interior temperatures 
would rapidly climb. 40O C would be reached in 5 to 15 minutes, depending on the 
exchange and the start temperature (D. Johns, Downer Engineering; S. Ross, 
Telecom, pers. comm. 2006). High temperature alarms are generally set to 35O C in 
exchanges, including cell-phone exchange sites. This temperature is not sufficient to 
immediately cause problems, though some equipment is likely to fail if these 
temperatures last for several days or more. Once 55O C or 60O C is exceeded more 
problems begin to occur - for example displays on rectifiers stop functioning (pers. 
comm. D. Johns). As temperatures rise there is also an increased fire risk to consider.  
 
For the above reasons air-conditioning units are indispensable; exchanges may not 
operate for long without being cooled. In the event of air-conditioning failure, most 
exchanges would soon shutdown. All voice and data communications routed through 
those exchanges would subsequently cease. The majority of air conditioners used in 
NZ exchanges are split system types, which testing indicates are vulnerable to failure 
once ashfall exceeds 30 mm (chapter 3).  
 
2.3.3.3 Fresh air intakes 
 
Fresh air intakes are present on many exchanges, but are only used as a backup for 
when air conditioners fail. The filtration used for these is usually EU3 media, which 
was found to let fine particulates through, before blocking up with ash (section 3.5.10) 
Filters are not designed to cope with the amount of ash that may be present in the 
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atmosphere during ashfall. Fresh air intakes must be manually switched off in the 
event of an ashfall. Any overheating and short-term shutdown as a result will be 
preferable to long term damage caused by the influx of volcanic ash. Short term 
inconvenience is preferable to long term communications failures and expensive 
refits. 
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2.3.3.4 Rural exchanges 
 
Rural exchanges vary depending on the size of the communities they serve, but are 
typically housed in small cabinets, such as the 24RU cabinet in figure 2.2. Cooling is 
effected by two different means depending on the age of the cabinet. Older cabinets 
use a small fan, which draws in outside air to the cabinet through one layer of filter 
media, newer cabinets use a separate internal and external fan with a heat exchanger 
in between the two. Unfortunately neither cooling system was available for testing 
during the course of this research. However testing of filter media during larger scale 
air-conditioner testing (chapter 3) indicates that the use of fresh air fans and filters is 
likely to result in both initial ingress of ash to the exchange and eventual blockage of 
the filter. This may result in bridged connections and component failure due to 
conductive ash causing shorts, then overheating as the filter becomes blocked. Newer 
sealed units should not be affected by ash ingress, but the exterior part of the heat 
exchange may become blocked with ash, depending on ash grainsize and airspeed. 
Once temperatures exceed 47OC a high temperature alarm triggers, automatic 
shutdown of equipment occurs at 54OC, and requires a manual power reset.  
 
2.3.3.5 Roadside cabinets 
 
The requirement for cooling in roadside cabinets creates a potential vulnerability to 
volcanic ashfall. Overheating would result in shutdown of the cabinet, terminating 
communications for those end-users each individual cabinet provides for. 
 
Internal temperatures in roadside cabinets are usually between 30OC and 40OC, 
depending on ambient air temperatures. Cooling is effected by an air to air heat 
exchange, rather than an air conditioner. Exterior (unfiltered) air is blown between 
sets of aluminium fins, cooling them as it passes between them. On the other side of 
each fin warm interior air is circulated, and is cooled as it does so (figure 2.7). This 
type of heat exchange is rated to 1300W, and is designed to keep the unit running at 
no more than 10OC above ambient temperature. Internal heat produced may be as 
much as 1200W, but units usually run at 600-800W. No exterior air is introduced to 
any internal part of the cabinet except for the heat exchange. 
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Figure 2.7: A. Telecom roadside cabinet, arrow indicates air outlet, circle indicates location 
of intake for heat exchange unit (C). B. Close up of heat exchange unit (D). 
 
The lack of a need for refrigerant or a compressor makes this type of cooling more 
resistant to volcanic ashfall than air conditioning. While intakes are positioned close 
to the ground (figure 2.7), air may also be drawn in through the outlet vent at the top 
of the unit. Therefore if a thick deposit of ash blocks the base of the unit, air may still 
be drawn into the heat exchange. Although lowering efficiency, some cooling would 
still be effected. The bases of the intakes are located 12 cm above ground level, 
requiring heavy ashfall or significant drifting of ash to cause this type of blockage. 
 
Ingress of ash to the heat exchange may also cause blockages, and decrease 
efficiency. Airspeed at the intakes was measured at 8 km/h. At this speed ash will be 
drawn into the heat exchange, but would then have to travel over one metre upwards 
to escape. While this will be possible for fine ash, coarser particles may be trapped 
within the base of the exchange, eventually blocking the intakes, causing the exhaust 
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vent at the top of the unit to also act as an intake, again lowering efficiency. The time 
taken for this to occur will depend on ashfall rate and grainsize. Should temperatures 
rise to 50OC a temperature alarm will be triggered, at 55OC shutdown would occur, 
preventing heat stress to equipment (C. Gilmore pers. comm., 2009). Once this 
shutdown has occurred, a manual restart is required. 
 
While fan failure is unlikely, should this happen to one fan, the other fan will switch 
to its maximum setting. An alarm will then be triggered informing the 
telecommunications company of this occurrence – assuming communications 
networks are functioning.  
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2.3.4 Lifeline dependency - Electricity 
 
To run exchanges, power is necessary. However power failure is common during 
ashfall. This can occur either through line breakage (e.g. in Rabaul in 1994 (Blong & 
McKee 1995), Chile Chico 1991 (Bebbington et al., 2008)), or insulator flashovers 
causing short circuits and thus outages (e.g. Ruapehu 1996 (Johnston et al. 2000) Mt 
St Helens 1980 (Sarkinen & Wiitala 1981)).  
 
2.3.4.1 Rural exchanges 
 
Rural exchanges rely on batteries to keep them functioning in the event of power-cuts. 
In this way they are vulnerable to volcanic ash, and will cause telecommunications 
failures should a power cut longer than 8-12 hours occur, depending on exchange type 
(S. Ross pers. comm., 2009). In some rural areas Telecom has installed sockets that 
allow local farmers to plug in portable generators to power exchanges. These are a 
contingency for heavy snowfall, and as such are situated in areas likely to be affected 
by snow (South Island), rather than most North Island sites likely to be affected by 
ashfall.  
 
2.3.4.2 Roadside cabinets 
 
Roadside cabinets are mains powered, but have backup batteries in case of power 
failure. Batteries in newer whisper cabinets will keep the cabinets operating for 11 
hours when the unit is operating at full load. Since most cabinets operate at less than 
maximum capacity, battery life may exceed this by a few hours. Some older cabinets 
may have slightly more or less battery life than this. For example Powerware N750 
cabinets have approximately 12 hours battery life, SATCAB600 cabinets have up to 8 
hours battery backup (Eaton Powerware, 2009).  
 
In addition to battery backups, most cabinets also have a generator inlet. These allow 
not only the telecommunications companies, but anyone with access to a generator to 
power the cabinets in the event of an emergency. The generator socket is a standard 3-
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pin plug type, and access to the socket is behind a small panel, which can be opened 
with standard allen or hex keys. This allows any member of the public to provide 
power to the cabinets should the need arise. 
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2.3.4.3 Cell sites 
 
Power supply may also be an issue for cell sites during ashfall. Battery backups are 
designed to last for up to 2-4 hours in urban areas, and 5-8 hours on rural cell sites (D. 
Johns, pers. comm., 2008). Power failure due to ashfall may be widespread, faults 
may affect multiple parts of the network, therefore restoring power could take several 
days. While it would be impractical to have battery backups that can last this long, 
this needs to be factored into the planning for such an event. 
 
2.3.4.4 Urban exchanges 
 
Backup diesel generators are available at most urban exchanges. In most instances 
these draw in outside (unfiltered) air, so ash ingestion is likely to be a long term 
problem. Short term use is possible, assuming air-filters on the generators are 
regularly cleaned. Should ashfall affect power supplies by disrupting distal power 
sources/supply lines, without directly affecting the exchange, the backup generators 
should function as well as they would in any other power cut. However their 
reliability can possibly be questioned. This was aptly demonstrated on November 4th 
2007, when a power outage (due to a cable fault) at Auckland’s Mayoral Drive data 
centre closed down that exchange for several hours. The temporary closure of the 
exchange caused disruptions to 15,000 broadband, mobile and dial-up customers – not 
just from telecom but from numerous service providers (McNaughton, 2007). Those 
with pagers (including the emergency services), were not able to use them. Eftpos 
transactions and other computerised communications around New Zealand failed for 
much of the day (Schouten, 2007). As far away as Christchurch, police southern 
communications staff were required to use pen and paper to record details and paper 
maps to pinpoint locations, when their computer system failed as a result of this loss 
in communications (McNaughton, 2007). 
 
This power-cut occurred despite backup generator systems being available in the 
exchange. In an ashfall event, there is therefore a strong possibility that power-cuts 
could cause problems for telecommunications, given that several exchanges may be 
affected by ashfall at the same time. This will not only stretch resources, but if ashfall 
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is directly impacting exchanges, access is likely to be hampered by the presence of 
both airborne ash and ash covered roads (chapter 5). While some back up systems will 
work, there is a significant chance that some of them will not, as demonstrated by the 
events of November 4 2007. This in turn would lead to network failure until power 
could be restored. 
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2.3.5 Corrosion 
 
Corrosion is only likely to be an issue in the long term. The low pH commonly 
associated with volcanic ash results in acidic leachates, most commonly containing 
sulphuric acid (H2SO4), but also potentially hydrochloric acid (HCl) and sometimes 
hydrofluoric acid (HF). These react with most metals, including aluminium and iron – 
both commonly used in telecommunications infrastructure. Ashfall induced corrosion 
is common during and after eruptions (e.g.; Blong, 1984; Blong & McKee 1995; 
Johnston, 1997a; Matsumoto et al., 1988). In terms of telecommunications 
infrastructure, roadside cabinets, rural and cellphone exchange cabinets and housings 
are painted, and are not expected to be adversely affected. Exposed roofing iron and 
gutterings on urban exchanges may suffer from some corrosion, depending on 
leachate pH, weather conditions and whether roofs are painted or galvanised. Air-
conditioning condensers are aluminium, and will be subject to oxidation, and 
potentially pitting on the aluminium fins. Transmitters/antennae on towers are also 
potentially at risk, and will need to be inspected after ashfall, painted surfaces will be 
protected but any exposed metal will quickly be affected by corrosion.  
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2.3.6 Radio / Microwave transmitters and transmissions 
 
Radio antennae, microwave towers and dishes are situated outdoors and thus may be 
exposed to ashfall. While vertical antennae are unlikely to accumulate much ash, 
insulators on antennae can. This occurred during the 1980 Mt St Helens eruption, 
when Teflon insulators shorted out due to being covered with ash. They were replaced 
with ceramic insulators, which were more resistant to ash induced flashover (Labadie, 
1983). Microwave dishes and components such as feed horns and wave guides may 
also accumulate ash deposits. Covers for dishes provide a simple mitigation option. 
These are currently used on microwave dishes close to Sakurajima Volcano in Japan, 
an area which experiences frequent light ashfall (Durand et al 2001). Ash 
accumulating in microwave dishes can be problematic in two ways; corrosion or 
oxidisation of the aluminium dish can occur as acidic volcanic ash reacts with the 
aluminium. Additionally signal loss may occur due to the covering of conductive ash 
on or in the aluminium dish (S. Oldfield, pers. comm., 2007). This necessitates the 
availability of staff during and after ashfall to clean ash from equipment to maintain 
as much functionality as possible. Simple plastic tarpaulins can be used to good effect 
in covering transmission equipment (Labadie, 1983).  
 
Some remote transmission sites use solar power. This power source will be 
compromised in ashfall, as ash will cover solar panels, depriving them of light. This 
needs to be considered in response planning to avoid cutting off isolated communities. 
 
Of immediate concern during ashfall is the potential for radio and microwave signal 
attenuation. Exactly how a particular ashfall will affect radio signals is largely 
unknown, or at least unpredictable. A few instances of ash clouds interfering with 
radio traffic have been recorded, yet there have also been many ashfalls where no 
disruption to radio transmission has occurred or been noted. A few examples of radio 
being affected include communications from Kodiak Island being rendered 
inoperative for several days following the 1912 Katmai eruption, (the island is 160 km 
from Katmai) (Erskine, 1962). During the 1963 Surtsey eruption radio static from the 
ash cloud was picked up by a passing ship (Anderson et al. 1965). Some radio traffic 
was affected by electromagnetic disturbances caused by volcanic ash during the 1991 
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Pinatubo eruption (Rodolfo 1995). The large amount of electrically charged ash that 
can be generated in an eruption column is likely to be responsible for this 
interference.  
 
Examples of the many more eruptions where radio communications have not been 
affected in this way include the 1980 Mt St Helens eruption, the 1995 and 1996 
eruptions of Mt Ruapehu, the 2002 eruption of El Reventador and the numerous 
eruptions from Sakurajima during the 20th century until present day. Further 
unreported instances of a lack of impacts of this sort are likely.  
 
Why radio traffic is affected by some eruptions and not others can be attributed to the 
large number of variables involved. Signal wavelength and strength will in part 
determine the amount to which it is affected by an ash plume or ashfall (this effect is 
mirrored by other types of radio interference such as dust storms or rain). A direct 
example of this happening in ashfall occurred during the 2002 eruption of Mt Etna, 
when INGV (Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia) staff attempting to use 
handheld radios from near the active vent could not communicate with the INGV 
observatory in Nicolosi. The attempt to communicate was made from the same 
location in similar weather conditions to the day before, when radio communication 
was possible. The only difference was the presence and location of the ash plume 
from the volcano. When two-way radio communication failed cell phones were used 
instead – these functioned normally despite the presence of the plume (Barnard, 
2004). Cellular phones use part of the UHF (300–3000 MHz) frequency. Hand-held 
radios, depending on type can be HF (3–30 MHz), VHF (30–300 MHz) or use a 
different part of the UHF range to cellular phones. The only variable in play – the 
presence of the ash plume – was the reason that the hand-held radio signal failed. The 
fact that at the same time the signal from the cell phone worked without interference 
is attributable to the use of a different (in this case higher) radio frequency by the 
mobile phone.  
 
In August 1991, ashfall from the Mt Hudson eruption caused satellite communications 
to fail in Los Antiguos, 120 km from the volcano. 80-100 mm of ashfall was recorded 
here (Narajo and Stern 1998). Although the satellite communications failed, HF radio, 
(using much lower frequencies) reportedly kept working(Wilson et al. in review). 
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Radio signals, especially in the higher frequency ranges (SHF and EHF, 3-30GHz and 
30-300GHz respectively), are adversely affected by the presence of atmospheric 
particles (Crane, 1971; Elabdin et al., 2008 a, b). It is this range that microwave 
transmitters utilize. Microwave signals can include television broadcasts, cell-phone 
calls, and wireless internet connections. Other users of these frequencies include 
satellite links (including sky digital television) and door openers. Microwave links 
have been tested in Sudan duststorms, and such transmissions have been found to 
undergo significant attenuation (Elabdin et al 2008a). This is particularly the case 
with signals in the microwave band and higher frequencies (> 3GHz). With visibilities 
under 200 m, attenuation increases rapidly with decreasing visibility (Ghobrial & 
Sharief 1987). Particle size will also have an effect on signal strength (Elabdin et al, 
2008b ). Exact effects are again dependant on wavelength.  
 
To an extent dust-storms can be used as an indicator for ashfall effects in regards to 
radio signals. However there are further complications during ashfall. The Sudanese 
dust storms tested were dry, ashfall may contain moisture, or can occur during rainfall 
(which also has an effect on signal attenuation). As frequencies increase, attenuation 
from rainfall becomes worse (Rahman & Leng 2003). Another complicating factor is 
the electrical charge which can be generated in an ash column (e.g. Gilbert et al 1991, 
Gilbert & Lane 1994). The lightning associated with this has in the past been recorded 
as being more problematic than the ashfall itself for microwave communications. 
Towers have been struck and damaged or destroyed by lightning during eruptions, 
cutting communication links. This occurred during the 1991 Hudson eruption, when 
many HF and VHF radio receivers were hit and put out of action by lightning strikes 
(Wilson et al, in review). 
 
While dust storms cannot be used as a direct analogue to ashfall they can still serve as 
an indicator of potential signal attenuation. When compared to a given dust storm, it is 
expected an ashfall of a similar concentration and grainsize will have a more severe 
impact on signal attenuation, due to its increased moisture content and electrical 
charge. 
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Although testing of signal attenuation has been conducted with dust-storms, testing 
this under ashfall conditions is not a practical option. The variables which can affect 
the signal (ash concentration (visibility), ash grainsize, water content and electrical 
charge) will differ in every eruption, so predicting what signal loss may occur would 
be very imprecise. Access to suitable equipment and eruptions also make this type of 
testing unfeasible. 
 
Should signal loss occur during an eruption it will be widely felt by those in the 
afflicted area. The use of cellular phones depends on radio signals travelling to and 
from mobile phones to cell phone towers, and in some areas microwave transmissions 
from cell towers. Cell phone towers in urban areas are usually linked to exchanges via 
fibre-optic cables, the larger distances between towers and exchanges in rural areas 
mean that microwave links are more cost effective and thus more common in these 
areas. Microwave transmissions are also used by broadcasters; television signals 
therefore have the potential to be disrupted. However this type of interference is 
limited to the time ash is falling. A small amount of maintenance – such as cleaning 
microwave dishes of any accumulated ash - may be necessary to keep 
communications working. Unless physical damage occurs to equipment, effects of 
ashfall on radio signals will be limited to the time ash is airborne. This may still be 
problematic for emergency responders as during emergencies radio is an important 
means of communication for authorities.  
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2.4 Summary of potential impacts to telecommunications 
infrastructure. 
 
Telecommunications infrastructure is robust enough that it is unlikely to be adversely 
affected by light ashfall unless power failure occurs. In this event battery backups will 
maintain communications for 2-12 hours, depending on exchange or cabinet type. 
Generators are available for some exchange types, and generator inlet sockets are 
present on new roadside cabinets. Without power, communications failure through 
exchanges and roadside cabinets will occur. Heavier ashfall poses more risks to 
communications infrastructure. In most instances this is due to the need for constant 
cooling of communications equipment. A threshold of ~30 mm of ash has been 
established for split system air conditioners. Above this amount of ash the likelihood 
of failure swiftly increases (chapter 3). Exchanges do not use this type of air 
conditioner exclusively, and some cooling systems will be more robust, however this 
type is commonly employed on urban and cell phone exchanges. Overheating of 
exchanges may lead to component damage followed by exchange failure, or automatic 
shutdowns, again depending on exchange type. Automatic engagement of fresh air 
fans in cell sites once temperature thresholds have been exceeded will be catastrophic 
for equipment. The capacity to address these issues during ashfall needs to be 
addressed in any telecommunications company’s response plan.  
 
In addition to impacts on cooling systems, heavy ashfall may be problematic for urban 
exchanges, since ash can block gutterings and downpipes, causing water to leak into 
buildings in the event of rain. Depending on roof type, after a few centimetres of ash 
exchange roofs may be damaged or collapse, harming or destroying exchange 
equipment in the process.  
 
As most ashfalls are light, the main risks to telecommunications networks are 
overloading and power loss. Vulnerability associated with power loss is unavoidable, 
as providing backup generators for all exchanges and cabinets is not practical, and 
battery backups will always be a temporary solution. However in most cases, if robust 
response plans are prepared before, and acted upon during the event, direct impacts of 
ash on telecommunications infrastructure need not cause failure. The exception to this 
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may be during ashfall in excess of ~15 centimetres. Response to physical impacts will 
then become dependant on the ability of staff to get to work, and from there getting to 
exchanges over ash covered roads. This issue is addressed in chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 3: AIR CONDITIONER PERFORMANCE 
DURING ASHFALL 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The use of air-conditioning became widespread from the 1950’s onwards. Since then, 
instances of more than a few millimetres of ashfall impacting developed areas have 
been rare. Globally there have been several examples of light ashfall, but the 
performance of air conditioners has not always been recorded in these instances. 
Where heavy ashfalls have caused building or roof collapse air conditioning 
performance has not been applicable. In cases of light ashfall it is not always apparent 
whether impacts are simply unreported or not significant enough to notice. For these 
reasons the vulnerability of air conditioners (heat exchangers) to ashfall has hitherto 
been largely unknown. Their importance exceeds simply a need for comfort in homes 
and offices; air-conditioners are a vital infrastructural component for many industries 
and lifelines. Examples include: 
 
• Telecommunications exchanges. These cannot function without artificial 
cooling; all exchange types and cell sites require constant air conditioning.  
• Waste water systems. Modern systems are dependant on air-conditioning to 
cool computer control systems. For example Auckland’s waste water 
treatment plant at Mangere could not function without air conditioners, due to 
the high level of heat generated by computers in it’s control room. 
•  Refrigerated warehouses containing frozen foods or medicines etc are 
completely dependant on air conditioning for refrigeration. 
• Large commercial or public buildings. Some large buildings are designed 
with glass facades to provide both views and a lot of light, but also capture so 
much incandescent heat that air-conditioning is necessary to keep interior 
temperatures bearable. As an example, temperatures in Auckland 
International Airport’s international terminal would quickly climb to well 
above 40OC without air conditioning (Robertson, R. pers. comm., 2005).  
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3.2 Examples of air-conditioner use in ashfall 
 
An area that frequently receives light ashfall is Kagoshima, Japan. Kagoshima city 
lies approximately 10km to the west of Sakurajima volcano. Until 1990 ashfalls 
occurred up to twice per week in the city; they continue to do so but at a less frequent 
rate. These ashfalls are usually light; a 5 mm covering of tephra would be considered 
an extreme event. Exterior mounted air-conditioning units are prolific in the city, and 
have no special protection; these also apparently function well despite frequent ashfall 
(Durand et. al., 2001). 
 
A similar situation exists in Catania, Italy located on the lower slopes of Mt Etna. 
Catania is frequently subject to ashfalls of up to a few millimetres, particularly over 
the last decade. As with Kagoshima, air conditioners have no special protection, and 
still function normally. This was confirmed by interviewing maintenance staff from 
several hotels in Catania, who reported a lack of problems when asked about the 
impacts of ashfalls from Etna on their air-conditioning systems (Pensione Ferrara, 
Katane Palace, Liberty hotel, Grand Excelsior hotel). Another hotel reported having 
service personnel regularly clean the units after ashfall, but had not noticed any 
adverse effects (hotel maintenance staff, Jolly Hotel, Catania pers. comm., 2005).  
 
While Catania and Kagoshima provide examples of how communications systems can 
continue to function well during an ashfall without any special protective measures 
being taken, there are examples of air-conditioning systems at telephone exchanges 
being affected by very light ashfall. Approximately 1 mm of ash reportedly set off 
high temperature alarms in a Telecom exchange in Ruatoria during the 1995 and 1996 
Ruapehu eruptions (Wilson et al., 2009). A similar problem was reported after the 
1992 Mt Spurr eruption. Air conditioning intakes in Anchorage experienced 
blockages, resulting in all air-handling units being manually shutdown after an ashfall 
of approximately 3 mm thickness. Fortunately the cool temperatures experienced in 
Alaska were sufficient to prevent exchange temperatures reaching critical levels and 
necessitating shutdowns (Johnston, 1997b). This shutdown performed manually, to 
prevent expected damage, rather than a result of actual damage to systems. 
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The eruptions of Chaiten Volcano in Chile (2008-2009) have recently given an 
example of more than a few millimetres of ashfall impacting developed areas. From 
the 2nd to the 6th of May 2008 approximately 60 mm of very fine ash was deposited on 
a cable television relay building 100km from Chaiten, in the town of Trevelin. Local 
technical staff reported that there was no impact on their air conditioner performance; 
it kept functioning normally, and had no protection aside from a foam rubber pad 
placed over the top to shelter it. No additional maintenance was required afterwards 
(Wilson, T pers. comm., 2009). The unit type was a through-wall design, which is an 
older design, and though still used is not as common in New Zealand as conventional 
split system units (figure 3.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Air conditioning unit used in Trevelin, Chile, subjected to 60 mm of ash with no 
adverse impacts.  
These instances of units continuing to operate effectively in ashfall conditions, seem 
to contradict those reports of them being affected by a few millimetres of ash. To 
understand how much (if any) ash would impact air conditioner performance it was 
necessary to test air-conditioners with volcanic ash under laboratory conditions 
(section 3.5). 
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3.3 How an air-conditioning unit works  
 
Air-conditioning units use a refrigerant such as Freon. This is mixed with a small 
amount of lubricant oil, then compressed in the air-conditioning unit compressor. This 
causes it to become a hot, high pressure gas. The hot gas is run through a series of 
coils (the radiator or condenser) which are situated in front of a fan. Heat is dissipated 
via these coils and the fan to the outside of the building. As this process takes place 
the refrigerant rapidly cools and condenses into a liquid. The liquid is run through an 
expansion valve, at which point it evaporates to become a cold low pressure gas, of 
approximately -40OC, depending on refrigerant type. This gas then moves through 
another series of coils (the evaporator) situated inside the building. A fan behind these 
coils blows air across the cold coils, subsequently cooling it. The process is cycled. In 
this way air can be cooled without the need for introducing fresh air from outside the 
building. Inverter units operate under the same principle, but whereas a standard air-
conditioner will start and stop depending on whether the required temperature has 
been reached, an inverter will keep running, but modulate the strength of the 
compressor to create more or less cold/hot air as required. 
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3.4 Previous work  
 
Previous testing of air-conditioners with volcanic ash was conducted by Wilson, 
(2005). This testing was undertaken to help evaluate the vulnerability of dairy farming 
operations to ashfall. Tests used an air-conditioner fan and radiator to determine 
whether the radiator could be blocked with volcanic ash. The testing was conducted 
inside an enclosed perspex box, recycling all air and ash. Small fans were employed 
to keep ash remobilised. While some ash would settle on the ground, most would be 
recycled through the unit. As the experiment progressed more ash was added. The 
compressor and condenser were not operating, so no heating or cooling of air was 
taking place, other than heat generated by the fan motor. As no cooling or heating was 
taking place, the effectiveness of the unit in cooling warm air was not being 
measured, rather the propensity of the unit to become blocked with ash. However the 
confined space that the unit operated in would have affected the airflow through the 
unit considerably, and ash that had not been trapped in the unit would be continuously 
re-entrained. An equivalent amount of ashfall that the unit had been subjected to could 
not therefore be established from this type of testing, nor could unit efficiency under 
ashfall conditions be quantified. Wilson (2005) did find that it was possible for air-
conditioning units to be blocked up by tephra, especially if water was involved, but 
the amount of ash required for this to happen was not established. 
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3.5 Air conditioning testing 
 
3.5.1 Introduction  
 
The objective of this testing was to establish how effective air-conditioning units are 
when functioning in an ashfall, and whether they can continue to provide cooling 
under such conditions. The amount of ash required to cause a drop in efficiency (if 
any) was sought, as were ways of mitigating any effects. Determining whether or not 
they would completely fail due to ashfall was the final goal.  
 
The widespread use of air-conditioners by commercial, industrial and domestic users 
gives this research a wide application. The units tested were sourced from Telecom 
NZ exchange buildings. While typical of those found in exchanges, they are not of a 
type specifically found only in telephone exchanges, but are commonly used 
worldwide in many commercial and industrial applications, and in some areas for 
residential heating and/or cooling. 
 
The testing conducted did not seek to determine the long-term impacts of ashfall on 
air-conditioning units, but whether they could continue to function if used during 
ashfall or while ash was entrained in the atmosphere. This was for several reasons. 
 
• The value and importance of equipment and goods cooled by air conditioners 
in commercial and industrial settings (e.g. communications exchange 
equipment) far outweighs the economic value of the air-conditioning units 
themselves (this applies equally to many commercial uses for air-
conditioning). Even if damage occurred to the units in the long term it would 
be more economic to continue to run them if they were able to keep 
functioning, rather than risking damage to more expensive equipment.  
• Previous testing of computer cooling fan and domestic cooling fan bearings 
found that these bearings functioned far better than expected in an ash laden 
environment, and continued to work after 720 hours of testing (Gordon et al., 
2005). This suggests that at least medium-term impacts on air-conditioner 
fans are unlikely 
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• Given the short duration of most ashfalls, it is unlikely that there would be a 
need to operate air-conditioning units under such conditions for a longer than 
a few hours or days. Continuous ashfall for longer periods is of course 
possible, but a sustained eruption and near continuous ashfall will likely result 
in power cuts, and evacuations leading to a lack of a need for air conditioning. 
 
In order to test the performance of air-conditioning units in ashfall conditions it was 
necessary to build a suitable apparatus for testing, and to run the units without ash to 
establish a baseline. As temperature was being measured, a stable environment with 
little or no change in ambient temperature was also needed. This was found in the 
basement of the Department of Geological Sciences at the University of Canterbury, 
which has one small entrance approximately 80 metres from the area used for testing, 
and is well insulated from outside temperature fluctuations.  
 
Eliminating external influences on air temperature meant that any change had to come 
from the unit itself, which remained at a relatively constant temperature (fluctuations 
<0.3OC) under normal circumstances. Therefore once ash was added to the 
atmosphere around the intakes it would be possible to record any change in 
performance due to ashfall. 
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3.5.2 Testing methodology  
 
3.5.2.1 Ash type 
 
Several cubic litres of fine volcanic ash were required to perform this testing. The 
tests were intended to simulate a distal ashfall. However access to fresh volcanic ash 
was problematic, given the lack of recent (magmatic) eruptions in New Zealand. As 
any fine ash from the most recent magmatic eruption New Zealand has experienced 
(1996 Ruapehu) has long since been washed away by rainfall, and ash from recent 
overseas eruptions is both expensive to obtain and subject to Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries (MAF) restrictions, it was necessary to create an artificial ash that 
would behave in the same manner that fresh ash would. To do this, unweathered 
samples of basalt were taken from the Lyttelton Volcano on Banks Peninsula, 
Canterbury. These samples were broken down in size, before being crushed in a 
‘Rocklabs Boyd Double Action Jaw Crusher’. This produced an ash-like material, but 
the grainsize was extremely varied, with some particles up to 2 mm in diameter. 
These samples were passed through a 250 µm sieve to remove coarse particles. The 
resulting rock flour or ‘ash’ was analysed for grainsize in a Micromeretics Saturn 
Digisizer 5200. Results indicated a modal grainsize of 100.2 µm and a mean grainsize 
of 93.86 µm. Further analysis was conducted by photographing the ‘ash’ with a 
scanning electron microscope. Grain shape was compared with samples of ash taken 
from several different eruptions. These included fresh basaltic ash collected during the 
2002 eruption of Mount Etna, Italy, andesitic ash from the 1996 eruption of Ruapehu, 
New Zealand and the 2007 eruption of Merapi, Indonesia. The shape of the grains was 
of particular importance, as this would influence how well the grains adhered to 
surfaces. Figure 3.2 shows the comparisons between these 3 types of ash and crushed 
Port Hills basalt.  
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Figure 3.2 Clockwise from top left: Crushed Port hills basalt, Glassy basalt from Etna 2002, 
Ruapehu 1996 andesite (no fines), Merapi 2007 andesite.  
 
A good correlation in grain shape was found between the 1996 Ruapehu ash, the 2007 
Merapi ash and the crushed Port Hills basalt sample. The predominance of glass 
(tachylite) in the fresh basalt sample from Etna compared to the higher crystal content 
of the other samples meant that this sample was slightly more angular. However the 
crushed basalt samples were felt to be a similar enough shape to actual ash samples to 
be used as a proxy for this type of testing. 
 
As well as determining how ash adheres to surfaces, grain shape is an important factor 
in determining the abrasiveness of the ash, as is the composition. While volcanic ash 
containing quartz (e.g. andesitic or rhyolitic ash) would be slightly more abrasive, this 
was not considered to be necessary for testing the short term use of air-conditioners in 
ashfall situations. Potential differences caused by this were not thought to be 
significant for the purposes of this experiment, since the objectives were to determine 
the adherence of ash to the condenser, and how any blockages created would affect 
air-conditioner performance, rather than the long term durability of air-conditioning 
units during ashfall.  
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3.5.2.2 Unit types 
 
Through-wall or window unit type 
 
Initial tests were conducted on a Mitsubishi electric MWH 17KV room air-
conditioning unit supplied by Telecom New Zealand. This unit had been taken out of 
a local exchange in order to upgrade to a newer unit, but was still in good working 
order. The MWH 17KV is fully self-contained in a steel casing which houses 2 
radiators, one facing the inside of the building and one outside. The unit is mounted in 
a wall cavity or window; they are often referred to as a window unit or window 
rattler. Either radiator can be used as a condenser or an evaporator as required, 
meaning it is capable of both heating and cooling. It has a cooling capacity of 4.98 
KW and a heating capacity of 5.42 KW. For the purposes of this testing the unit was 
set to run at maximum capacity. Air entering the unit from the outside was drawn into 
the unit through a metal grill using a large fan, which then pushed the air through the 
radiator (condenser) to the outside again. This differs from a conventional split system 
unit in that air is pushed outwards through the radiator, rather than being sucked 
inwards through the radiator before exiting out the front of the unit. The exterior side 
radiator is used as a condenser when the unit is used to cool air, and as an evaporator 
when warm air is required inside. The exterior radiator fins are closely spaced at 1.5 
mm apart.  
 
No outside air is brought inside with heat exchange units, this includes through wall 
units. The MWH 17KV is divided down the centre, with the only connections 
between the two halves being the pipes through which the refrigerant moves to enable 
the heat exchange, and a prop shaft which connects and turns both fans (the same 
motor thus powering both fans). Interior air is drawn into the unit through the radiator 
(evaporator when cooling) and blown out again in the same manner, cooling the 
interior of the building (figures 3.3 & 3.4). 
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Figure 3.3 Mitsubishi MWH 17KV exterior side. Arrows indicate air direction, the shaded 
area indicates where the building wall or window would normally be 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Mitsubishi MWH 17KV interior side. Arrows indicate air direction 
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Split system type 
 
The second unit tested was a Toshiba RAV-200KH split system unit, one of Toshiba’s 
light commercial range of air conditioners (figure 3.5). This unit was taken from an 
urban telephone exchange in Christchurch as part of a general maintenance program. 
Units are retired after a few years even when working well; this unit was in perfect 
working order. It has a cooling capacity of 5.8KW, slightly higher than the first unit 
tested. Being a split system this air conditioner consists of two sections; an outside 
unit and an inside unit. These are connected by pipes carrying refrigerant. During 
testing the inside unit was not subjected to any ash, and ran as it would under normal 
circumstances, sucking air from the room through an evaporator with a fan, and 
blowing the cooled air out again into the room. The outside unit drew air through the 
condenser via a large fan, which pushed air out of the reverse side of the unit. This 
type of unit is found worldwide in a variety of applications. It is also typical of those 
used by Telecom in both exchange buildings and cell tower exchanges all over New 
Zealand. Fin spacing in the condenser is 2 mm. For the purposes of testing the 
thermostat was repositioned on the outside of the air-conditioner where it would 
remain at room temperature, ensuring the unit continued to operate at maximum 
capacity for the duration of the testing. 
 
Figure 3.5: Internal and external sections of Toshiba RAV-200 split system pre testing  
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3.5.3 Testing – Mitsubishi electric air conditioning unit 
 
3.5.3.1 Test set-up 
 
In order to simulate ashfall and measure performance it was necessary to create an 
environment where the air intakes and outputs for both the condenser (exterior) side 
and the evaporator (interior) were kept separate. It was also desirable to prevent too 
much ash from being distributed around the testing area. Not only would this create a 
mess but could affect the results of the test if ash were to also be drawn in to the 
interior intake of the air conditioning unit.  
 
The experimental set-up consisted of a large wooden box built around the air-
conditioning unit and divided up into four sections, separating interior/exterior air, 
and intake/output air. This prevented air being recycled through the system 
immediately after exiting it and thus potentially altering temperature – an initial test 
run in a prototype test unit did not separate intake and output air adequately. This 
resulted in air being recycled, on both sides, so that temperatures became hotter and 
colder respectively until the cold side iced up at -11OC, the hot air reached over 85OC 
before being manually shutdown.  
 
Air moving through the exterior section of the system would be carrying any ash 
which had not lodged within the unit. To prevent large quantities of this ash entering 
the testing area and eventually being redrawn into the air-conditioner, a filter was 
used instead of an end wall in the test box. This also allowed air to freely leave the 
test box. This was necessary as the intake and output areas were separated, a solid box 
with a separation between the air intakes and output side would leave the air with 
nowhere to go, resulting in the creation of backpressure, which would in turn prevent 
air being drawn into the unit in the normal manner. Figure 3.6 illustrates the setup of 
this experiment. 
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Figure 3.6: Left: Interior air side of MWH 17KV air-conditioner with intake and outlet 
separated to monitor temperature. Centre: looking down on the unit, ash was introduced in 
this central area. Right: the filter covering the exit for the exterior air 
 
The filter used was EU3 media, as used by Telecom in the fresh air intakes on urban 
exchanges. This type of filter is designed to remove coarse particulate matter, but 
below 100 microns performance drops off; 80% of particles at 10 microns will be 
caught, 45% of particles at 1 micron. This would not only stop (some of) the ash from 
escaping into the room, but give an indication of the effectiveness of such filters in an 
ashfall. Regular cleaning of this filter was undertaken to prevent blockages from 
slowing output air and affecting the performance of the air-conditioning unit. The top 
of this part of the unit was covered in a Perspex sheet to prevent ash escape but leave 
the interior visible. The input area of the unit was uncovered, to allow ash to land on 
the unit. The divider between it and the interior part was positioned as a wall or 
window would be under ordinary installation of this type of air-conditioner. The area 
of this section measured 430 mm x 1160 mm, giving a surface area of 0.499m2. This 
equates to the approximate area affected by the airflow created by the unit. 100 ml of 
ash by volume therefore equated to a thickness of ash of ~ 2 mm. Similar divisions 
were employed on the interior (evaporator) side, without the need for filtration. All 
dividers were sealed to prevent ash or air of a different temperature affecting results. 
Exterior air (ambient air) was continuously monitored with a room thermometer, the 
performance of the air-conditioning unit was continuously monitored with a 
cyberscan pH/temperature meter positioned 5 cm in front of the interior air outlet. 
Airspeed was monitored outside the condenser pre testing, with 15 readings taken in a 
grid pattern in front of the unit. These values average out at 10.6 km/h. 
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Figure 3.7: Airspeed (km/h) outside the exterior condenser prior to testing 
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3.5.3.2 Testing 
 
Each period of testing was preceded by turning on the air-conditioning unit 1 hour 
beforehand. This ensured that the unit was running efficiently, that it was adequately 
‘warmed up’ and that the temperature in the room was stable. All air to pass through 
the unit air was directed away from the intakes so that the cool air from the evaporator 
and hot air from the condenser mixed sufficiently to reach equilibrium and not alter 
the ambient room temperature. Room temperature was regularly checked throughout 
the course of the experiments, and on all but one occasion remained constant at 
25.7OC. On that occasion other machinery in the same room was in use, which may 
explain the slight rise. The unit was run for 12 hours pre-testing, and output 
temperature monitored. This established a baseline for the output of the machine. 
Cold air temperature fluctuated up to 0.3OC either side of 10.4OC, but usually stayed 
within 0.2OC of that temperature. It was noticed that moving the thermometer gave 
differing results of up to 1OC even with slight movements, consequently it was 
attached to a wooden post in front of the airflow. When used to heat air, the output of 
53.5OC fluctuated a little more, up to 1 degree either side of this value. 
 
To introduce ash to the unit, an amount (initially 100ml) of dry ash was sprinkled over 
the air intake for the outside of the air-conditioner. The best method for doing this was 
found to be by shaking a sieve (250 µm) at a height of about one metre above the unit. 
This was high enough to allow ash to disperse, and low enough to ensure it all landed 
on the intake area. The sieve was sufficiently moved around to ensure the consistent 
application of ash over the whole area. No secondary fan was required to help 
introduce or remobilise ash as the unit provided enough air movement itself. 
Furthermore it was desirable to as closely mirror a real ashfall as possible, rather than 
making all of the ash in the area remobilise and enter the unit.  
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Figure 3.8: A. Introducing ash using a sieve, note the ash on the white board that has passed 
through the filter. B. the unit after ~ 2 mm of simulated ashfall 
 
The specified amounts of ash (see results table, appendix 1) were sprinkled over a 5 
minute period with a 5 minute break every 30 minutes. This allowed other small tasks 
to be achieved - such as cleaning the filter, checking equipment, refilling water bottles 
(wet testing). At 500 ml per 30 minutes, the amount of ash introduced equated to an 
ash accumulation rate of 2 mm (un-compacted) per hour. This was felt to be a realistic 
representation of an actual fallout rate for a distal area. Actual fallout rates vary 
immensely between eruptions, ranging from millimetres or less over days or weeks 
(e.g. Etna, 2002), to metres in a matter of hours for some proximal events (e.g. 
Tarawera, 1896 (Keam, 1988)). Water was added in the wet testing by spraying a mist 
of water droplets from below the sieve that was sprinkling ash. This was added 
continuously while ash was being distributed, at a water to ash ratio of 2:1 (by 
volume). Water temperature was 25O C 
 
The filter at the end of the test box was cleaned at least every 30 minutes to allow air 
to freely exit, and prevent back pressure building up. This was done by vacuuming the 
filter, which worked effectively. 
 
A 
 
B 
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3.5.4 Results 
 
3.5.4.1 Air conditioner performance in dry conditions 
 
The performance of the MWH 17KV was better than anticipated. Initial tests 
continued until the unit was subjected to a 2.6 mm thickness of ash. This took 75 
minutes. During this time the output temperature rose from 10.2OC to 10.6OC and 
back to 10.4OC (results are listed in appendix 1). These temperatures were all within 
the normal fluctuations. At this stage the unit was gently removed from its casing (it 
slides out on tracks), inspected and replaced. Very little ash was visible inside the 
radiator, trace amounts adhered to pipes and the compressor inside the unit.  
 
Testing resumed after the unit ran for 60 minutes to ensure it had worked up to 
maximum performance and come down to temperature. Ash addition continued until a 
4 mm thickness of ash was reached, the unit was again inspected (figure 3.9)  
 
Figure 3.9: A. The interior of the unit after 4 mm of ashfall, B. The condenser after 4 mm of 
ashfall, showing no adherence of ash to the fins. 
 
Slightly more ash was caught inside the unit on internal components, but no blockage 
or lodged ash was visible in the condenser. Testing continued again until the unit had 
been subjected to a 6 mm thick ashfall, over a 3 hour period. Temperatures had 
remained stable at 10.4OC  10.6OC during this period. At this time the rate of ashfall 
was increased slightly from 2 mm per hour to 2.5 mm per hour. Ash addition 
continued until the air conditioner had been subject to a 10 mm covering of ash, over 
a 275 minute period. Output temperature was not further affected, remaining at 
between 10.4OC and 10.6OC. The unit was left running for another 3 hours, but no 
A 
 
B 
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further change occurred. Inspection revealed a covering of ash inside the base of the 
unit of up to 2 mm, but only trace amounts of ash appeared within the condenser. 
Figure 3.10 illustrates temperature vs. ash thickness. 
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Figure 3.10: Temperature vs. ash thickness for dry ash test.  
 
Although there was a slight initial rise in temperature there was no evidence of a drop 
off in performance of the air-conditioning unit. Temperature remained within normal 
limits, as established pre-testing. Interior airflow remained the same as the fan 
continued to operate at the same speed, and the temperature remained within normal 
operating levels. Ash did not appear to lodge within the radiator, although it was 
building up inside the unit. Eventually this could cause problems if ashfall continued, 
potentially causing the fan motor or compressor to overheat as a thick covering of ash 
insulated the internal components. 
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3.5.4.2 Air conditioner performance in wet conditions 
 
Testing initially simulated a very light ashfall of up to 1 mm thickness. Temperature 
was not affected by this amount of ash, though trace amounts adhered to the 
condenser. The peak of 10.7OC after 1 mm of ash (figure 3.11) is still within the limits 
of usual temperature fluctuation. Testing resumed the next day, but output 
temperature had dropped by 0.6OC to 10.1OC, again within normal limits. Simulated 
ashfall continued until the unit had experienced 5 mm of ash. Small amounts did 
adhere to the unit, (figure 3.12) but not enough to cause any impacts on unit 
performance. Figure 3.11 illustrates temperature vs. ash thickness. This test simulated 
a brief, light ashfall lasting 2.5 hours. 
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Figure 3.11: Temperature vs. ash thickness for wet ash test. 
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Figure 3.12: Condenser after 5 mm of wet ash. Note small amounts of ash adherence 
 
  78
3.5.4.3 Air Conditioner performance when heating  
 
In order to test whether ash was cleared from the condenser due to it being hot, drying 
any moisture that may have helped the ash to adhere, it was decided to run a test with 
the unit in reverse. In this way the air-conditioner would be acting as a heat pump, and 
the exterior radiator would be acting as an evaporator. As the evaporator was cold and 
wet, it was thought that blockages would be more likely to occur in the radiator as ash 
clogged up the gaps between the fins. Again tests simulating 5 mm of ashfall were 
conducted. The results indicated that performance was not affected either wet or dry 
ash tests. Fluctuations in temperature stayed within normal operating limits. A slight 
increase in the amount of ash adhering to the condenser was seen in both the wet and 
dry ash tests, compared to the tests using the unit for cooling. Whether the ash was 
wet or dry did not affect results, as when the radiator acts as an evaporator, its cold 
surface is already wet. 
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Figure 3.13: Temperature vs. ash thickness for dry ash test, heating air 
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Mitsubishi Electric Air Conditioner: Wet Ash Test, Unit Warming Air
51.6
51.8
52
52.2
52.4
52.6
52.8
53
53.2
53.4
53.6
0
mm
0.2
mm
0.4
mm
0.6
mm
0.8
mm
1.0
mm
1.2
mm
1.4
mm
1.6
mm
1.8
mm
2.0
mm
2.2
mm
2.4
mm
2.6
mm
2.6
mm
2.8
mm
3.0
mm
3.2
mm
3.4
mm
3.6
mm
3.8
mm
4.0
mm
4.2
mm
4.4
mm
4.6
mm
4.8
mm
5.0
mm
Ash Thickness (mm)
Te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 (O
C
)
 
Figure 3.14: Temperature vs. ash thickness for wet ash test, heating air 
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3.5.5 Testing – Toshiba air conditioning unit 
3.5.5.1 Test set up. 
 
The setup for the testing of the Toshiba unit followed the same principles as those 
used in the testing of the Mitsubishi air conditioner. A large box with a filter in the 
end wall was constructed to house the exterior part of the unit. A divider separated the 
back and front parts of the unit, to prevent the air that was being drawn into and 
blown out of the unit from mixing. This could result in temperature fluctuations. The 
top of the intake area was left open so that ashfall could be simulated, the outlet on the 
exterior side was lidded to keep the ash from entering the room where it would be 
entrained in the inside part of the unit (figure 3.15). 
 
 
Figure 3.15 Toshiba unit test setup. Ash was introduced behind the external unit (to the right 
in this photo). Ash and air moved through the unit from the right of this photograph to the 
left. The internal part of the system drew air in through the intake facing the camera, and out 
to the left after mixing with air from the external part, thereby maintaining constant ambient 
temperature. 
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The intake area was constructed to allow a similar amount of air to enter the unit as 
would under “normal outdoor” conditions. These conditions are problematic to 
determine, as unit setup can vary immensely. Exterior units may be positioned with 
the intake within a few centimetres of a wall, mounted on roofs with unobstructed 
intakes, or even inside cell tower exchanges with the intake facing the inside of the 
exchange. The total area affected by airflow created by the units can therefore vary 
immensely. For the purposes of this testing an unobstructed intake and a lack of wind 
(ash falling vertically) were assumed. In this situation the area affected by the exterior 
unit fan was found to extend to approximately 350 mm beyond the unit casing. This 
was tested by observing small amounts of ash dropped from above the unit pre-
testing. Any ash falling outside this range did not enter the unit. This value is to be 
taken lightly; variables influencing the area around units that ash may enter from 
include the different unit configurations mentioned above, wind speed and direction, 
settling velocity of the ash, ash grainsize and fan speed on differing units. A slightly 
larger area was created behind the unit, extending beyond this to 370 mm from the 
casing. To the side which is also used as an air intake through the condenser, the box 
wall was located 150 mm beyond the casing, as air entering from the side does so at a 
lower velocity, and a smaller area was affected. Holes were cut in the wooden box 
sides to allow air to circulate more freely.  
 
Mounted outside this box was the interior part of the unit, cooling ambient air. 
Refrigerant was connected through pipes passing through the side wall. Air from this 
part of the system was directed towards and mixed with the air coming out of the 
exterior part of the unit. In this way the ambient air temperature remained in 
equilibrium, with very little change occurring during the course of the experiments. 
Ambient temperature during this testing was less than during the testing of the 
Mitsubishi electric unit, typically 21.7 to 22.1OC. Some fluctuations were experienced 
outside these values, but appeared to have no effect on the cold air output. A small 
hole was drilled in the side below the cold air output, in which a thermometer was 
positioned to monitor the cold air temperature. This ensured that the thermometer 
could not move in relation to airflow, potentially affecting measurements. 
 
To establish how much ash may affect air conditioner performance it was necessary to 
know the amount of ashfall the unit was subjected to. This was determined by 
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calculating the surface area around the unit from which ash could potentially enter the 
intake. When a known volume of ash fell over this area, an equivalent depth of ashfall 
could be calculated. In this case, the intake area of the unit measured 880 mm wide 
and 310 mm deep on the unit’s side. Adding the area around the unit that ash could 
potentially be entrained from gave a surface area of 1030 x 660 mm. Once the area 
taken up by the unit itself (880 mm x 310 mm) was subtracted, a surface area of 
407000 mm2 remained. This meant that 407 ml of uncompacted ash, sprinkled evenly 
over this space would equal a 1 mm covering of ash (uncompacted) on the ground. 
For testing purposes this was rounded to 400 ml. 
 
Airspeed at the entrance to the condenser on the outside of the unit was also 
measured. As the unit condenser extended beyond the dimensions of the diameter of 
the fan, and curved around the side of the fan on one side, airspeed would naturally 
differ considerably depending on where measurements were taken. 70 measurements 
were taken, spread over a grid over the back and side of the exterior condenser. 
Results are given in figure 3.16. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.16: Airflow in km/h at the outside of the exterior condenser pre testing. Negative 
values indicate air being blown outwards rather than sucked inwards. 
 
Air speeds in this unit were significantly lower than in the Mitsubishi unit. Larger 
units tend to have larger but slower (and quieter) fans. Average air speed over the 
entire unit pre-testing was found to be 2.5 km/h. The fastest, near the centre of the fan 
was 5.2 km/h. Areas of “dead air’ where no movement was detected were present in 
opposite corners of the unit. 
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3.5.5.2 Testing 
 
Testing of the Toshiba RAV-200KH air-conditioning unit followed similar 
procedures to the Mitsubishi air conditioner. Each period of testing was preceded by 
running the system for at least 60 minutes to ensure the system was operating at 
maximum efficiency. Ash was sprinkled at intervals above the intake for the exterior 
part of the unit, in the same way as described in section 3.5.3.2., using a 250 µm 
sieve. As with the Mitsubishi tests, the filter in the end of the test box was regularly 
vacuumed to prevent blockages causing a build up of pressure in front of the unit, 
which would in turn reduce air intake. 
 
Testing began with a simulated light dry ashfall, of 3 mm per hour. To achieve this 
100 ml of ash was distributed over the exterior area every 5 minutes. This continued 
until over 22 mm of ash had accumulated. As this testing took place over a few days 
there were times when the unit was running in order to warm up and reach maximum 
efficiency, before ash was again added. Total operating time when the unit had been 
subjected to an equivalent ashfall of 22 mm was therefore 660 minutes, rather than 
440 minutes. This was not seen to be problematic, as the rate of ashfall need not be 
consistent in actual volcanic eruptions, yet air-conditioning units are likely to continue 
operating as much as possible. 
 
An increase in ashfall rate was simulated after this, as 300 ml was introduced every 5 
minutes, (9 mm per hour) until a 35 mm thickness of ash was reached. At this point 
the ashfall rate was increased again to 500 ml or 15 mm per hour, as the previous 
increase in rate of ashfall did not appear to affect the results in terms of temperature 
changes. Testing for the dry ash test ceased after 1350 minutes of testing, and a 
simulated ashfall exceeding 95 mm in thickness. 
 
The radiator was carefully cleaned using compressed air, a vacuum cleaner and a 
brush prior to beginning the wet testing. The testing of ashfall in wet conditions 
followed the same procedures as with the testing of the Mitsubishi unit. The main 
difference was the ratio of ash to water, at 10:3. Water temperature was 22OC for 
these tests, matching average ambient room temperature. Since results from the dry 
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testing indicated ashfall rate did not appear to have much bearing on results, 500 ml of 
ash was added every 5 minutes from the beginning of testing, (15 mm per hour) rather 
than starting with a smaller amount. Testing in wet conditions continued until the unit 
had been subject to the same amount of ash as it was in the dry testing; a 95 mm 
thickness. 
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3.5.6 Results 
 
3.5.6.1 Air conditioner performance in dry conditions 
 
The results of the Toshiba test were significantly different to the Mitsubishi electric 
testing. An effect on the output of the system was almost immediately apparent. After 
only 2 mm of ash was deposited, temperatures had risen from an initial 10.3OC to 
11OC. They climbed as high as 11.5OC, but dropped to 11OC before the end of testing 
on day one, at 185 minutes or 9 mm of ash. Figure 3.17 illustrates temperature vs. 
thickness of ashfall over a 24 hour period. 
 
Toshiba Air Conditioner: Dry Ash Test
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
0 m
m
1.2
5 m
m
2.7
5 m
m
4.2
5 m
m
5.7
5 m
m
7.2
5 m
m
8.7
5 m
m
10
 m
m
11
.5 
mm
13
 m
m
14
.5 
mm
15
.75
 m
m
17
.25
 m
m
18
.5 
mm
19
.75
 m
m
21
.25
 m
m
23
.25
 m
m
27
.75
 m
m
32
.25
 m
m
35
.25
 m
m
42
.75
 m
m
50
.25
 m
m
51
.5 
mm
51
.5 
mm
51
.5 
mm
55
.25
 m
m
61
.5 
mm
64
 m
m
70
.25
 m
m
77
.75
 m
m
85
.25
 m
m
86
.5 
mm
86
.5 
mm
86
.5 
mm
92
.75
 m
m
Depth of ashfall (mm)
C
ol
d 
A
irT
em
pe
ra
tu
re
 (O
C
)
 
Figure 3.17: Cold air temperature vs. ash thickness for dry ash test (Toshiba). Peaks in 
temperature are associated with exterior unit shutdowns. 
 
Photographs taken at this time show ash lodged within the unit, resting between 
condenser fins, supported by the horizontal coils (figure 3.18). It is thought that the 
ash caused an insulating effect on the condenser, preventing heat from escaping. This 
is because although temperatures had risen and some ash was present within the 
condenser, there was not enough to cause any significant blockage to airflow.  
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Figure 3.18: Exterior unit condenser after 9 mm of ashfall. Note ash accumulating on 
horizontal coils 
 
The following day the unit was started 60 minutes before testing. After this warm up 
period output temperatures had climbed to 12.1OC, in response to the ash present in 
the condenser. Although this temperature is higher than those experienced at the close 
of testing on the previous day it follows the general trend of gradual warming shown 
in figure 3.17. Ambient temperature was exactly the same, so this was not 
contributory.  
 
Further temperature rises continued as more ash was added to the system, From an 
initial temperature of 12.1OC a the start of the day, output temperature rose to a 
maximum of 13.3OC, by the time 15 mm of ash (total) was reached, after a total 
running time of 370 minutes. The next break in testing did not result in any change in 
output temperatures after testing resumed. During the next hour another 3 mm of 
ashfall was added, temperatures remained between 13.4OC and 13.7OC. At this stage 
the top of the unit was briefly removed to inspect the interior. While some ash was 
present in the condenser, very little had remained in the base of the unit, as the airflow 
created by the fan had removed all but a thin covering of ash, bare metal was still 
visible on the base. Although this inspection involved stopping the unit for only 5 
minutes, upon resumption of testing colder air was again produced by the air 
conditioner, dropping by 0.7OC from it’s previous output to 12.6OC. This is likely to 
be due to small amounts of ash being dislodged from the condenser as the lid was 
removed and replaced, as well as giving the compressor a chance to cool slightly 
while being shut down. Temperature rose to 13OC after being subjected to another 
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millimetre of ashfall, the total amount now 19 mm. Figure 3.19 illustrates ash lodging 
in the condenser after 18 mm of ash 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.19: Condenser accumulating ash after 18 mm of ashfall 
 
Testing the following day again began with a lower temperature output, of 12.2OC. 
Internal components within the unit – such as the compressor, had cooled overnight, 
and had not yet started to overheat, despite the unit being given 60 minutes to run 
prior to testing. By this time visibly less ash was being drawn into the condenser as 
blockages began to affect the airflow. In some areas it could be seen being blown 
back out of the condenser. Once again temperature began to rise as ash was added. By 
the time the increase in ashfall rate occurred after 660 minutes of testing, temperatures 
were once again up to almost 13OC. These slowly rose as more and more ash caused 
blockages in the condenser to increase. Temperatures remained over 13OC but under 
14OC until the end of testing for the day, at 820 minutes and over 51 mm of ashfall 
(figure 3.20). By now the rate of simulated ashfall was at 15 mm per hour.  
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Figure 3.20: Condenser after 51 mm of ash 
Although the condenser was significantly blocked with ash, when the unit was 
restarted the following day, output temperatures again reached as low as 12.1OC. 
However this did not last for long, as 70 minutes after being switched on, and before 
more ash was even added the exterior unit shut itself down. This was due to the high 
pressure switch being tripped in the compressor. This occurs in response to an excess 
of heat in the condensing unit, in turn causing higher pressures in the compressor, 
making the compressor work harder to maintain lower temperatures. As less heat is 
transferred to the outside air, more heat remains inside the condensing unit (including 
the compressor) and the refrigerant. This causes the pressure to rise inside the 
compressor, until the high pressure switch trips, shutting down the unit. Some air 
conditioners will not then restart until manually switched off, then on again. This unit 
automatically switched itself on again after temperatures had cooled sufficiently. In 
this instance it took 5 minutes to do so. During that time the interior fan continued to 
function, but air was not being cooled effectively, and output temperature rose to 
19.1OC within 2 minutes, remaining at that temperature for the duration of the exterior 
unit shutdown. Once the exterior fan switched on again, temperatures took 3 minutes 
to return to previous levels. 
 
No ash was added for the next 2 hours, to monitor how the unit would run. During 
this time two more 4 minute shutdowns occurred, as the compressor again over 
pressurized.  
 
When testing resumed the following day, ash was again added, resulting in a 2 minute 
shutdown. Compressor and exterior fan shutdowns of between 2 and 5 minutes began 
to occur every 20 to 30 minutes, output temperatures remaining between 12OC and 
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13OC, aside from when the compressor had shut down. This slightly lower 
temperature than the previous highs over 13OC was due to the condenser and 
compressor cooling during the shutdown periods. Air flow was measured again at this 
point, and was found to have been drastically reduced (figure 3.21). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.21: Airflow in km/h at the outside of the exterior condenser after 1115 minutes of testing 
(system subject to a total depth of 64 mm of ash). Negative values indicate air being blown 
outwards rather than sucked inwards. 
 
The pattern of shutdowns every 20 to 30 minutes changed after 1125 minutes of 
testing, and over 65 mm of ash. Over the next 110 minutes a further 21 mm of ash 
was added, the compressor stopped shutting down, but cold air temperature began to 
rise, reaching 15.3OC before the compressor shut down for two minutes again. Two 
more 2 minute shutdowns occurred in the next 90 minutes, then the unit began to 
function for only 5 minutes or less between the compressor stoppages. After a total of 
1350 minutes, and a simulated ashfall of just over 90 minutes the entire system 
shutdown, and the display registered a malfunction code. This code (21) indicated a 
failure of the high pressure switch to reset. This required a manual restart, though 
would have happened soon again had it been restarted without cleaning out the 
condenser. Testing ceased at this point as the unit had effectively failed under these 
conditions. 
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3.5.6.2 Air conditioner performance in wet conditions 
 
Although the unit was cleaned prior to testing, initial cold air output temperatures 
before the addition of ash were not as low as those achieved prior to dry testing, but 
approximately 1OC warmer. This could be because of two things: 
− The compressor had suffered damage due to prolonged high pressure leading 
to repeated shutdowns 
− A small amount of coolant had leaked from the unit due to the prolonged high 
pressure during the later stages of the dry test 
 
Results from this testing followed a similar pattern to the dry testing. An increase in 
temperature was seen almost immediately after ash began to be added (figure 3.22). 
The first 280 minutes of ashfall equated to a depth of 32.5 mm of ash, and resulted in 
a gradual temperature rise from 11.3OC to 13.6OC. Ash adherence differed to the dry 
testing, in that ash preferentially stuck to the outside of the condenser and it’s 
protective grill, as well as lodging within the radiator (figures 3.23, 3.25& 3.26).  
Toshiba Air Conditioner: Wet Ash Test
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Figure 3.22: Cold air temperature vs. ash thickness for wet ash test (Toshiba). Peaks in 
temperature are associated with exterior unit shutdowns. 
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Figure 3.23: Condenser after ~32 mm of ash. Note the adherence of ash to the outer grill 
 
The condenser and compressor had cooled by the time testing resumed the next day. 
Initial temperatures stabilised at 11.8OC once the system had run for 60 minutes. A 
further litre of ash and 300 ml of water were added before the air conditioner had its 
first compressor overload and corresponding shutdown of the exterior unit, for 2 
minutes and 30 seconds, after a total depth of ashfall of 35 mm. This is visible as the 
first sharp peak in figure 3.22. Ash continued to accumulate on the condenser, but 
temperatures remained fairly constant at 12± 0.3OC. 75 minutes and 19 mm of ashfall 
later the second compressor overload and shutdown occurred, this time lasting for 
over 4 minutes. No further ash was added for the next 2 hours to ascertain whether or 
not the fan could clear any ash from the condenser. It did not appear to, and 3 more 
compressor and fan shutdowns occurred in this time. 
 
By now the unit had been running for 10 hours and had been subjected to 55 mm of 
ashfall. Once ash addition started again the unit began to shutdown more regularly; 
for 2 to 6 minutes every 15 to 30 minutes. After the 3 minutes taken to get back down 
to the (slightly elevated) temperature the unit could run at while blocked with ash was 
taken into account, the cold air was running at close to room temperature or even 
above for 30% to 50% of the time. The temperature of the cold air while the 
compressor was stopped gradually increased each time the compressor shutdown, 
until it exceeded room temperature, and the unit began to actively heat the air instead 
of cooling it. This pattern of shutdowns continued as the system was subjected to 
more ashfall. The blockages in the back of the unit prevented as much air as usual 
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entering the unit, therefore less ash was being entrained. For the same reason ash 
within the condenser was not being moved either. While less air entered through the 
condenser, the fan was still moving at the same speed. Air was still being pushed out 
the front of the unit, but was also entering from the front, creating a lot of turbulence 
in and around the front of the fan. Air speeds at the back of the condenser where air 
usually enters from were measured after 665 minutes, and the addition of ~67 mm of 
ash, results are illustrated in figure 3.24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.24: Airflow in km/h at the outside of the exterior condenser after 665 minutes of 
testing (system subject to a total depth of ~67 mm of ash). Negative values indicate air being 
blown outwards rather than sucked inwards. The unit is effectively blocked at this point. 
 
The pattern of shutdowns for 2 to 6 minutes every 15 to 30 minutes continued until 
the end of ash addition at 95 mm. Figures 3.25 and 3.26 illustrate blister like 
accumulations of ash blocking the condenser after 85 mm of ashfall. The unit was run 
one more time (without the addition of ash) on the following day, having had the 
chance to cool down overnight. After being left for 4 hours it was monitored for one 
hour to ascertain whether there had been any change in performance due to being run 
without ash in the atmosphere. Results are plotted in figure 3.27. 
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Figure 3.25: Blister-like accumulation of ash on the external grill of the condenser after ~85 
mm of ashfall. Note there are also substantial blockages internally, between condenser fins. 
 
 
Figure 3.26: Accumulation of ash on the condenser after ~85 mm of ashfall. 
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Figure 3.27: Toshiba unit output temperature from 4 hours after the end of ashfall. The peaks 
indicate external unit shutdowns as internal compressor pressures exceeded limits. 
 
The average output temperature during this time was 14.5OC, including the times 
during which the compressor had shutdown. This means it was running at 55% of 
normal performance by the end of testing compared to it’s capacity before the 
addition of volcanic ash, assuming a pre-testing output of 10.2 degrees and an 
ambient temperature of 20.7 degrees. Although the unit was therefore having some 
cooling effect, every time the compressor shutdown there existed the risk of the high 
pressure switch not resetting, and the unit not restarting without manual intervention. 
The first time the compressor shut down was after 35 mm of ashfall. Allowing for a 
small margin of error, this indicates the unit could not be relied upon to provide 
sufficient cooling when subjected to at most ~ 30 mm of ash. 
  95
3.5.7 Testing limitations 
 
This testing did not take into account any electrostatic charge held by the grains, 
which would be present during an ashfall (Gilbert et al. 1991). The electrical charge 
should not affect the degree to which the particles adhere to air-conditioner surfaces, 
as the units are grounded, however electrostatic attraction may cause or enhance the 
creation of accretionary lapilli (Gilbert et al, 1991). As the ash used in this experiment 
was not electrostatically charged and was only being dropped from a height of one 
metre, accretionary lapilli could not form, and thus was not a part of the experiment. 
The lack of large masses of accretionary lapilli is unlikely to alter the results in any 
significant way; lapilli size particles are unlikely to be sucked into air-conditioning 
units unless they face skywards. Testing did not include this scenario. 
 
The trials using wet ash have some limitations. In order to be able to freely scatter ash 
onto the testing apparatus and air-conditioning unit, the ash needed to be dry first – 
damp or wet ash sticks together. While this can happen to a degree to ash wetted by 
moisture in the atmosphere (e.g., with the formation of accretionary lapilli), air-fall 
ash does not stick together in large masses to the same degree that it would in a 
container or a sieve. Therefore it was necessary to sprinkle dry ash and mix it as it fell 
with a mist of water from a spraying unit. As a result the ash itself may not have been 
as wet as it could have been in an actual eruption during rain. However spraying water 
into the path of the ash ensured that the unit itself was wet, and that at least some of 
the ash was damp, which in turn would increase the ability of the ash to adhere to the 
unit.  
 
The effects of wind were also not included in testing. Strong winds may blow more 
ash into the condenser than the still conditions simulated in the tests. In this case the 
time and amount of ash needed to cause blockages could be less than results indicate.   
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3.5.8 Discussion: Air-conditioner performance in ashfall 
 
In both wet and dry scenarios the Mitsubishi electric air-conditioner did not appear to 
experience anything more than minor temperature fluctuations. This unit was tested 
with a simulated ashfall of up to 10 mm thickness occurring over about 4.5 hours. No 
drop-off in performance was observed; output temperatures remained within 0.4OC of 
initial temperatures achieved by the unit before any ash was added. To a large extent 
the unit appeared to be self cleaning; ash would quickly pass through the system 
without being trapped. Trace amounts of ash did adhere to the condenser fins, but the 
temperature of the cooled air - and thus performance - was not affected.  
 
These results differed substantially from those of the Toshiba unit. There were two 
reasons for this. Firstly the smaller size and different fan configuration of the 
Mitsubishi unit resulted in faster airflow through the unit, the maximum airspeed on 
the outside of the condenser for the Mitsubishi was recorded at14.5 km/h, as opposed 
to 5.2 km/h on the Toshiba. Averaged out over the entire face of the condenser, the 
airspeed for the Mitsubishi was 10.6 km/h, the Toshiba was 2.5 km/h. These values 
differ partly because of different fan size, shape and speed, but also because the 
Mitsubishi unit pushed air through the unit rather than sucking it through, as the 
Toshiba did. The air had therefore already travelled through the Mitsubishi condenser, 
and was exiting it, but was measured as it entered the condenser on the Toshiba unit, 
prior to reaching the fan. Despite these different setups these values still reflect the 
airspeed through the condenser, which results indicate is a key factor in determining 
the amount of ash that lodges within the unit, and ultimately in unit performance. The 
areas in the Toshiba unit where airspeed was greatest (5.2 km/h) still blocked up 
readily, whereas the area with the slowest airflow in the Mitsubishi unit, at 5.7 km/h 
remained unblocked. This does not reflect a critical speed at which blockages occur, 
but a difference in fan configuration. This is the second important difference between 
the units. Because the Mitsubishi unit pushed air through the condenser, any blockage 
caused by ash would continue to be subjected to positive air pressure from the fan, 
and could therefore be moved subsequently. Blockages in the Toshiba condenser 
caused the airflow to be diverted to other parts of the unit. Reduced pressure on those 
blockages meant they were less likely to be dislodged without manual intervention. 
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For these reasons ash was cleared more effectively from the Mitsubishi than the 
Toshiba. This difference illustrates that no specific “safe” air speed for the effective 
removal of volcanic ash from condensers can accurately be assigned generically to 
air-conditioner units. Unit set-ups differ, not just in fan speed and size, but in 
placement of the fan relative to the condenser, condenser shape and in condenser fin 
spacing. Grain size and weather conditions will also have an effect on what air speed 
will be sufficient to clear blockages. Despite these variables it is evident that faster 
speeds are better, and the >10 km/h average air speed through the Mitsubishi electric 
unit was sufficient to prevent ash accumulating in the condenser. The fact that air 
moving at 5.7 km/h through areas of the Mitsubishi did not deposit ash, but air 
moving at 5.2 km/h resulted in blockages in the Toshiba indicates that the air speed 
required to prevent ash lodging in the condenser for this type of unit may be greater 
than in the through-wall type unit.  
 
In both wet and dry Toshiba tests there was an initial rise in temperature. During the 
dry test, output temperatures rose by 1OC after 135 minutes of testing, or 6.5 mm of 
ashfall. In the wet test a similar result was seen in that it took 135 minutes for 
temperatures to rise by one degree, but by this time there had been over 14 mm of 
ashfall. In both cases there was some ash adhering to the condenser, but not enough to 
cause blockages or significantly reduce airflow. These results suggest that initial 
temperature rises are caused not by reduced airflow but by an insulation effect due to 
ash covering parts of the condenser. This effect appears to be fairly small, in the order 
of increasing output temperatures by up to about 2OC. It appears to start occurring 
after as little as 1-2 mm of ashfall, as rises in temperature began exceeding normal 
fluctuation levels within minutes of ash addition beginning. Increases in temperature 
after 10 mm – 15 mm of ash, can be attributed not only to this insulation effect but to 
a reduction in airflow, caused by the blockages in the condenser. During the dry 
testing the maximum amount the temperature increased by before the unit began to 
shut itself down as the compressor overloaded was 3.6OC, during wet testing it was 
2.5OC.  
 
After the Toshiba unit had been cleaned out following the dry test, it was unable to 
regain the low output temperatures close to 10OC that it was able to pre-testing. This 
indicates either compressor damage or coolant leakage had taken place in the first 
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(dry) test. Either of these causes would be induced by abnormally high pressure in the 
compressor, in turn caused by ash blocking airflow through the condenser. Therefore 
even if air conditioners manage to keep running during heavy ashfall, once the 
compressor overload starts being tripped, there is a risk of damage to the compressor, 
ultimately reducing unit efficiency.  
 
Fin spacing appeared to have little effect on blockages. The narrower spacing between 
fins on the Mitsubishi was expected to cause more blockages, but due to the faster 
airspeed this did not occur. This is likely only to become an issue if a coarse grainsize 
ash (larger than the spacing between fins) impacted a horizontally mounted 
condenser, as is sometimes done on rooftops.  
 
Although there is a drop off in performance for conventional split system units after a 
few millimetres of ash, the slightly elevated temperatures will in most instances be 
insufficient to cause damage or shutdowns for end users of air conditioning systems. 
Once blockages in the condenser reduce the dissipation of heat sufficiently to cause 
the compressor to overload, performance will in most cases drop below levels 
required to maintain adequate cooling. This effect is worsened by the fact that the 
interior unit can continue to function without the exterior unit running, but will blow 
air at room temperature, or even heat the air while the compressor is shutdown. 
Blockages sufficient to cause the compressor to overload will depend on unit and 
compressor type, but this appears to be able to happen from between 30 mm and 50 
mm of ashfall. This could be sooner, depending on weather conditions and unit type. 
The variables present mean that these numbers need to be treated with caution. After 
the cycle of shutdowns begins, the combination of elevated output temperatures and 
periods of either no cooling or active warming will constitute air conditioning failure, 
as performance loss will approach 50% of usual. This figure may drop further if the 
compressor sustains damage, to zero once the whole unit shuts down, as seen in the 
Toshiba dry ash test.  
 
While determining the abrasion of bearings was not an objective in these tests, the 
units were monitored for adverse effects of this type. None were noted on the units 
themselves during testing, although it is expected that fan bearings could eventually 
suffer increased wear from abrasion in the long term if not adequately maintained, as 
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ash may adhere to lubricants and remain in contact with moving parts well after 
ashfall has ceased.  
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3.5.9 Cleaning ash from condensers 
 
Cleaning dry ash from condensers can be achieved through the use of compressed air. 
The small gaps between fins on the radiator prevent brushes being useful except for 
removing ash from the outside. Care must be exercised as the fins are very thin, and 
prone to bending even when only a little force is applied. Water blasting is too 
powerful and will result in the radiator fins sustaining damage. If compressed air is 
not available gentle hosing may get rid of some of the ash, but a thorough job needs to 
be done as any ash not removed by water will dry and harden, making it almost 
impossible to subsequently remove as it is very difficult to access. If ash is already 
wet then gentle hosing is an acceptable method of ash removal from condensers, 
however if a unit has been running, the heat from the condenser may have dried out 
some of the ash, so where possible compressed air should be tried first. This could be 
problematic if ashfall is still taking place, due to possible damage occurring to the air 
compressor if it is sucking in ash laden air. If no other methods are available, simply 
banging the top of the unit will help to dislodge loose ash. In dry conditions 
vacuuming the condenser will also help to remove much of the ash. 
 
Where units are acting as heat pumps, the cold wet evaporator will potentially be 
harder to clean, since even dry ash will be wetted as it lodges in the evaporator, in the 
long term this is more likely to harden into a solid deposit that is difficult to remove. 
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3.5.10 Filter performance 
 
The filter used to prevent large amounts of ash entering the test area was EU3 media, 
designed to remove 80% of particles at 10 microns, but only 45% of particles at 1 
micron. During these tests the filter failed in two ways – as well as letting some ash 
through (figure 3.8A), the filter quickly became choked with ash, restricting airflow. 
For the purposes of the experiments being conducted, this necessitated regular 
cleaning (vacuuming both sides) of the filter.  
 
These types of filters are typically used for fresh air filters in exchanges, usually as a 
backup for when air conditioners are not providing the amount of cooling required. 
Under normal circumstances these filters can be cleaned or replaced quickly enough 
that blockages do not occur. However the amount of ash potentially present in the 
atmosphere during ashfall far exceeds usual amounts of dust and airborne particulates. 
The volumes expected during all but very light ashfall will cause filters to quickly 
become choked with ash and restrict airflow. Furthermore distal volcanic ashfall can 
potentially be very fine, the grainsize of the smallest particles can be <1 µm, (Heiken 
& Wohletz, 1985). Fine ash can therefore pass through most air filtering systems. 
Even self-cleaning filters are not likely to be effective, as these use high pressure air 
to flush material out from filters. This air would have to come from inside the 
building during ashfall, as compressors would quickly fail if ash were ingested. This 
would lower the pressure inside the building, causing ash laden air to be drawn inside. 
Any type of filtration is therefore unlikely to work effectively during ashfall. 
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3.6 Mitigation options 
 
Mitigating the impacts of volcanic ash on air conditioners can be undertaken in a 
variety of ways. Most of these need to be implemented prior to ashfall. The most 
effective means of mitigating these impacts is to use air conditioners with more 
powerful fans per unit area of the condenser. Faster airflow through the condenser 
results in less blockages occurring. Those types of air conditioner (such as through- 
wall units) that push air through the condenser will also be more effective. In most 
areas potentially subject to ashfall, volcanic eruptions are still a low probability. 
Despite their potentially high impact, retrofitting infrastructure with more robust air 
conditioners is therefore economically unfeasible. However in areas with a high 
probability of ashfall (and thus higher risk) this option could be considered when new 
units are installed in essential services. 
 
While most modern air conditioners have automatic reset switches on their 
compressors to restart units after overloads, this is not always the case. Automatic 
restart after compressor overload will keep units at least partially operational for more 
time after heavy ashfall has blocked condensers. This will give technicians or 
engineers additional time to reach and repair or clean out units as required. Units may 
still operate for hours or days after initial shutdowns begin to occur. More efficient 
cooling may also be gained when units are operating under excess load and the 
compressor is shutting down, by stopping the interior unit running while the exterior 
unit is shut down. In this way interior air would not actively be warmed by the air 
conditioner during these times. This will only make a small difference, but could be 
significant.  
 
Filtration has been shown to be ineffective for the volume of ash experienced during 
ashfall (section 3.5.10). However a simple way of reducing the amount of ash 
ingested by air conditioners is by either placing them in sheltered areas – such as 
under deep eaves, or by emplacing a small (preferably sloping) roof over the unit, so 
that ash falling sub-vertically cannot directly enter the unit. Deep eaves on the cable 
television relay building in Trevelin are thought to have given the air conditioning 
unit some protection from the 60 mm of ash received from Chaiten between the 2nd 
and 6th of May 2008 (section 3.2). Protective shelters need to be built strong enough 
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that they do not collapse under tephra loading, or have steep enough pitches that ash 
will slide off. Remobilised ash may still be entrained with ingested air, but the amount 
will be reduced.  
 
Once ashfall has begun the options mentioned above cannot realistically be 
implemented. If units are at manned premises or in homes, regular cleaning will help 
to alleviate blockages as ash accumulates (section 3.5.9 describes cleaning methods). 
Many air conditioners are deployed in commercial or industrial situations where they 
are completely unmanned. Some locations (such as rural telephone exchanges) can be 
quite remote. Getting to air conditioners will be difficult during and immediately after 
ashfall. Roads may be closed or even impassable, visibility can be severely reduced 
even where roads are still open, slowing traffic substantially. Chapter 5 discusses 
driving during and after ashfall. Companies responsible for the maintenance of air 
conditioners for essential services need to allow for these eventualities in their 
emergency response planning for volcanic eruptions. 
 
Although it has been shown that air conditioners may operate during ashfall, it is 
advisable that non- essential units are turned off while ash is entrained in the air. This 
will prevent unnecessary damage and/or difficult cleanup of condensers.  
 
3.7 Summary 
 
The vulnerability of air conditioners to ashfall has been shown through 
experimentation to be dependant on airspeed and fan configuration. Faster airspeed 
through condensers results in less ash lodging within the system, and a more robust 
unit in ashfall. Common split system air conditioner types were observed to have a 
slight decrease in performance almost immediately after ashfall began, but it took 
between 35 mm (wet) and 50 mm (dry) of ash to cause failure. 30 mm is suggested as 
a maximum amount of ashfall under which typical air conditioner units may safely 
operate, albeit at reduced efficiency. Exceeding this is likely to cause sufficient 
blockages in the condenser that compressor damage and shutdowns may follow. It 
should be noted that in some instances failure may occur before this, as unit 
configurations vary, and remobilisation of ash or strong winds during ashfall may 
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affect results. This experimentation has nevertheless determined that air conditioner 
operation remains viable during ashfall, provided monitoring and regular maintenance 
are carried out. Essential cooling can therefore continue to take place during ashfall, 
subject to appropriate operating procedures taking place. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE IMPACTS OF VOLCANIC ASH ON 
AIRPORTS AND GROUNDED AIRCRAFT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
4.1.1 Airborne ash encounters 
 
The problems associated with airborne aircraft encountering volcanic ash in the 
atmosphere are well appreciated within the aviation industry. From 1973 through 
2000, about 100 incidents of aircraft flying into airborne volcanic ash were 
documented. An average of two reported encounters per year since 1991 have 
occurred (a large number occurred in that year due to the Pinatubo eruption), further 
unreported encounters are likely. (Guffanti & Miller, 2002). More have taken place 
since this time, including 2 aircraft encounters with volcanic ash recorded over 
Micronesia in November 2002 and a further one in March 2003. One of the 2002 
incidents resulted in damage to an Airbus A340, including damaged pitot tubes and 
light abrasion around engine intakes (Tupper et al., 2004). That occasion involved ash 
from Ecuador’s Reventador volcano, 14,000 km distant; (Tupper et al., 2006). The 
fact that volcanic ash clouds can still damage aircraft after travelling such distances 
illustrates why they are a major problem for aviation.  
 
Globally, volcanic ash intersects aviation paths at altitudes over 30,000 ft on 
approximately 20 days per year (Miller and Casadevall, 2000). Aircraft encounters 
with volcanic ash clouds usually result in damage to the aircraft; the abrasive nature 
of the ash causes significant damage to all forward-facing surfaces (including the 
windscreen). Any protruding parts, for example antennas, probes, ice detectors, angle 
of attack vanes and pitot tubes are also vulnerable, and may be damaged or even 
rendered inoperable (ICAO 2001). Jet engines are particularly susceptible to damage 
from volcanic ash, due to the fact that engine operating temperatures (~1400O C) 
exceed the melting point of all volcanic ash types. “The ash melts in the hot section of 
the engine and fuses on the high pressure nozzle guide vanes and turbine blades… 
causing the static burner pressure and compressor discharge pressure to increase 
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rapidly which, in turn, causes engine surge. This effect alone can cause immediate 
thrust loss and possible engine flame-out” (ICAO, 2001). Seven cases of engine 
failure due to ingestion of volcanic ash had been reported by 2002. On three occasions 
this almost caused commercial passenger aircraft to crash (Guffanti & Miller, 2002). 
 
4.1.2 Previous instances of ashfall impacting airports 
 
Less dramatic, and less common than airborne encounters with volcanic ash are 
instances of ashfall impacting airports and grounded aircraft. The frequency of ashfall 
actually landing on airports is far less than airborne encounters, however disruptions 
to airports due to volcanic activity are more common. These include the closure of 
airports and/or airspace due to the presence of airborne ash, even if the airport itself is 
not physically impacted. A database of all known airports that have been affected by 
volcanic ash between 1944 and 2006 was published as a USGS open file report by 
Guffanti (2007). This records volcanic activity affecting 101 airports on 171 
occasions over 28 countries, and involves eruptions at 46 volcanoes (figure 4.1) 
(Guffanti et al., 2007). The database includes closures to airports due to ash in nearby 
airspace, and occasionally volcanic hazards other than ashfall (pyroclastic flows, lava 
flow, gas emissions and phreatic explosions).  
 
Figure 4.1 locations of airports impacted by volcanic activity, 1944–2006 (Guffanti et al., 
2008) 
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An analysis of the database indicates that between 1944 and 2006 ashfall landed on an 
airport on at least 73 occasions, with thickness ranging from trace amounts to a 
maximum of 50 cm (Guffanti et al., 2007). Since 2006 there have been further 
incidents of this nature. For example the 2008 eruptions of Chaiten Volcano in Chile 
resulted in disruptions to 5 airports in Chile, 9 in Argentina and 2 in Uruguay 
(Guffanti, M., pers. comm. 2009). Five of these airports are located over 100 km from 
Chaiten; one is over 2000 km away. These disruptions ranged from airport closures to 
cancelled flights.  
 
The risk to life is not so immediate or severe on the ground as it is when flying into an 
ash cloud. However the potential physical impacts of ash on grounded aircraft and 
airport infrastructure are considerable. Potential economic effects of ashfall on 
airports are even more substantial. This is because only a small amount of ash landing 
on airports, or even being present in proximate airspace may close them down, 
without any aircraft or infrastructure sustaining actual physical damage.   
 
Minor ash falls on airports will render them inoperative, with damage to both aircraft 
and facilities (Labadie 1994). Tyler and Reynertson (1981) give details of the clean-
up operation at Fairchild Air Force Base, USA after ash falls from Mount St Helens in 
1980. Water was used to wet the ash; graders and snowploughs then worked the ash 
for loaders to pick it up. It was then hauled to a central location where it was buried in 
landfills. It was noted that around buildings the wind blowing ash from roof tops 
constantly contaminated previously cleaned areas (Johnston, 1997b). During the 2002 
eruption of Mt Etna, Catania’s Fontanarossa airport was closed for much of the 
duration of the 3 month eruption. This was due both to the presence of the ash plume, 
and to ash falling on the runways. Ash was cleaned up using sweeper trucks, as well 
as manual labour (Barnard, 2004). During the same period, (November 2002) 
Ecuador’s Reventador volcano erupted, and 4 mm of ash was deposited on Quito’s 
Mariscal Sucre airport. This closed the airport for over a week, while ash was cleaned 
from airport buildings, runways and aircraft. Clean-up here was entirely by 500 
workers with brooms and shovels. Sweeper trucks were unavailable for use in the 
cleanup (Leonard et al., 2005). 
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The 1991 Hudson eruption in Chile resulted in cancellations or severe delays for 10 to 
20% of all flights on the Atlantic coast passing through the area between Argentina’s 
Trelew and Rio Gallegos (~ 1000 km) from August to October 1991 (Bitschene, 
1995). Some airports, for example Camet airport in Argentina were closed due to ash 
covering runways (BGVN, 1991). Fine ash on the tarmac led to mechanical problems 
occurring in brake and propulsion systems. At least one engine from an Argentine 
airlines aircraft was replaced due to ash ingestion (Bitschene, 1995). 
 
In New Zealand, ash impacted airports during the 1995 and 1996 eruptions of 
Ruapehu (Johnston, 1997a). During these eruptions the Wellington Volcanic Ash 
Advisory Centre (VAAC) issued over 200 volcanic ash advisories. These resulted in 
the closure of air-space during eruptive episodes, due to either ash clouds and/or a 
sulphur dioxide haze. Consequently many flights were either cancelled or re-routed. 
At least 13 airports were affected, causing flow-on effects well beyond these areas 
(figure 4.1). 
 
Airport 1995 1996 
Auckland 
Hamilton 
Tauranga 
Whakatane 
Gisborne 
Rotorua 
Napier 
Taupo 
Wanganui 
New Plymouth 
Palmerston North 
Wellington 
Nelson 
 
* 
* 
* 
*A 
* 
*A 
* 
* 
 
* 
*A 
*A 
*A 
*A 
* 
*A 
*A 
*A 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
 
Table 4.1: Closed or disrupted airports during the 1995-1996 eruption (airports that received 
ash falls marked by A) (from Johnston, 1997a) 
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The 1996 eruption had the more widespread effect. Seven of these 13 airports 
received at least trace amounts of ash, with Rotorua Airport receiving the most (~1 
mm thickness). This required a substantial clean-up operation. At least two minor 
aircraft ash encounters were reported, a Saab Metroliner en route to Nelson from 
Wellington (20 June 1996) and an Aztec en route to Takaka from Wellington (21 June 
1996); no serious damage was reported (Johnston, 1997a). 
 
4.1.3 Ashfall hazards to airports and grounded aircraft 
 
Volcanic ash consists of very small fragments (< 2 mm diameter) of volcanic rock 
and glass. Because of this small size it can easily penetrate small crevices on 
machinery, vehicles, grounded aircraft, inadequately sealed buildings and even some 
types of filters protecting machinery or vehicles. The hard nature of volcanic ash 
renders it extremely abrasive. Therefore any moving parts on machinery are 
vulnerable – even if they appear to be covered up and protected. For the aviation 
industry, this penetrative nature can cause significant damage. Removal of ash from 
aircraft exteriors needs to be performed with care, as the cleaning processes used may 
cause further abrasion on aircraft surfaces. Airport infrastructure and machinery are 
also at risk. Different methodologies of cleaning up ash from both aircraft and airports 
have been employed in previous eruptions (section 4.1.2). 
 
Abrasion is unfortunately not the only hazard posed by tephra to the aviation industry. 
Aerosols attached to freshly erupted grains of ash are potentially extremely acidic and 
may cause corrosion on contact with vulnerable surfaces. This is more problematic 
when rain or mist leaches the acids out of the deposited layer of ash causing corrosion 
of metal surfaces. Aerosols that escape from the grains of ash whilst still in the air 
may cause acid rain, which will again cause corrosion. The amount of corrosion that 
occurs will depend not only on the pH of the leachates, but also on weather 
conditions. Light rain or drizzle is sufficient to wet ash but not to wash ash off 
surfaces. Heavy rain on the other hand may be sufficient to help clean ash off aircraft 
and other surfaces. This in turn causes other impacts to airport infrastructure, such as 
blocking of drains or downpipes, subsequently causing roofs to leak and surface 
flooding on the ground. 
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Less common is damage caused by the residual heat carried in ash from the volcano. 
Ash quickly cools as it travels through the atmosphere, so this is only a problem for 
events proximal to airports. This has occurred in the past, when an estimated 88 US 
B-25 bombers from the 340th Bombardment Group stationed in Pompeii during World 
War II were covered in ash from an eruption of Mt Vesuvius. The heat from the ash 
burnt fabric control surfaces, melted or cracked Plexiglas windows and severely 
damaged all aircraft impacted (figure 4.2). This was in addition to damage from 
volcanic bombs and lapilli (Kaiser, 2007).  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Damaged B-25 at Pompeii after ashfall from the March 23 1944 eruption of 
Vesuvius. Note the holes in the fabric surface of the tail. Source U.S. National Archives and 
Records Administration 
 
The weight of volcanic ash causes problems, especially when wet. Ash may absorb a 
large amount of water - up to 50% of it own volume, thus increasing its weight 
significantly. Large span structures (such as aircraft hangars) run the risk of collapse 
under such loads. An example of this occurred during the 1991 Pinatubo eruption 
where over 15 cm of wet ash combined with ground shaking from volcanogenic 
earthquakes caused numerous hangars to collapse at Clark Air Force Base, Basa Air 
Base and Cubi Point Naval Air Station (Casadevall, 1992, 1996). 
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As well as the problems caused by abrasion, corrosion and loading, the slipperiness of 
small grains of volcanic ash constitutes a hazard in itself. This in part prevents the 
landing of aircraft on ash covered runways, combined with the risk of the ingestion of 
volcanic ash by jet engines. The covering of markings on roads, runways and 
taxiways is also an issue. Ash suspended in the air not only prevents aircraft flying, 
but causes visibility problems on the ground, exacerbated by people or machinery 
moving over ash covered surfaces, remobilising it into suspension.  
 
Boeing recommends that aircraft are not operated on runways contaminated with any 
volcanic ash at all (Boeing, 2004). This assessment is seen by some pilots and airport 
officials as being overly cautious, given that aircraft can safely operate in dusty desert 
environments (Giancarlo Guarrera, pers. comm., 2005). Furthermore the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recognise the possibility of landing and taking 
off on runways with small amounts of ash – provided several safety issues are closely 
adhered to (ICAO, 2001). Many pilots however refuse to land on runways with any 
amount of ash present, thus even minor amounts may close airports until after a clean 
up has been effected. An example of this was at Fontanarossa Airport during the 2002 
eruption of Etna, when on several occasions pilots refused to land, despite airport 
authorities declaring the airport open and no plume being present (Giancarlo 
Guarrera, pers. comm., 2005). The risk of any ash being present was sufficient to 
make the pilots concerned decide to deviate to other ports. For airports to remain open 
all ash must therefore be removed from airside areas, a time-consuming process 
which is expensive both in terms of actual physical removal costs and airport closure 
time. 
 
Thicker deposits of ash are naturally more problematic than thin layers, as physical 
damage begins to take place, both to airport infrastructure and grounded aircraft. The 
well-known picture by R L Reiger of a DC-10 that has been rocked back onto its tail 
at Cubi Point Naval Air Station after 15-20 cm of ashfall from the 1991 Pinatubo 
eruption, illustrates a more severe impact at airports (Casadevall, 1992). Several of 
the B-25s damaged at Pompeii in 1944 from the March 23rd eruption were rocked 
back onto their tails in a similar fashion (figure 4.3) 
  112
 
Figure 4.3: Source U.S. National Archives and Records Administration 
 
A detailed account of discussions and recommendations from a 1993 workshop on the 
impacts of volcanic ash on airport facilities is given in Casadevall (1993). This work 
gives examples of impacts of volcanic ash on airports from several eruptions in the 
late 1980’s and early 1990’s. ICAO (2001) has provided guidelines on possible 
impacts of ash and methodologies for cleaning it up. This chapter seeks to further 
identify and quantify the impacts of volcanic ash on grounded aircraft, and determine 
whether existing cleaning methodologies for airports and aircraft are best practice. 
This is in part based on the more recent experiences of two airports that have 
frequently been impacted by volcanic ash; Fontanarossa Airport, Catania, Italy 
(during the 2002 eruptions of Mt Etna) and Mariscal Sucre Airport, Quito, Ecuador 
(during the 1999 eruption of Guagua Pichincha, and the 2002 eruption of El 
Reventador Volcano). Further impacts are addressed through laboratory 
experimentation simulating the effects of ash on aircraft surfaces. 
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4.2 The 2002 Etna eruption: Impacts of ashfall on Fontanarossa 
Airport, and Sigonella Naval Air Station, Catania, Italy 
 
4.2.1 Airport background 
 
Fontanarossa is Sicily’s busiest airport, Italy’s 2nd busiest regional airport and 4th 
busiest national airport. Over 5 million passengers transited this airport in 2004. The 
main runway is 2560 m long and 45 m wide, with a 7.5 metre apron each side (SAC, 
2007). It is located 30 km from the summit area of Etna. The airport is operated by the 
Società Aeroporto Catania (SAC) which in turn is answerable to ENAC, the Ente 
Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile or Italian national civil aviation authority. 
 
Sigonella is a joint Italian air force and US Naval Air Station (NAS), located south of 
Fontanarossa, 38 km from the summit area of Etna. It is a major Mediterranean base 
for the USA, who operate several different types of aircraft from here. In addition 
NATO aircraft often transit through this base. The Italian air force operates mainly 
turbo –prop anti-submarine aircraft from Sigonella. 
 
4.2.2 Eruptive events affecting Fontanarossa and Sigonella 
 
On 27 October 2002, a flank eruption began on Mount Etna that lasted 3 months, 
finally ending on 28 January 2003. Eruptive fissures opened on the south and east 
flanks of the volcano, with both effusive and explosive activity ensuing. Aa lava 
flows caused damage to property proximal to the volcano, while Strombolian and 
especially Hawaiian style activity created large amounts of basaltic ash that caused 
damage or disruption to more distal areas, including Fontanarossa airport, and to a 
lesser extent NAS Sigonella. This eruption resulted in more ash falling on Catania 
than there had been in living memory. During the first three days of the eruption 
accumulated ashfall in Catania measured approximately 1.6 mm (Barnard, 2004). 
Fontanarossa, located on the southern edge of the city, received a similar amount of 
ash. 
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During November and early December 2002 fieldwork was undertaken in Catania to 
ascertain the effects of the volcanic activity, especially basaltic ash, on the populace 
and infrastructure of the province of Catania. Further fieldwork and interviews with 
the operations manager of SAC (Giancarlo Guarrera) were conducted in mid 2005. 
Major Colombo of the Italian air force was interviewed at NAS Sigonella to ascertain 
impacts of ashfall on that airport. 
 
4.2.3 Impacts on radar systems 
 
Radar systems are not present at Fontanarossa airport; the Italian military controls all 
airspace in Italy, and all local radar equipment is situated at NAS Sigonella. While 
located only a few kilometres away from Fontanarossa, the ash plume missed the base 
on most occasions during the 2002 eruptions, radar equipment was only directly 
impacted by volcanic ash on one occasion. This involved only trace amounts of ash, 
which had no noticeable physical effect on any radar equipment (Major Colombo, 
pers. comm., 2005). The radar equipment present could not detect the ash plume, 
therefore detection relied on visual observation. For this reason it was ruled by ENAC 
that flights could only operate during daylight hours. 
 
4.2.4 Impacts on runways 
 
Ashfall landed on Fontanarossa on many occasions during the course of the 3 month 
long eruption. This happened so frequently that airport authorities kept no records of 
the number of times it occurred or the amount of time the airport was closed. In each 
case ashfall on runways and taxiways was cleaned up at the earliest opportunity, as 
the airport operators (SAC) were striving to keep the airport open as much as 
possible. Sweeping usually commenced as soon as ashfall began. Although this could 
mean the same areas needed to be cleaned more than once, the cost of running 
sweepers for longer was far outweighed by the cost of the airport being closed. 
Because of this rapid approach to cleaning the amount of accumulated ash never 
exceeded more than approximately 1 mm. This was still enough to obscure runway 
markings, create a slippery surface and the possibility of engine damage due to the 
ingestion of ash. Residual ash was sometimes left on the runways after cleaning. This 
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caused problems as it was remobilised by aircraft as they landed and took off, creating 
problems for following aircraft (Guarrera, G., pers. comm., 2005). 
 
4.2.5 Runway clean up operations and procedures 
 
Runway and apron clean-up was preformed by vacuum/sweeper trucks, some of 
which were street sweepers leased from the local council (ANAS). The trucks would 
sweep up and down the runway longitudinally. The entire 150,000 m2 runway area 
would take 30 hours for a single truck to clean approximately 1 mm of ash from the 
surface, though this was usually sped up by 2-4 trucks working at once. Not all areas 
always required cleaning; sweeping would usually take between 2 and 8 hours 
depending on the amount of ash present on the runway. Water tankers were used to 
remove residual ash, washing ash to the grassed areas on the sides of the runway. 
These operated by driving across the runway rather than along it, and used high 
pressure water. The green areas (safety strips) were wetted, then “ploughed” with a 
pulvimixer to entrain ash in to the soil, followed by rolling the earth to assist in 
preventing remobilisation of ash. Using a pulvimixer and roller, 1000m2 took about 
one hour to cover. Joints between slabs on the runway and taxiways were also 
cleaned, using a small vacuum (SAC, 2003). Since the 2002 eruption the airport has 
purchased an additional street sweeper and water tanker to help in future ashfall 
cleanups (Guarrera, G., pers. comm., 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Clean up at Fontanarossa airport 
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4.2.6 Impacts on buildings and services 
 
As each ashfall was only ~ 1 mm there was time to sweep clean roofs, canopies 
balconies etc before any build up of ash occurred. Drains and downpipes were cleaned 
using high pressure water. No adverse impact occurred due to the rapid cleanup 
(Guarrera, G., pers. comm., 2005). 
 
4.2.7 Impacts on grounded aircraft 
 
Aircraft were very rarely parked at Fontanarossa during the eruption. Those few that 
were left outside for any length of time had engine intakes covered with tarpaulins. 
These were the only parts of aircraft that were covered. Before flying a visual 
inspection was conducted prior to starting engines. Once engines had been started up 
they were checked for a sulphur smell which was thought may have indicated the 
presence of ash (Guarrera, G., pers. comm., 2005). Fortunately ashfall did not impact 
the airport on the few occasions aircraft were left outside, therefore ash did not 
physically land on grounded aircraft at Fontanarossa during this eruption. 
 
As a precautionary measure most of the military aircraft stationed at NAS Sigonella 
were moved to Sardinia for the duration of the eruption. Therefore on the one 
occasion when light ashfall landed on the base there was no impact on grounded 
aircraft (Major Colombo, pers. comm., 2005).  
 
4.2.8 Operational impacts 
 
Decisions to officially close Fontanarossa were made by a crisis team (NVO) who 
considered the opinions of both pilots and INGV (the Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e 
Vulcanologia), as well as any SIGMETs or NOTAMs (ENAC, 2003). This team 
reported to the director of the airport, who in most cases had the final say on closing 
Fontanarossa. The decision to close was automatic if ash was present on the runway, 
but the wind direction also had a strong influence. This not only dictated the location 
of the plume but in which direction takeoff and landing would be in. On cloudy days 
it was not always apparent where the plume was. The same applied at night, 
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consequently, during the eruption the airport adopted a timetable of opening from 7 
am until 6 pm where possible (La Sicilia, 28/12/02). 
 
While the airport director usually decided who closed the airport officially, pilots 
could decide whether or not to land in Catania – even if the airport was officially 
open. Decisions were often made in-flight, as pilots could divert after making a visual 
assessment of the conditions around Fontanarossa. This would often then result in that 
airline diverting all subsequent flights that day to Palermo or Reggio Calabria. 
Another reason given for diversion was that pilots would not always believe that the 
runway had been adequately cleaned of ash. Some pilots refused to fly into Catania at 
all for the entire duration of the eruption. The strength of the pilots association in Italy 
meant that if a pilot declared conditions to be dangerous then the pilots association 
would declare the airport closed, much to the frustration of airport officials (Giancarlo 
Guarrera, pers. comm., 2005).  
 
No additional staff were required during the eruption, despite additional sweeping and 
cleaning needs. 
4.2.9 Economic impacts 
 
Ongoing closures meant that the economic damage caused to the airport by the 
eruption was significant. Not only did ash covering runways cause closures, but 
airspace was also closed by the plume. The fact that some pilots refused to fly into 
Catania during the eruption, preferring to land in Palermo, even when Fontanarossa 
was open, cost the airport even more money. While SAC declined providing an 
estimate of costs, it was said by the mayor of Catania (Umberto Scapagnini) to be 
around €500,000 per day (La Sicilia, 29/10/02). 
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4.2.10 Lessons learned from the 2002 Etna eruption 
 
Subsequent to the 2002 eruption, the airport operators SAC undertook the writing of a 
manual detailing procedures for operations around and removal of volcanic ash: 
“Cenere Vulcanica: procedure per la gestione, i controlli ed il monitoraggio della 
sicurezza ed agibilita’ delle aree di movimento aeroportuali” (SAC 2003). This 
translates as “Volcanic Ash: Procedures for it’s management and control, and the 
monitoring of the safety and operation of the airport’s area of maneuvering” (this 
equates to the airside part of the airport). This is an unpublished manual designed for 
use by Fontanarossa airport, based largely on experience gained during Etna’s 2002 
eruption. It describes recommended courses of action for Fontanarossa to take before, 
during and after an eruption. Most importantly it gives timeframes for cleaning 
methodologies. These timeframes are extremely useful for pre-eruption planning at 
any airport. A synopsis of its recommendations in the event of an eruption are: 
 
 Pre-event: (eruption pending, airport open) 
• Cover exposed equipment (especially computer or electronic 
equipment) with plastic sheeting 
• Put any other equipment not in frequent use inside buildings 
• Arrange additional means of cleaning paved areas, e.g. hire street 
sweeper trucks and water tankers. 
• Arrange for the supply of additional (extraordinary) quantities of water 
• Locate areas suitable for temporarily storing volcanic ash once it has 
been removed from the airport. 
• Acquire additional auxiliary electrical generators. 
• Acquire lime to help with the stabilisation of ash 
• Supply water hoses to the temporary ash storage area  
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During the event (airport closed to flights) 
• Cover any electronic equipment exposed to the elements. 
• Move any other equipment still outdoors inside. 
• Begin cleaning runways and taxiways  
• Clean other areas airside 
• Wet the safety strips (green areas beside runway) and plough in ash 
with pulvimixer, followed by a roller. 
• Thoroughly wet the ash storage area, keep water spraying over the ash. 
  
After the eruption has ceased 
• Uncover equipment that has been covered up 
• Plough lime into green areas to help stabilise ash. 
• Continue to wet safety strips beside runways 
• Remove ash from temporary storage area(s) 
• Clean elevated surfaces (balconies, roofs, canopies etc). 
• Inspect runways/taxiways/aprons 
• Resume normal airside operations 
• Clean other areas (e.g. carparks). 
 
Procedures for removing volcanic ash are also mentioned, as described in section 
4.2.5. These procedures list the time taken for different numbers of machines to clean 
different areas. The results of these give the following timeframes for cleaning (table 
4.2). 
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Activity Equipment used Area covered per machine 
per hour 
Sweeping and vacuuming 
(or blowing as required) 
volcanic ash, moving 
along the length of the 
runway 
Large vacuum sweeper 5000m2 
Washing the runway 
surface, with high pressure 
water, driving across the 
runway widthways  
Water tankers 7500m2 
Ploughing ash into green 
areas and subsequently 
rolling it 
Roller-compactor/ 
pulvimixer 
1000m2 
 
Table 4.2 Runway cleaning timeframes 
 
The 2002 eruption of Etna provides a good example of the considerable economic 
damage that ashfall and ash plumes can cause, even when no actual physical damage 
is sustained. The frequency of explosive eruptions at Etna has given the airport 
operators (SAC) significant experience in dealing with light ashfall, adding weight to 
their recommended procedures and methodologies. 
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4.3 The 1999 Guagua Pichincha and 2002 Reventador Eruptions: 
Impacts of ashfall on Mariscal Sucre Airport, Quito, Ecuador 
 
4.3.1 Background  
 
Much of this account of the impacts of the eruptions of Guagua Pichincha and 
Reventador on Quito’s airport is included within Leonard et al., 2005, available 
within as appendix 5. The aviation section of that article was written by this author. 
Section 4.3 of this chapter includes and adds to that information. 
4.3.2 Airport background 
 
Quito’s international airport (Aeropuerto Internacional Mariscal Sucre) is Ecuador’s 
main airport. Approximately 25 international and 50 domestic flights operate daily 
through this airport, together with cargo, military and private flights. The airport 
runway is approximately 3100 metres long by 46 metres wide, with taxiways of a 
similar length. Mariscal Sucre is located only 14 km from the summit of Guagua 
Pichincha volcano, and 93 km from Reventador volcano. 
4.3.3 Eruptive events affecting Mariscal Sucre 
 
The airport was subjected to ashfall from eruptions from both Guagua Pichincha 
(during October to December 1999 activity) and El Reventador Volcano (in 
November 2002). On three occasions during those eruptions the airport was forced to 
close for a week to 10 days in order to clean ash from the runways, airport 
infrastructure and from aircraft grounded on site during the eruptions.  
 
During the Guagua Pichincha eruption in 1999, 2 - 3 mm of ash was twice deposited 
on Quito airport; the 2002 Reventador eruption resulted in a 4 mm covering of ash. In 
all cases grounded aircraft were covered by ash. While there was no physical damage 
to aircraft and airport infrastructure during these eruptions, economic damage was 
significant, due to airport closure time, aircraft being rendered inoperable while the 
clean-up took place and the costs of the clean-up itself. 
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4.3.4 Impacts on Runways: Clean up operations and procedures 
 
Cleaning the 285,000 m2 of runways and taxiways/aprons was the most time-
consuming task related to the ashfall. In each eruptive case the runway cleanup was 
performed by 500 labourers with brooms, in the absence of available machinery 
(figure 4.5). One sweeper truck was owned by the airport, however this was found to 
be ineffective in removing ash.  
 
 
Figure 4.5: Manual runway cleanup at Mariscal Sucre Airport after the 2002 Reventador 
eruption. Photo courtesy of Mariscal Sucre Airport. 
 
Ash on the green areas around the runway was wet with a water tanker to prevent it 
from being remobilised onto the swept areas. A coagulation chemical supplied by 
Continental Airlines and sprayed with trucks was also used to stabilise ash in these 
green areas. The on-tarmac ash being swept was only slightly dampened (with tankers 
every 30 minutes), as wet ash was found to become sticky and more difficult to clean 
up. The time taken to clean the runway and taxiway of the 2-4 mm of ash was at least 
7 days for each eruption, using 500 labourers working 15 hours per day. This equates 
to 52500 hours spent sweeping and bagging ash. On average each worker could thus 
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clean around 5.4 m2 per hour, including the time taken to bag ash, load it onto a truck, 
and breaks. 
4.3.5 Impacts on buildings and services 
 
Cleaning up the airport buildings and other infrastructure was performed manually, 
with brooms and shovels. The 4 mm maximum of ash that fell on the airport during 
both the 1999 Guagua Pichincha and 2002 Reventador eruptions was not sufficient to 
cause structural damage to buildings. Air-conditioning units were not installed at the 
airport at this time. The lack of vulnerable infrastructure resulted in the airport 
proving to be robust enough to survive the ashfall undamaged. While ash blocked 
stormwater systems in some parts of the city in 2002, this problem was not significant 
at the airport as insufficient rain fell in this area in the hours and days after the 
eruption to cause this to happen. 
 
4.3.6 Impacts on grounded aircraft 
 
In 2002, the airport was given 5 hours warning of an eruption from IGEPN (the 
Instituto Geofisico, Escuela Politecnica Nacional), but no mitigation was initiated at 
that time. The airport was closed one hour before ash began to fall. Rapid responses 
were required to protect vulnerable parts of the aircraft parked on the taxiways and 
aprons of the airport. At the onset of ashfall, aircraft nose-cones and windshields were 
covered by tarpaulins. Landing gear, engines and pitot tubes were also covered. 
Wings were not covered, but all flaps/spoilers etc were fully closed or retracted. 
 
Ash adhered to the aircraft, but was dry enough to be removed by a person blowing 
on it. The ash remained on the aircraft from 12 to 48 hours, depending on when crews 
cleaned each aeroplane. Aircraft were moved with tow vehicles rather than starting jet 
engines or auxiliary power units in the presence of ash. Cleaning was performed using 
water from an airport fire truck. This only took 10 to 15 minutes for a medium sized 
passenger aircraft (e.g. a Boeing 737). After cleaning, full service checks were 
preformed on each of the aircraft to ascertain whether any damage had been sustained. 
No abrasion was seen to have occurred when the ash was washed off with the fire 
  124
hoses. Similarly no ingress of ash to the interior of wings etc was observed. In some 
cases cleaning was performed manually, using brooms. 
 
No corrosion was noted, though this was unlikely as the ash remained dry. The 
tarpaulins (secured with adhesive tape) were successful in protecting the vulnerable 
parts of the aircraft. An Airbus representative from Miami flew in to oversee the 
cleaning and assess any ash damage. Authorities stated that they did not need to open 
up the engines for inspection, but full ‘service inspections’ were conducted.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: Aerogal Boeing 727covered in ash from the Reventador 2002 eruption. Note the 
covered windscreen and nosecone, front wheel assembly and engine intakes. Photo courtesy 
of Mariscal Sucre Airport. 
 
4.3.7 Operational impacts 
 
The decision to close the airport was the responsibility with Ecuador’s Dirección 
General de Aviación Civil (DAC). This body is in communication with Ecuador’s 
Geophysical institute (IGEPN) and the Ecuadorian meteorological service. IGEPN 
also communicates directly with the Washington VAAC, which communicates 
internationally. IGEPN staff noted that the decision-making process was not well 
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established, with some convincing required to close the airport (Leonard et al., 2005). 
This was in part due to pressure from local carriers, who had more to lose than larger 
international airlines when Mariscal Sucre closed.  
 
4.3.8 Economic impacts 
 
These interruptions to normal service proved costly for both the airport and for 
carriers, especially local airlines. The cleanup itself was comparatively cheap (in 
Ecuador labourers could be cheaply hired for $0.75 – $1.00 US per hour) therefore the 
entire clean up would cost ~$50,000). This solution may not have been as 
economically feasible in nations with higher pay rates. However the length of time 
that the airport was closed for caused a significant loss of income. 
 
The national airline in Ecuador (TAME) was particularly affected by the 2002 
Reventador eruption. Seven aircraft were trapped on the ground for the duration of the 
eruption and clean-up. These seven aircraft represented a large proportion of the 
airline’s total fleet of 11. While advanced warning times may have given the airline 
more time to move the aircraft, availability of pilots to fly the planes would still have 
been a problem.  
4.3.9 Lessons learned from the 1999 Guagua Pichincha and 2002 
Reventador eruptions 
 
Despite the low-tech approach to cleaning the runways, these eruptions have 
demonstrated that it is possible to remove vast amounts of volcanic ash with little 
more than brooms, provided a cheap labour force is available. More importantly the 
cleaning methodologies employed to remove ash from aircraft have proved to be 
effective. These give an option for airport operators and airlines to consider in future 
ashfalls. 
 
In terms of risk management, the delay in closing the airport after advice had been 
given of an impending eruption proved to be costly. This delay illustrates the 
importance of having a well established decision making system, and of good 
communications with volcano monitoring agencies. The 2002 Reventador eruption 
demonstrated the impact that closing an airport can have on local carriers; prolonged 
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closures can severely threaten their business. As a result they have a greater interest in 
keeping airports open, to a higher risk threshold than large international airlines. 
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4.4 Aircraft surfaces: Susceptibility to corrosion and abrasion. 
 
The experiences of Mariscal Sucre and Fontanarossa airports were both valuable in 
terms of determining impacts on the operation of airports during and after ashfall, but 
the potential for damage to grounded aircraft was fortunately not realised in either 
case. Corrosion and abrasion to aircraft surfaces remains a real threat if grounded 
aircraft are subject to ashfall. 
 
4.4.1 Ash properties causing corrosion 
 
Ash collected from volcanic plumes commonly has a coating to particles, which is 
interpreted to be sulphuric acid (Cadle et al., 1979; Casadevall et al., 1984; Rose et 
al., 1980). Soluble components (salts) are also present, increasing the conductivity 
and corrosiveness of ash (Rose, 1977). This is borne out by instances of acid rain in 
the vicinity of volcanoes, which has been found to have a pH as low as 2 (unpolluted 
rainwater has a pH of 5.8) (Gíslason et al., 1996), or at Sakurajima volcano a pH <1 
(ICAO, 2001). Matsumoto et al. (1988) conducted tests on various metals left outside 
for a month in sporadic ashfall from Sakurajima volcano. Deterioration was found to 
occur strongly in aluminium, followed by steel, galvanized steel, copper and then 
stainless steel. Numerous historic instances of ash and ash leachates causing corrosion 
on contact with metals have been recorded (e.g. Bitschene, 1995; Blong, 1984; Blong 
& McKee 1995; Johnston, 1997). The corrosive properties of ash are well established, 
but to date there have been no significant instances of corrosion from ash on aircraft, 
possibly in part due to the rarity of ash impacting grounded aircraft, and the speed 
with which it is usually cleaned up. 
 
4.4.2 Aircraft surfaces 
 
Aluminium alloys are used in aircraft manufacture, as pure aluminium does not have 
sufficient strength for structural use. While much stronger than pure aluminium, 
alloys are known to be more susceptible to corrosion (Banis et al., 1999). Corrosion is 
a common occurrence on aircraft especially around fasteners where holes drilled 
through cladding and alloys allow the penetration of water (D. Good, Air New 
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Zealand, pers. comm., 2009). These areas are also susceptible to galvanic corrosion, 
depending on the type of fastener used, and fretting corrosion if any movement is 
present. Any corrosion degrades the mechanical performance of the alloy and can 
cause metal fatigue, which eventually may threaten the integrity of the aircraft 
(Petroyiannis et al., 2005). For this reason any unpainted alloy skins are usually clad 
in pure aluminium to provide corrosion resistance. Cladding normally makes up about 
5% of the total skin thickness (D. Good, pers. comm., 2009). Skin thicknesses may 
vary slightly depending on use, but are commonly ~1 mm thick. Pure aluminium is 
used as not only is it less susceptible to corrosion than aircraft alloys, it is anodic to 
the core alloy. When exposed to a corrosive solution, current flows from the anodic 
cladding through the metal to the cathodic core. This dissolves the cladding 
preferentially, protecting the core (and thus the strength of the skin) electrochemically 
(Petroyiannis et al., 2005). The unpainted areas of aircraft vary between airlines, but 
frequently include the leading edge on wings and tails. Some airlines (e.g. American 
Airlines) leave most of the aircraft unpainted. 
 
While providing some protection, thin aluminium cladding can be compromised; it is 
easily scratched, and these scratches may penetrate through to the alloy beneath. This 
could be problematic for cleaning volcanic ash off aircraft. Testing has shown that 
some electrochemical protection of 2024-T3 alloy is given by the surrounding 
aluminium, even when the alloy is exposed in scratches (Petroyiannis et al., 2005), 
but it is unclear how much corrosion could still occur on these surfaces if impacted by 
volcanic ash and ash leachates. The extent to which abrasion can occur on aluminium 
surfaces when ash is being cleaned off is also unclear.  
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4.4.3 Laboratory work 
 
Experimental work was conducted on aircraft skins, to determine timeframes over 
which acidic leachate damage could occur from ash, and the potential for abrasion 
from different cleaning methods when removing ash. Two of the most commonly 
used alloy types were sourced from Air New Zealand; 2024-T3 (a copper-magnesium 
aluminium alloy) and 7075-T6 (a copper-magnesium-zinc aluminium alloy). Table 
4.3 lists alloys used as external skins on commercial aircraft, and illustrates the 
common use of 2024-T3 and 7075-T6 on aircraft skins (in bold type). New aircraft 
models such as the Airbus A380 and Boeing 777 use more advanced alloys (including 
titanium alloys) that were not available at the time of testing. 
 
Aircraft type 
Area used 
Airbus 
A319, A320, 
A321 
Airbus  
A380 
Boeing 
707, 727, 
737, 747 
Boeing 
737-300, 
757, 767 
Boeing 
777 
Fuselage/body 
skin/flaps 
2024-
T3/7475 A6013 HDT 2024-T3 2024-T3 
7150 
T77/2XXX-
T3 
Wing – top 
skin 7150 A7055 
7075-
T6/7178 7150-T651 7150 T77 
Wing – bottom 
skin 2024-T3 A2024 HDT 2024-T3 2324-T39 
Ti 15 – 3, 
2324-T39 
Vertical tail 
skin Composites* Composites* 7075-T6 7075-T6 Composites* 
Horizontal tail 
skins (upper) Composites* Composites* 2024-T3 2024-T3 Composites* 
Horizontal tail 
skins (lower) 
Composites* Composites* 7075-T6 7075-T6 Composites* 
* Composites vary but include materials such as epoxy, bismaleimide, polyimide, fibreglass, 
boron fibre, carbon fibre, and more recently carbon fibre reinforced plastic (CFRP). 
 
Table 4.3 Alloy types used as external skin by common aircraft type. Alloys tested are in bold 
type. Table derived from Brady, 1999; NMAB 1996; Good, pers. comm., 2009, Starke & 
Staley 1996, Smith, (2003) AZoM, 2004. 
 
While these alloys are usually covered with paint or pure aluminium cladding, testing 
them was necessary as the potential for exposure to ash leachates still exits. This 
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could occur through scratches in cladding or paint, fastener holes, areas of peeled 
paint, door mechanisms/hinges etc. Bare alloy, clad alloy and painted sections of 
aluminium were tested. Two types of paint have been used on the painted samples 
tested; a white gloss isocyanate commonly found on commercial aircraft exteriors, 
and a green “corrosion inhibiting” matt primer. The rationale behind performing this 
work was to assist airport operators and aircraft engineers in making informed 
decisions on prioritising ash cleanup, and determining optimal cleaning 
methodologies for cleaning aircraft.  
4.4.3.1 Methodology 
Bare aluminium alloy, clad alloy and painted aircraft panels were divided into 
sections and photographed pre-testing, using both macro lenses and an optical 
microscope. Further imaging was conducted post testing using a scanning electron 
microscope.  
 
The chemistry of ash leachates differs not just between volcanoes, but in different 
eruptions from the same volcano, or may even change during an eruption when the 
eruption style changes. There is because there are a large number of variables in 
determining volatile adsorption onto ash particles (Witham et. al., 2005). Cl, Ca, Na, 
SO42-, Mg and F are commonly found in high concentrations in ash-water leachates 
are (IVHHN, 2005). Fresh ash and associated leachates were not available at the time 
of experimentation, however lahar samples taken from the September 2007 eruption 
of Mt Ruapehu provided good substitutes for volcanic ash leachates. These samples 
were collected from both the Whakapapa skifield and the Whangaehu river lahars. 
The Whangaehu river sample sediment was derived from the March 2007 lahar, the 
chemistry of the river water mixed with that sample was influenced by the September 
2007 lahar. Samples were gathered at various distances from source, with 
corresponding changes in pH values. This provided a useful variety of samples to test 
on the aircraft aluminium, as their volcanic source meant that they were chemically 
good proxies for potential leachates. The slightly different physical nature of the wet 
lahar sediment meant that usual leachate analyses as described by Witham et al., 
(2005) were not appropriate in this case. An analysis of the composition of the 
sediment was conducted by Massey University’s Fertilizer & Lime research centre. 
The lahar samples were found to be extremely high in sulphates; SO4 was measured at 
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between 2190 and 2623 µg/g of sediment. High sulphate levels are typical of ash 
leachates (Witham et al., 2005) 
 
Three different wet sediment samples were used in testing. The sample collected from 
the Whakapapa lahar had a measured pH of 2.5, the pH of the Whangaehu samples 
were 3.4 and 4.5 respectively. Each of these samples were applied to both bare 
aircraft alloy and painted aircraft panels (figure 4.7). 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Wet ash samples applied to 7075-T6 alloy  
 
Samples were left undisturbed on the surfaces for 6, 24, 48 or 96 hours. Sediment was 
wiped off with a soft dry cloth at the end of each test period. In all cases the samples 
required more pressure to remove after 24 hours had elapsed than following the 6 
hour tests. A dry ash test was also conducted on all bare sample types. This sample 
came from the same Whakapapa lahar source as the sample used in leachate testing, 
but was unsealed and allowed to dry at room temperature for 3 days. It’s pH was 
subsequently measured at 2.9 (as opposed to 2.5 for the wet sample), but this reading 
should be treated with caution due to the dry nature of the sediment.  
 
Further testing of the potential for ash abrading surfaces during clean up involved 
leaving ash on sections of clad aluminium and painted aluminium. As abrasion testing 
required an actual ash sample rather than lahar sediment to give accurate results, ash 
from the 1994 Rabaul eruption was used. This dacitic ash had a mean grainsize of 
88.9 µm and a modal grainsize of 79.6 µm. Prior to application it was mixed with 
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acidic Whangaehu river water that had been sampled several hours after the 
September 2007 lahar. After buffering the pH of the ash-water mix remained at 3.7. 
This mix was then applied to both clad and painted alloy surfaces. Once the ash had 
been left on the surface for the required time (either 6, 24 or 48 hours), it was cleaned 
off using a brush, water, or a combination thereof, this is the most likely method to be 
used by airport maintenance staff. Vacuuming would not work on the ash, as having 
been wet it strongly adhered to the surfaces once dried. Compressed air would be 
impractical and largely ineffective on the slightly cemented ash.  
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4.4.3.2 Results 
Corrosion testing 
 
Tables 4.4- 4.9 indicate the results of ash leachate corrosion tests on aircraft surfaces. 
SEM micrographs of pitting on tested surfaces after being exposed to a leachate of pH 
2.5 for 24 hours are included for comparison.  
 
Rare pitting:   Pits constitute <1% of the surface area 
Minor pitting:  Pits constitute 1-5 % of the surface area 
Pitting:   Pits constitute 5-10 % of the surface area 
Extensive pitting:  Pits constitute >10% of the surface area. 
 
Impacts of ash leachates on unclad 7075-T6 alloy 
pH 
Exposure 
duration 
(hours) 
Observations 
2.5 6 Mild oxidation on surface, minor pitting 10-30 µm deep 
2.5 24 Significant surface oxidation, pitting 10-30 µm deep 
2.5 48 Significant surface oxidation, extensive pitting 10-30 µm deep 
2.5 96 Significant surface oxidation, extensive pitting 10-30 µm deep 
3.4 6 Very mild oxidation on surface, rare pitting 10-30 µm deep 
3.4 24 surface oxidation, pitting 10-30 µm deep 
3.4 48 Significant surface oxidation, extensive pitting 10-30 µm deep 
3.4 96 Significant surface oxidation, extensive pitting 10-30 µm deep 
4.5 6 Slight discolouration of surface 
4.5 24 Very mild oxidation on surface, rare pitting 
4.5 48 Very mild oxidation on surface, rare pitting 
4.5 96 Very mild oxidation on surface, rare pitting 
 
Table 4.4 Impacts of ash leachates on unclad 7075-T6 alloy 
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Impacts of ash leachates on unclad 2024-T3 alloy 
pH 
Exposure 
duration 
(hours) 
Observations 
2.5 6 Mild oxidation on surface, pitting 
2.5 24 surface oxidation, pitting 10- 30 µm deep 
2.5 48 Significant surface oxidation, pitting 10- 30 µm deep 
2.5 96 Significant surface oxidation, pitting 10- 30 µm deep 
3.4 6 Slight oxidation of surface, minor pitting 10- 30 µm deep 
3.4 24 Surface oxidation, minor pitting < 10 µm deep 
3.4 48 Surface oxidation, minor pitting < 10 µm deep 
3.4 96 Surface oxidation, minor pitting < 10 µm deep 
4.5 6 Rare slight pitting, negligible oxidation except on edges of area exposed to leachate where a slightly more oxidised rim exists 
4.5 24 Very mild oxidation on surface, rare pitting < 10 µm deep 
4.5 48 Very mild oxidation on surface, rare pitting < 10 µm deep 
4.5 96 Very mild oxidation on surface, rare pitting < 10 µm deep 
 
Table 4.5 Impacts of ash leachates on unclad 2024-T3 alloy 
 
Impacts of ash leachates on clad 2024-T3 alloy 
pH 
Exposure 
duration 
(hours) 
Observations 
2.5 6 Minor oxidation, rare pitting 
2.5 24 Significant surface oxidation, minor pitting 10-50 µm deep 
2.5 48 Significant surface oxidation, pitting 10-50 µm deep 
3.4 6 Very minor areas of oxidation, no pitting 
3.4 24 Surface oxidation, rare pitting 10-30 µm deep 
3.4 48 Significant surface oxidation, rare pitting 10-30 µm deep 
4.5 6 No discernable impact 
4.5 24 Minor oxidation, no evidence of pitting 
4.5 48 Minor oxidation, no evidence of pitting 
 
Table 4.6 Impacts of ash leachates on clad 2024-T3 alloy
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Figure 4.8 SEM micrograph of surface of clad 2024-T3 aluminium prior to testing. Small 
amounts of dust are present. Fine scratches such as the prominent one pictured on a diagonal 
are not uncommon. Faint grooves running across the surface left to right are part of the 
manufacturing process. 
 
Figure 4.9: SEM micrograph of 7075-T6 aluminium after being exposed to a leachate of pH 
2.5 for 24 hours (note larger scale than figures 4.8 and 4.10) 
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Figure 4.10: SEM micrograph of 7075-T6 aluminium after being exposed to  
a leachate of pH 2.5 for 24 hours. 
 
 
Figure 4.11: SEM micrograph of 2024-T3 aluminium after being exposed to  
a leachate of pH 2.5 for 24 hours  
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Figure 4.12: SEM micrograph of clad 2024-T3 aluminium after being exposed to  
a leachate of pH 2.5 for 24 hours 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13: Optical Microscope view of 2024-T3 aluminium after being exposed to a 
leachate of pH 2.5 for 24 hours. The oxidised surface (lower ¾ of image) clearly stands out 
against the untested surface. Note pitting. Field of view is 8 mm. 
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Impacts of ash leachates on painted aircraft surfaces (glossy isocyanate) 
pH 
Exposure 
duration 
(hours) 
Observations 
2.5 6 No observed effect 
2.5 24 Little effect, minor ash adherence to surface, easily removed with cloth 
2.5 48 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area, no other effect apparent 
2.5 96 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area, no other effect apparent 
3.4 6 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area, no other effect apparent 
3.4 24 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area, no other effect apparent 
3.4 48 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area, no other effect apparent 
3.4 96 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area, no other effect apparent 
4.5 6 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
4.5 24 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
4.5 48 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
4.5 96 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
 
Table 4.7 Impacts of ash leachates on painted aircraft surfaces (glossy isocyanate) 
 
 
Table 4.8 Impacts of ash leachates on painted aircraft surfaces (matt primer) 
Impacts of ash leachates on painted aircraft surfaces (matt primer) 
pH 
Exposure 
duration 
(hours) 
Observations 
2.5 6 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
2.5 24 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
2.5 48 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
2.5 96 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
3.4 6 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
3.4 24 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
3.4 48 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
3.4 96 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
4.5 6 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
4.5 24 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
4.5 48 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
4.5 96 Increased ash adherence to outside of sample area. no other effect apparent 
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Figure 4.14: Painted Aluminium surface (matt primer) The surface on the left hand side of the 
ash has not been exposed to leachates, the right hand side has been exposed to 
a leachate of pH 2.5 for 96 hours. No effects were seen. Field of view is 13 mm 
 
Impacts of dry ash (pH 2.9) on several aircraft surfaces 
Surface type Duration (hours) Observations 
2024-T3 alloy 6 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
2024-T3 alloy 48 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
2024-T3 alloy 24 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
2024-T3 alloy 96 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
7075-T6 alloy 6 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
7075-T6 alloy 24 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
7075-T6 alloy 48 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
7075-T6 alloy 96 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
Clad 2024-T3 alloy 6 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
Clad 2024-T3 alloy 24 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
Clad 2024-T3 alloy 48 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
Clad 2024-T3 alloy 96 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
Painted* alloy 6 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
Painted* alloy 24 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
Painted* alloy 48 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
Painted* alloy 96 No effect, ash easily wiped off with cloth or brush 
*Painted alloy surfaces tested were painted with glossy isocyanate. 
Table 4.9 Impacts of dry ash on different aircraft surfaces 
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The results of these tests indicate that painted aircraft surfaces have adequate 
corrosion protection from volcanic ash leachates when covered by either primer paints 
or top coats. No damage to paint or discolouration occurred in this time frame. 
Conversely, unpainted aircraft surfaces were found to potentially be at substantial risk 
from corrosive acidic leachates. The effects of acidic leachates on bare surfaces were 
quickly apparent; in most cases significant oxidation had taken place on unpainted 
surfaces by the time ash was removed after 6 hours. Oxidation was clearly visible as a 
rough frosted type surface. It occurred on both clad and unclad alloys exposed to 
leachates equal to or more acidic than pH 3.4. The less acidic leachate (pH 4.5) had 
no discernable effect in this timeframe on aluminium clad alloy, and only slight 
impacts on unclad alloys. Oxidation increased over time though, and even the 
leachates with a comparatively benign pH of 4.5 caused some damage after 24 or 48 
hours. By 48 hours after application the reaction between the acids and 
aluminium/alloy appeared to have ceased, no further effects were noted in the 96 hour 
tests. 
 
As well as surface oxidation, all bare surfaces were found to be subject to pitting. 
Clad surfaces suffered from deeper pitting than the unclad alloys, due to the 
preferential electrochemical dissolution of the anodic pure aluminium cladding over 
the cathodic alloy. In most instances pit depth on clad alloys was 10 – 50 µm, whereas 
maximum pit depth on unclad alloys appeared to be ~30 µm (figures 4.8-4.12). While 
pitting on clad surfaces appeared to be deeper than on alloy surfaces, the total surface 
area affected by pitting was slightly higher on the 7075 alloy than the 2024 alloy. The 
pure aluminium cladding had a marginally smaller pitted surface area despite the 
deeper pits. 
 
Despite their high acidity, without water acting as an electrolyte the dry ash did not 
affect aircraft surfaces. Even after 48 hours there was no impact on any of the bare or 
painted surfaces tested.  
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Abrasion by cleaning method tests 
 
Removal of previously wet ash from clad 2024-T3 surface by cleaning method 
Method 
Time until 
ash 
removed 
(hours) 
Observations 
Brushing/sweeping 6 
Most ash easily brushed off except for residual ash which required 
low pressure water 
Brushing/sweeping
24 
Hard to remove, several passes with brush required to remove ash. 
Residual ash required low pressure water to remove 
Brushing/sweeping 48 Not possible to remove without low pressure water aiding sweeping 
Wetting 6 Easily rinsed off with low pressure water 
Wetting 24 Most ash removed by water, muddy residue also required brushing 
Wetting 48 Most ash removed by water, muddy residue also required brushing 
 
Table 4.10 Removal of previously wet ash from clad surfaces by brushing/wetting. 
 
Removal of ash from painted (glossy) surface by cleaning method 
Method 
Time until 
ash 
removed 
(hours) 
Observations 
Brushing/sweeping 6 
Ash easily brushed off, small areas of adherence were wetted to 
facilitate removal 
Brushing/sweeping
24 
Harder to remove, several passes with brush required to remove 
ash. Residual ash required low pressure water to remove 
Brushing/sweeping
48 
Harder to remove, several passes with brush required to remove 
ash. Residual ash required low pressure water to remove 
Wetting 6 Easily rinsed off with low pressure water 
Wetting 24 Most ash removed by water, muddy residue also required brushing 
Wetting 48 Most ash removed by water, muddy residue also required brushing 
 
Table 4.10 Removal of previously wet ash from painted aircraft surfaces by brushing/wetting. 
 
Cleaning ash off surfaces with water and/or brushes was thought to have the potential 
to abrade paint or aluminium. This did not occur during these tests, both optical 
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microscopy and SEM micrographs indicating negligible scratching or gouging on 
either aluminium clad or painted surfaces.  
 
4.4.3.3 Implications of testing 
 
Impacts to metal surfaces depend not just on the pH and the duration that ash is left on 
the aircraft, but on the presence of rainfall during or after ashfall. Testing indicated 
dry ash had no effect on any kind of aircraft surface, but wet ash resulted in leachates 
corroding and oxidising both clad and unclad surfaces. This means that light rain 
during or after ashfall could result in significant damage to ash covered aircraft. 
Heavy rain is likely to clean aircraft of ash, and is thus less of a problem in terms of 
corrosion. Wet ash from phreatic or phreatomagmatic eruptions will have the capacity 
to begin to cause corrosion immediately upon landing on the aircraft. As it is unlikely 
that leachate pH will be known immediately after ashfall, it will be necessary to treat 
any ash as being highly acidic, removing it from aircraft as soon as possible to prevent 
corrosion. 
 
The amount of surface oxidation and pitting corrosion experienced in these tests 
would not in itself prevent aircraft flying. Oxidation of aluminium and alloy surfaces 
is common on aircraft; repairing oxidised surfaces is dealt with as part of routine 
aircraft maintenance and does not require immediate attention. Pitting is more serious, 
as once pits form they tend to continue to slowly grow over time. This type of 
corrosion therefore requires prompt attention. In the short term the mechanical 
performance of clad alloy is unlikely to be compromised by the level of pitting seen in 
these tests, as it is the clad surface that is corroded rather than the structural alloy. 
Pitting directly in alloy is more problematic, in that even aircraft skins are structural; 
pits can eventually lead to fatigue failure if they are located in a critical load path 
(Banis et al., 1999). The 10-30 µm deep pits experienced by the unclad 2024 and 
7075 alloys amounted to between 1 and 3% of the 1 mm alloy thickness. This level of 
pitting is not sufficient to compromise the structural integrity of the alloy (D. Good, 
pers. comm., 2009). The corrosion does however need to be quickly removed, and the 
surface repaired. Depending on the extent of corrosion this could result in the aircraft 
being out of service for days to weeks. Even without this damage occurring, any 
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aircraft subjected to ashfall will require extensive inspection to ensure all ash is 
removed and the plane is safe to fly. 
 
The potential for abrasion while cleaning ash off aircraft surfaces exists, despite 
negligible abrasion occurring during testing. Different ash types may give different 
results. The ash used in testing was a fine grained dacite, its high silica content and 
angular grain shape made this a very abrasive ash. However volcanic ash could 
potentially be more abrasive than this, and give less benign results. This could occur 
with a more silicic rhyolitic ash, or even a glassy ash with sharp angular grains. 
Extreme care should therefore be taken when removing ash from aircraft skins. 
Abrasion to windshields and windows was not tested, as experience after the Pinatubo 
eruption suggests these can easily be scratched if rubbed when removing ash 
(Casadevall, 1992). Ideally windshields should be covered in the event of an aircraft 
being parked outside during an ashfall (figure 4.15). 
 
 
Figure 4.15: TAME airlines Boeing 727-134 with improvised covers on windscreen, wheel 
assemblies and engine intakes 
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4.5 Summary of Potential Ashfall Impacts on Grounded Aircraft 
 
While ash has landed on airports on more than 73 occasions since 1944, in most 
instances grounded aircraft were not impacted, often because they were moved in 
time to avoid the ashfall. Those impacts that have occurred include impact damage 
from larger clasts (bombs), charring from hot ash, tephra loading causing planes to 
rock back onto their tails, windscreen abrasion from incorrect cleaning and economic 
damage from taking aircraft out of service while they are cleaned and or repaired. 
These potential impacts still exist, as does the potential for corrosion and abrasion.  
 
Testing of ash leachates on aircraft skins has shown the risk of corrosion to be a 
significant threat. Wet ash has the capacity to start attacking exposed metal surfaces 
immediately, causing pitting damage evident after just 6 hours, and extensive after 24 
hours. This means aircraft need to be cleaned as soon as possible after wet ash lands 
on aircraft, or ash on aircraft becomes wet from rainfall. Abrasion is certainly a 
potential problem for windshield and windows, and remains a possibility on metal 
surfaces. Any moving part has the potential to be affected by abrasion, which is why 
covering vulnerable parts like wheel assemblies, windshields and engine intakes has 
been recommended practice for several years (e.g. Casadevall, 1993) More detailed 
methodologies for cleaning aircraft after ashfall are given by Labadie (1994) and 
repeated in ICAO (2001). 
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4.6 Mitigating the effects of ashfall on airports and grounded aircraft 
 
The following series of recommendations for actions to take pre-event, during a 
volcanic eruption and after ashfall has ceased is derived from the experiences of 
Mariscal Sucre and Fontanarossa airports, results of laboratory tests, and previous 
recommendations (Casadevall (1993), Labadie (1994) and ICAO (2001)) based on 
eruptions over the last 30 years. 
 
4.6.1 Pre-event.  
 
Ideally these actions should be taken by any airport potentially subject to volcanic 
ash. At the very least they should be taken when warning of a possible eruption is 
given by the relevant authority (in New Zealand this is GNS Science). 
 
• Acquire and store materials needed for covering or sealing openings and 
vulnerable areas on aircraft (engine and APU intakes, windscreens, nose 
cones, wheel assemblies, pitot tubes). Coverings for ground equipment such as 
electronic or computer equipment will also be required. These coverings can 
be as simple as duct-tape and plastic sheeting. 
• Acquire and store additional cleaning materials (brooms, vacuum cleaners, 
cleaning fluids), dust masks and goggles for all staff on site, spare parts for 
essential machinery, oil filters, air filters, lubricants. 
• Prearrange additional means of cleaning paved areas, runways etc. This may 
involve agreements for the hire of street sweeper trucks, water tankers, front 
end loaders, rollers etc, or arrangements with contractors 
• Prearrange a source of auxiliary power generators. 
• Prearrange a source of large volumes of water for cleaning up volcanic ash  
• Locate areas suitable for temporarily or permanently storing volcanic ash once 
it has been removed from the airport. 
 
Once an eruption appears imminent these additional measures should be undertaken 
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• Cover exposed equipment (especially computer or electronic equipment) with 
plastic sheeting 
• Put any other equipment not in frequent use inside buildings 
• Supply water hoses to the temporary ash storage area  
• Any aircraft not evacuated from the area before ashfall should have the 
following areas or components covered with plastic sheeting and tape: Engine 
and APU intakes, windscreens, nose cones, wheel assemblies, pitot tubes 
• Aircraft with large horizontal tails may accumulate large amounts of ash and 
rotate backwards about the rear wheels onto their tails. These need to be 
supported or anchored as appropriate. 
 
4.6.2 During ashfall 
 
• Move inside/cover any other equipment still outdoors 
• Begin cleaning runways and taxiways with vacuum/sweeper trucks, or 
ploughs/blades as appropriate for the amount of ash. 
• Clean other areas airside 
• Wet the safety strips (green areas beside runway) and plough in ash with a 
pulvimixer, followed by a roller (light ashfall only). 
• Thoroughly wet the ash storage area, keep water spraying over the ash. 
• Clean ash from large span roofs (such as hangars) before more than ~5 cm has 
accumulated, to allow a generous safety margin before roof collapse. Slippery 
conditions mean all workers near edges should be harnessed.  
• Clean damp or wet ash off exposed aircraft surfaces as soon as possible, 
concentrating on exposed metal surfaces 
  
4.6.3 After the eruption has ended 
 
• Clean elevated surfaces (balconies, roofs, canopies etc). 
• Complete runway/taxiway cleaning 
• Complete aircraft cleaning 
• Uncover equipment that has been covered up 
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• Continue to wet safety strips beside runways 
• Remove ash from temporary storage area(s) 
• Inspect runways/taxiways/aprons 
• Resume normal airside operations 
• Clean other areas (e.g. carparks). 
4.6.4 Removing ash from airports 
 
Experience at different airports in the past has shown that there are a number of 
methods that can be employed to clean up ash from runways/taxiways etc. Deposits 
thicker than a few millimetres deep can be bladed into lines using 
graders/snowploughs, this method was used at Fairchild Air Force Base after ashfall 
from Mount St Helens in 1980. The experience of Quito’s Mariscal Sucre airport has 
shown that with a large enough workforce it is possible to remove several millimetres 
of ash with brooms and manual labour. The account of the use of vacuum/sweeper 
trucks and rollers employed to remove light ashfall from runways and other airside 
areas by SAC not only gives useful information about how to remove thin deposits of 
ash, but indications of the length of time it takes to perform such tasks. With this 
information plans for the required amount of machinery to resume operations in a 
given timeframe can be established. As most ashfall impacts on airports are light, and 
cheap readily available labour forces are not common, this method is likely to be the 
most commonly employed for removing ash from airports.  
 
Methods for removing ash have not deviated greatly since those used after the 1980 
Mt St Helens eruption, and detailed in ICAO document 9691 (2001). General 
principles remain the same, the methodologies employed by SAC in Catania reflect 
this, but have slightly refined the process through frequent experience. These 
refinements include beginning the cleaning process during ashfall, determining that 
running sweepers lengthways and water tankers widthways across runways works 
faster, and that a vacuum and sweeping combination works best on light ash deposits.  
 
Suggested practices for mitigating the effects of volcanic ash are recommended for 
New Zealand, through the establishment of a preliminary response plan for volcanic 
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ash for Auckland Airport and Air New Zealand. This plan is currently in preparation 
as a GNS Science report, and included in this thesis as appendix 2. 
4.7 Summary  
 
Provided aircraft are adequately protected, and roofs are cleaned before tephra loading 
becomes an issue, physical damage resulting from ashfall can be minimised. However 
impacts to airports and grounded aircraft are not only physical. Financial losses 
resulting from the costs of airport closure are likely to exceed those incurred from 
damage and cleanup. Pre planning for ashfall is essential to minimise airport closure 
time, facilitating a rapid return to business as usual. A reactive approach to ashfall 
will result in more damage and a longer recovery time, as access to required cleaning 
equipment (including runway cleaning machinery) may not be possible, contacting 
staff may be difficult, and aircraft may be stranded and unnecessarily exposed to 
ashfall. Even seemingly simple omissions like a shortage of personal protective 
equipment such as dust masks may hinder clean up procedures, ultimately costing 
more in airport closure time. The mitigation strategies listed in this chapter will aid 
the process of effectively managing the risk posed by volcanic ashfall.  
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CHAPTER 5: VEHICLE MOBILITY ON ASH COVERED 
ROADS. 
 
5.1  Introduction  
 
Recordings of ash affecting vehicles have largely concentrated on damage to vehicle 
components (e.g. Labadie, 1983), reports of lowered visibility whilst driving in ashfall 
(e.g. Blong 1984) and thin layers of ash making driving conditions slippery (e.g. 
Durand et al. 2001). This information is certainly valuable, but in planning for an 
evacuation or responding to an eruption, emergency managers also need to know 
whether it is possible to actually drive vehicles on ash covered roads. If so how much 
ash is it possible to drive through? Ideally roads will be cleaned by roading contactors 
or local authorities before vehicles commence driving on them, but this is not always 
possible or practical. Driving on ash covered roads may be necessary for evacuees 
from affected areas, emergency services, emergency responders, lifelines maintenance 
or repair staff and infrastructure/utility providers. Even getting road maintenance staff 
to depots to access road cleaning equipment may necessitate a vehicle journey on an 
ash covered road. 
 
This chapter seeks to determine what depths of ash may prove difficult or impossible 
to drive through. This is based both on evidence from historical eruptions and from 
experiments undertaken on Mount Etna in 2002 and 2005. It should be stressed that 
this work is very much of a preliminary nature, and further research is required to 
more accurately determine the affects of ash on vehicles and vehicle mobility. In the 
context of there being very little information published on this subject, the small 
amount of work done here is indicative only.  
 
5.2 Ashfall, roads and vehicles since 1980 
 
1980: Mt St Helens: Ashfall on roads following the May 18 and subsequent 
eruptions of Mt St Helens resulted in reduced visibility, accidents, speed restrictions, 
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stranded travellers and altered traffic volumes (Blong, 1984). Approximately 3000km 
of State Highways were closed for a week, thousands of county and municipal roads 
were closed for hours to weeks (Schuster, 1981). These roads were generally closed 
due to slippery conditions and visibility problems rather than by the inability of 
vehicles to get through, as layers of ash were usually thin enough to be driven on. The 
Yakima area received about 10-15 mm of ash, but further away Ritzville was 
impacted by 40 mm of ash (Blong, 1984). According to The Columbian newspaper 
(May 26 1980) some vehicles trying to leave Ritzville on the I-90 (12 out of 75 cars) 
turned back because of poor road conditions (Blong, 1984). It is not specified whether 
this was because of visibility, slipperiness, traction problems or driver caution.  
 
1991 Mt Pinatubo: After the June 1991 eruption the Olangapo and Subic Bay city 
areas had to cope with 15-20cm of coarse ash on major roads (Nairn, 2002). This was 
cleared after 2 days by scraping it to the side of the road. More problematic were 
mudflows from slopes adjacent to roads and flooding as drains became blocked. 
Lahars also destroyed bridges (Nairn, 2002). Millimetres to centimetres of ash 
remained on roads for months as wind remobilised ash from piles on the side of the 
road.  
 
1991 Mt Hudson: Vehicles in Perito Moreno were involved in accidents when driven 
through ashfall at moderate speeds. Engines suffered damage and caused vehicle 
breakdown, due mainly to air-filter and carburettor blockages (Bitschene, 1995). 
 
1992 Mt Spurr: The August 18th eruption deposited about 3 mm of ash on 
Anchorage. Roads were affected in that visibility was reduced, however rainfall on 
the evening of the 19th alleviated the problem. City buses stopped operating on the 
18th, and ran a limited service on the 19th. Increased maintenance of vehicle fleets was 
reported to have been necessary for many organisations (Johnston, 1997b). 
 
1992 Mt Unzen: Reduced visibility on roads was reported following the Mt Unzen 
eruption (Yanagi et al. 1992). 
 
1994 Tavurvur and Vulcan, Rabaul: The Rabaul eruption provides a unique 
example of thick ashfall covering an urban area in modern times. Up to 1 metre of 
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primary ashfall from both cones (Tavurvur and Vulcan) covered the township. The 
roads in Rabaul are laid out in a grid pattern North-South and East-West. Most of 
those roads have a constant gradient of 2 - 5% between the caldera wall and the 
harbour (SMEC, 1999). These could be driven on when dry (Nairn, 2002), but 
became slippery after a small amount of rainfall. This led to roads becoming 
impassable to all but four wheel drive vehicles – and even these were often stuck as 
vehicles sunk into the thick ash deposits (Stammers, 2000). Stuck vehicles were 
especially an issue in the wet season, as increased runoff after rainfall and the 
presence of a great volume of ash meant mudflows were common and further blocked 
roads (Nairn, 2002; Blong & McKee, 1995). 
 
1995-96 Mt Ruapehu: Thin layers of ash deposited over the central and eastern 
North Island caused slippery road conditions after the 1995 and 1996 Ruapehu 
eruptions. During the 1995 eruption the Desert Road (SH1) was closed 3 times as a 
result of both ashfall causing reduced visibility, and an ash and rain mix making a 
slippery sludge that was deemed to be to dangerous for the road to remain open 
(Johnston, 1997a). 
 
2002 El Reventador: On November 4, 2002 2-5 mm of ash covered Quito, following 
the eruption of El Reventador (Leonard et al., 2005). Vehicle circulation in the city 
was reported to have been banned, except for emergencies (PAHO/WHO, 2002). On 
following days most drivers were said to have driven cautiously – ashfall is not 
uncommon in Quito so most drivers had some experience driving on slippery ash and 
dealing with obscured road markings. Vehicle damage was minimal; some vehicles 
were reported to have minor problems with ash getting into fuel injectors and 
carburettors as small amounts of ash managed to get through the air filter. These 
problems were easily rectified with regular maintenance of vehicles. Some 
windscreens were scratched by wiper blades when used to remove ash (Leonard et al., 
2005). 
 
2002 Mt Etna: The 2002 eruption of Mt Etna, while sizable compared to previous 
recent activity nevertheless created havoc on local roads in Catania, even with less 
than 2 mm of ash covering roads. Numerous traffic accidents occurred, due to the 
slippery conditions and increased stopping distances. Falls from motorcycles and 
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scooters/mopeds were so common that for a short time after the eruption riding them 
was banned in Catania. Public outcry soon reversed this decision (Barnard, 2004). 
Steep hills became difficult to climb for 2 wheel drive vehicles, even with thin (~2 
mm) coverings of ash. Only drivers with determination and a willingness to slowly 
advance uphill while spinning tyres were observed to make it up some hills in urban 
areas on the flanks of the volcano. The spinning tyres would remove ash as the 
vehicle progressed, allowing it to grip the asphalt beneath. This was more of an issue 
for front wheel drive cars (which represent the majority of cars locally). The weight 
distribution of a vehicle driving uphill is transferred to the rear, causing the front 
wheels to lose traction on slippery surfaces. This was observed in both wet and dry 
conditions. 
 
1955 – Present Day Sakurajima: Ashfall from Sakurajima volcano has periodically 
fallen on Kagoshima city since the present active period began in 1955 (Nairn, 2002). 
The main issue for roads and transportation is ash covering road markings and 
creating a slippery surface. This occurs with any ashfall greater than 1 mm depth 
(Durand et al, 2001). Ashfall does not usually exceed a few millimetres thickness – it 
has only exceeded 5 mm on four to five occasions (Lorden, 2001). Kagoshima City 
attempts to clean up ashfall within 3 days, using a combination of road, footpath and 
hand sweepers. Failure to do so can result in ash “setting” and becoming more 
difficult to remove (Durand et al, 2001). 
 
5.2.1 Summary: 
The reports referenced above generally refer to situations involving thin layers of ash 
affecting roads. Impacts include reduced visibility, slippery conditions, covered road 
markings, and increased maintenance requirements on vehicles. As these examples 
imply, in the well known volcanic events of the last 30 years few eruptions have 
affected road networks with more than a few centimetres of ash – Rabaul is the 
obvious exception here. When it comes to driving on thicker deposits of ash, or even 
driving on slopes that are covered with ash, a whole different set of problems emerge 
– being able to actually move vehicles. There are a large number of variables in both 
ash type and vehicle type/configuration affecting how possible this is. 
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5.3 Variables affecting mobility on ash covered roads: 
5.3.1 Variables in vehicles affecting mobility on ash covered roads: 
• Drive:  Front wheel drive/rear wheel drive/four wheel drive. Four wheel drive 
will naturally provide the most traction. 
• Tyres: Tread pattern, tread depth, tyre width, tyre circumference, tyre 
inflation. Off-road mud tyres with a deep tread pattern have an advantage in 
keeping vehicles moving on uneven surfaces or in wet muddy type conditions. 
However normal road tyres often perform well driving on sandy surfaces, 
these will usually perform just as well when driving on the top of thick 
amounts of ash on flat terrain – they don’t dig in as much as mud tyres, and 
may thus help forward momentum. Large circumference tyres are 
advantageous when crossing ruts. Tyre width, (also affected by tyre inflation) 
will have an impact on how much vehicles sink into ash. Wider tyres increase 
the vehicle footprint – spreading the weight over a larger area so that it doesn’t 
sink as much. Lowering tyre pressure, (a common 4wd technique) will also 
widen the footprint of the tyre and help prevent vehicles bogging down in ash. 
10psi is sufficient for driving on sandy (and thus ash) surfaces, but not for 
driving on tar seal.  
• Weight: Overall weight of the vehicle plus weight distribution. Heavier 
vehicles need more torque to keep moving in thick ash deposits as they will 
sink further. Where the weight is distributed on a vehicle will have an impact 
on wheel traction. For example a rear-wheel-drive front-engine car will 
generally have less traction on ash covered surfaces than a front-wheel drive 
front-engine car due to the weight of the engine being at the opposite end of 
the car to the driven wheels. This is applicable to maintaining forward 
movement, not braking or turning on thin slippery deposits.  
• Power & torque: Torque is more important than horsepower in keeping 
vehicles moving in thick unconsolidated deposits – similar to vehicles bogged 
in mud. 
• Ground clearance: This is only an issue in deeper or rutted ash where 
vehicles may sink into the deposit and become “bogged”. 
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• Differential type: Open, locked or limited slip. With an open (normal) 
differential only one wheel needs to be stuck or spinning to prevent the vehicle 
from moving any further. With a limited slip or locked differential power will 
still be delivered to the other wheel(s). 
• Traction control system (TCS) The presence of this feature enables some 
vehicles to eliminate wheel spin by cutting power or applying brakes to one or 
more wheels. The exact computer settings and configuration of the system will 
influence how much wheel spin occurs, or how much the vehicle slips if 
driving on thin slippery deposits. 
• Transmission: manual or automatic. Automatic gearboxes generally deliver 
power more smoothly and result in less wheel spin, improving traction. 
• Driving style: How the driver approaches driving. Experienced off-road 
drivers may have an advantage in keeping forward momentum driving on 
surfaces covered in thick ash. Sudden or jerky acceleration is more likely to 
result in a loss of traction than the smooth application of power. 
 
5.3.2 Variables in ash affecting mobility on ash covered roads: 
• Depth: Thin layers of ash (up to a few millimetres) are slippery, and may 
result in accidents if driven on too quickly. A few (>5) millimetres of ash may 
result in traction problems for two wheel drive vehicles when driving uphill on 
unconsolidated fine ash, but slow progress may be made on tar-seal as tyres 
spin and remove ash, exposing the road surface beneath. 
• Grainsize: Fine ash is more problematic when wet than coarse ash, turning 
into a muddy slurry that can easily bog vehicles. An analogy is wet sand 
compared to mud. Wet sand may support the weight of a vehicle where mud 
does not.  
• Water content: Most reports of slippery conditions after ashfall refer to wet 
ash, however thin coverings of ash will be slippery whether wet or dry. Once 
thicknesses are above a few millimetres the dynamics change, and with 
enough water a slurry may form, which may bog vehicles.  
• Degree of compaction or cementation: Loose unconsolidated ash is the most 
problematic, as vehicles will sink into it. An ash deposit that has compacted 
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over time, or even undergone a degree of cementation after rainfall may be 
able to be driven on in the same way as sand may be driven on. Similar 
dangers to driving on beaches or in deserts will exist in terms of patches of 
less consolidated sand/ash which may cause vehicles to become stuck. 
• Smooth vs. rutted: Smooth surfaces provide less resistance than rutted 
surfaces, allowing vehicles to progress more easily. However as more vehicles 
cross thick ash deposits more ruts will form. 
5.3.3 Variables in road type affecting mobility on ash covered roads: 
• Slope of road: The steeper the ash covered slope is the more difficult it is to 
climb. On flat roads thick deposits of fine-medium sand sized ash will in some 
circumstances be passable even to two wheel drive vehicles, but moderate 
slopes can become insurmountable barriers to the same vehicles. 
• Road surface: Smooth tar-seal/coarse chip bitumen/gravel/dirt. These 
variables only apply where tyres have some contact with the road – i.e. in 
shallow coverings of ash or where wheel-spin removes sufficient ash for the 
tyres to reach the road surface. Coarse chip bitumen will afford the most 
traction. 
 
5.3.4 Other issues 
• Drainage: Culverts etc will likely become blocked with ash during/after 
rainfall. This may result in surface flooding on roads. This presents a whole 
new set of problems. Similarly ash may be remobilised by wind and create 
large drifts, or by rainfall on slopes adjacent to roads, causing muddy flows of 
ash onto roads. Runoff may also result in erosion of road surfaces. 
• Objects on Roads: Trees, branches, power poles or lines downed because of 
ash loading may fall on roads and block or hinder progress. In extreme cases 
collapsed or partially collapsed buildings may also create obstacles.  
• Bridges: Aside from the prospect of lahars destroying bridges, ash laden 
bridges may collapse, if sufficient load is applied. This is only likely in very 
thick ashfalls. 
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5.4 Driving on ash 
 
Driving on ash can be likened to driving on sand, depending on the grainsize of the 
ash. There are differences between driving on a beach and driving on ash though. In 
most instances where attempts are made to drive through ash, deposits will tend to be 
thinner, the presence of a hard substrate (the road) beneath the ash will affect the 
potential progress of vehicles. Ash grainsize may differ from sand grains, which will 
also affect mobility  
5.5 Experimental work: Driving in ash on and around Mount Etna. 
 
5.5.1 Vehicles used in testing  
 
Different vehicles were used to drive in ash conditions on Etna both during the 2002 
eruption, and on remobilised (wind blown) ash around the Rifugia Sapienza area 
during 2005. The vehicles used on both occasions are recorded in table 5.1 
 
Vehicle/model year Rear/front/4 wheel drive Tyres Other 
Toyota Prado (1998), 4wd Road Short wheel base 
Fiat Panda (1994) 
 
4wd Road Small wheels, 
narrow tyres 
Toyota Hilux Utility 
(1999) 
Rear Mud Note - 2wd 
Toyota Prado (1998), Rear Road (as 4wd but used in 
2wd) 
Fiat Stilo (2005),  Front Road Diesel  
Nissan Micra (2002) Front Road  
 
Table 5.1: Vehicle and tyre type used in testing 
 
The degree to which the vehicles coped with the ash conditions in 2002 was recorded, 
and a summary of results were first published in a brief table in 2004, reproduced 
below (Barnard, 2004). 
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Thickness of ash Effects 
0-2 mm Road markings obscured, traction reduced (wet and dry ash), 
visibility reduced as dry ash is remobilized by traffic and wind. 
Steep hills difficult for 2wd vehicles to climb 
2-20 mm Moderate hills become difficult for 2wd vehicles to climb, 
steep hills impossible. Drifts cause larger humps in road. Once 
dampened and compacted it becomes firmer, easier to drive on. 
20-100 mm Slight inclines may be impassable to 2wd vehicles, 4wd 
vehicles may need closed (locked) differentials to climb 
moderate hills. Larger drifts (eg 300 mm) may hinder or stop 
2wd vehicles on flat roads 
100-300 mm Uneven surfaces in the ash stop any 2wd vehicles, compacted 
damp ash on flat surfaces is still able to be driven on. 4wd 
utility type vehicles (not cars) may be able to slowly progress 
on the flat. Drifts may need to be cleared. Moderate inclines 
difficult, but may be possible for experienced 4wd drivers. 
Steep inclines generally impassable. Ruts easily formed on 
hills. 
>300 mm Compacted ash may be driven on by 4wd vehicles, softer 
patches may easily bog vehicles. Gradual inclines possible on 
compacted ash, but after a few vehicles ruts in the ash will 
form, hindering uphill progress for further vehicles 
 
Table 5.2: Vehicle mobility on ash covered roads (Barnard, 2004). 
 
Further work in 2005 has produced some modifications from the 2002 results. A more 
systematic approach was taken and a 2005 Fiat Stilo was used to attempt to drive 
through various thicknesses of ash on different slopes. This covered some variables 
that were not addressed in 2002. As the tests were conducted on the slopes of Etna, 
they were very close to the source of the ash. For this reason the grainsize of the ash 
was generally coarse. Furthermore the 2005 tests were conducted on remobilised 
wind-blown ash – the fine component had long since been removed by wind and rain. 
A sample of ash was taken from the moderate slope tests on 5-15 cm of ash with the 
Fiat Stilo. Results of a grainsize analysis conducted with a Micromeretics Saturn 
Digisizer 5200 indicated a coarse ash with a modal grainsize of 842.7 µm and a mean 
grainsize of 632.5 µm. Although different areas were used in testing, grainsize was 
similarly coarse in all of the 2005 tests. 
 
The tests were also all conducted in dry conditions. As evidenced by reports from 
Rabaul the addition of water will make progress more difficult (SMEC international 
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1999). Unfortunately from this point of view rain was uncommon during the testing 
periods. 
 
Results can only be taken as guidelines given the large amount of variables in both 
ash type and vehicle type/configuration. More systematic testing would be needed to 
establish a greater degree of accuracy, and quantitative results.  
 
Ash thickness <5 mm (Dry) 
 
                      Slope 
 
Vehicle 
Flat or gently 
inclined (flat-1:17) 
Moderate (~1:16-
~1:10) 
Steep (>1:10) 
Toyota Prado 4wd Stopping distance 
increases. 
Stopping distance 
increases. 
Stopping distance increases, 
especially on decent. Uphill 
progress ok. 
Fiat Panda 4wd Stopping distance 
increases 
Stopping distance 
increases 
Stopping distance increases, 
especially on decent. Uphill 
progress ok. 
Toyota Hilux rwd Stopping distance 
increases 
Stopping distance 
increases 
Some loss of traction as ash 
cleared from beneath 
wheels. Slow progress uphill 
Toyota Prado rwd Stopping distance 
increases 
Some wheel-spin 
on take off 
Some loss of traction as ash 
cleared from beneath 
wheels. Slow progress uphill 
Fiat Stilo fwd Stopping distance 
increases 
Some wheel-spin 
on take off 
Loss of traction as ash 
cleared from beneath 
wheels. Slow progress 
uphill, wheel-spin. 
Nissan Micra fwd Stopping distance 
increases 
Some wheel-spin 
on take off 
Loss of traction as ash 
cleared from beneath 
wheels. Very slow progress 
uphill with almost constant 
wheel-spin. 
 
Table 5.3: Vehicle Mobility on roads covered by less than 5 mm of dry ash 
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Ash thickness 5-15cm (Dry) 
 
                      Slope 
Vehicle 
Flat or gently 
inclined (flat-1:17)
Moderate (~1:16-
~1:10) 
Steep (1:10 or 
steeper) 
Toyota Prado 4wd Progress slowed but 
otherwise fine 
Progress slowed but 
otherwise fine 
Progress slowed but 
otherwise fine 
Fiat Panda 4wd Progress slowed but still possible Not tested 
Toyota Hilux rwd Progress slowed but 
otherwise fine 
Progress slowed but 
still possible 
Difficult to climb, but 
climb made with 
effort, and extra 
weight placed over 
back wheels.  
Toyota Prado rwd Progress slowed but 
otherwise fine 
Progress slowed then 
4wd engaged 
Not tested in 2wd 
Fiat Stilo fwd Progress slowed 
(unconsolidated ash) 
but practical for short 
distances only.  
Hill climbed with 
difficulty at walking 
pace. Possible to make 
progress but only 
practical for short 
distances. 
(unconsolidated ash).  
Unsuccessful at 
climbing hill 
Nissan Micra fwd Not tested Not tested Not tested 
 
Table 5.4: Vehicle Mobility on roads covered by 5 to 15 mm of dry ash 
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Figure 5.1: Fiat Stilo during testing on unconsolidated ash  
near Sapienza, Mt Etna 
 
 
Figure 5.3: INGV Fiat Pandas (as used in testing) 
parked on thin ash beside road, Monacella. 
Figure 5.2: INGV Toyota Prado on ash 
Covered track on Mount Etna 
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Ash thickness 20-30cm (Dry) 
 
                  Slope 
Vehicle 
Flat or gently 
inclined (flat-1:17) 
Moderate (~1:16-
~1:10) 
Steep (>1:10) 
Toyota Prado 4wd Can be driven on both 
unconsolidated and 
compacted ash (much 
more easily on 
compacted ash) 
Compacted ash easily 
driven on, gradual 
uphill progress made 
on unconsolidated ash 
Very slow uphill 
progress possible, it 
may take more than one 
attempt to climb. Ruts 
impede progress 
Fiat Panda 4wd 
 
Progress possible on 
compacted ash, not 
tested on 
unconsolidated ash 
Progress possible on 
compacted ash, not 
tested on 
unconsolidated ash 
Not tested 
Toyota Hilux rwd Progress possible on 
compacted ash, not 
tested on 
unconsolidated ash 
Progress made on 
unconsolidated ash 
Several attempts made 
at climbing a steep hill 
(~10 metres length) on 
an unconsolidated ash 
deposit. Successful only 
with weight placed over 
back wheels (with mud 
tyres) after several 
attempts had cleared 
some ash away with 
wheel-spin and run-up. 
Not advisable. 
Toyota Prado rwd Progress possible on 
compacted ash, not 
tested on 
unconsolidated ash 
Not tested Not tested 
Fiat Stilo fwd Progress possible on 
compacted ash, not 
tested on 
unconsolidated ash 
Vehicle stuck Vehicle stuck 
Nissan Micra fwd Not tested Not tested Not tested 
 
Table 5.5: Vehicle Mobility on roads covered by 15 to 30 mm of dry ash 
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Ash thickness >30cm (Dry) 
 
                  Slope 
Vehicle 
Flat or gently 
inclined (flat-1:17) 
Moderate (~1:16-
~1:10) 
Steep (>1:10) 
Toyota Prado 4wd Can be driven on both 
unconsolidated and 
compacted ash (much 
more easily on 
compacted ash) 
Compacted ash easily 
driven on, gradual 
uphill progress made 
on unconsolidated ash 
Unsuccessful at 
climbing hill. 
Fiat Panda 4wd 
 
Progress possible on compacted ash, not tested 
on unconsolidated ash 
Not tested 
Toyota Hilux rwd Progress possible on compacted ash, not tested 
on unconsolidated ash 
Not tested 
Toyota Prado rwd Progress possible on 
compacted ash, not 
tested on 
unconsolidated ash 
Not tested Not tested 
Fiat Stilo fwd Not tested Vehicle stuck, 
unsuccessful at 
climbing hill. 
Vehicle stuck, 
unsuccessful at climbing 
hill. 
Nissan Micra fwd Not tested Not tested Not tested 
 
Table 5.6: Vehicle Mobility on roads covered by over 30 mm of dry ash 
5.6 Discussion 
Driving on thin (less than a few millimetres) of ash is hazardous in that it is slippery, 
road markings are obscured and remobilised ash can cause severe visibility problems. 
This is indicated by experiences of drivers in recent historical eruptions, as well as 
research conducted around Mt Etna. However the traction problems associated with 
steep inclines in light ashfall conditions have previously not been documented. Other 
problems include driving during ashfall, where windscreens need to be frequently and 
carefully cleaned to avoid scratching them with wiper blades. 
 
With more ash on the ground (a few centimetres) vehicle mobility issues become 
increasingly complex. These preliminary results indicate that two wheel drive 
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vehicles begin to struggle even on moderate inclines as ash depths become greater 
than a few centimetres. It should still be possible for evacuees to use vehicles to leave 
affected areas, provided no steep hills are present. Even then it may be possible in 
some cases to slowly climb short hills covered in ash – e.g. to leave steep driveways 
to get onto cleared roads. However, given the amount of variables present this is not 
guaranteed; a shovel may still be necessary to clear a driveway in order to get a 
vehicle to the road in some situations. With this much ash or more around other 
complications could potentially occur. The weight of ash may have caused power 
lines, trees and branches to be downed across roads. Rain may cause culverts to 
become blocked, which would in turn cause localised flooding. Slips and mudflows 
from hilly areas adjacent to roads may also block progress for vehicles. Wind blown 
drifts of ash could cause further problems. By this stage utility companies and 
emergency responders should only consider using four wheel drive vehicles in hilly 
areas.  
 
Once ash depths have exceeded 20cm it becomes impractical for two wheel drive 
vehicles to be used anywhere hills are present. While most vehicles may easily drive 
on compacted ash on flat surfaces, wheel-spin caused by cars negotiating hills will 
quickly cause ruts, which will in turn lead to vehicles becoming stuck. Even moving 
vehicles from where they are parked once this amount of ash is present will be 
difficult. Moderate inclines will impede four wheel drive vehicles, but is unlikely to 
stop them.  
 
Over 30cm of ash causes similar problems, but to a greater degree. Four wheel drive 
vehicles will still be required to climb hills, but steep hills will not be passable to 
wheeled vehicles. (Tracked vehicles may be useful, but were not tested as part of this 
study). Further problems may include bridge loading of ash. Thick deposits may 
weaken or collapse bridges in extreme cases. 
 
5.6.1 Driving on ash-covered roads in New Zealand 
 
Should heavy ashfall impact New Zealand roads, it is unlikely that steep roads will 
need to be negotiated frequently. The typical maximum gradient for New Zealand 
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state highways is 10% (1:10) (Transit NZ, 2002). There are some exceptions to this in 
mountainous terrain. Furthermore section 329 of the Local Government Act 1974 (no. 
66) states: “No road shall be laid out or constructed by the council, and no road or 
proposed road on any scheme plan shall be approved by the Council, with a grade in 
any part of its length steeper than...(clause c) one metre in 8 metres, in any case 
where that grade is not fixed by any such district scheme or by any bylaw or special 
order. In this section the term “road” does not include an access way” Steep sections 
of road are therefore likely to be short, or driveways. These may be able to be cleared 
with shovels etc to enable vehicles to be used. 
 
Where vehicles do drive on roads with more than a few millimetres of ash covering 
them carrying a shovel is advisable. A technique used by drivers stuck in sand is first 
to try to reverse out of the tracks made driving into the sand. If this doesn’t work then 
digging away sand from the differential (usually the lowest part of the vehicle) may 
be necessary. Deflating the tyres to about 10 PSI is another technique used to help 
drive on sandy areas. Clearing tracks for the tyres can also help, as can gradually 
moving the vehicle back and forward in short steps.  
 
5.7 Summary 
Standard cars should be able to be used in light ashfall, by residents to evacuate from 
affected areas where up to a few centimetres of ash are present on the ground. The 
exact amount depends on the presence of hills and rainfall, as well as secondary 
problems affecting the roads (such as flooding, lahars, downed trees etc). Speed 
restrictions need to be in place to reduce the number of accidents caused by loss of 
traction and visibility. Once a few centimetres of ash cover roads they need to be 
closed to two wheel drive traffic except where used for evacuation. Over 15 to 20cm 
of ash will effectively block hilly areas to any two wheel drive traffic, and potentially 
stop them on the flat in some circumstances. Four wheel drive vehicles should be used 
by utility companies and emergency responders when ashfall has exceeded a few 
millimetres, if no other means of transport is available (e.g. helicopter/boat). They can 
be used on flat surfaces of compacted ash even at significant depths (i.e. 30 cm+), but 
may still become stuck, and should not travel alone. On steep inclines road vehicles of 
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any sort will not be useable, and alternatives such as helicopters will need to be used – 
assuming airborne ash is not creating a hazard for aircraft. Tracked vehicles may be 
useful in some situations, but were not tested as part of this study 
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CHAPTER 6: WASTE WATER SYSTEMS AND 
VOLCANIC ASHFALL 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Serious volcanic ash impacts on wastewater systems are surprisingly rare. Few 
eruptions have deposited large amounts of volcanic ash (>10 mm) in urban areas at 
any one time, urban wastewater/stormwater systems have therefore not often been 
tested in terms of large quantities of volcanic ash entering the systems. In some of the 
few cases where this has occurred, contemporaneous processes like pyroclastic flows 
or lahars have taken place, destroying infrastructure to such an extent that impacts of 
ashfall alone cannot be determined (for example Rabaul, 1994) Where smaller 
amounts of ash have affected cities/towns, the effects of ash on their wastewater 
systems are rarely described.  
 
Wastewater systems are distinct from storm water systems in that wastewater includes 
sewerage networks. Stormwater – rain runoff from built up areas is sometimes 
separated from wastewater, draining through its own reticulation network into natural 
drainage systems such as rivers, or directly into the sea. However stormwater and 
municipal sewerage networks often share reticulation systems, as the shared network 
of pipes requires less financial outlay at the time of construction. These combined 
wastewater systems allow for the ingress of ash into sewerage pipelines, as ash on the 
surface is carried by rainwater (or water used in clean up operations) into the 
stormwater system, and thus the sewerage reticulation network, eventually ending up 
at waste treatment plants. Failure of such systems will ultimately result in sewage 
backing up and overflowing into streets from drains and buildings from toilets. This in 
turn will cause a major health hazard. 
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6.2 Previous instances of ashfall affecting wastewater systems 
 
6.2.1 Mt St Helens, USA, 1980 
 
The effects of this eruption on the waste treatment plant in Yakima are to date the 
most well documented instance of this type of incident. This is thanks largely to a 
paper jointly written by the Wastewater Facilities Manager and the Process Control 
Supervisor at the Yakima Wastewater Collection and Treatment Facilities, 
Washington, (Day and Fisher 1980). The paper specifically described the effects of 
ash entering the treatment plant.  
 
The city of Yakima, an area of 31km2, was covered by about 10 mm of sand-sized ash 
on May 18 1980. The following account of the effects on the Yakima treatment plant 
is a synopsis of the Day & Fisher paper (1980). 
 
In 1980 Yakima was served by a network of 446 km of wastewater lines; about 5% of 
these were combined stormwater and sewerage. The facility would normally process 
69300m3 of wastewater per day. Initially, during and immediately after the eruption 
on May 18th, the plant continued to operate largely as normal. The only change to 
normal procedure was that pH was closely monitored, and a drop from 6.7 to 5.7 was 
immediately noted; it is not recorded where in the plant this measurement was taken. 
Observations of ash reaching the plant were recorded on the following day, as 15 
times the usual amount of sand and grit began to be received (but only partially 
removed) in the pre-treatment process. Throughout the day it became apparent that 
ash was damaging equipment, vibrations were occurring in grit classifiers and the 
gearbox of the mechanically cleaned bar screen. Pumping difficulties were 
experienced and sludge lines became blocked. 
 
Two days after the eruption ash was passing throughout the system. Methane 
production was greatly reduced, biofilter media began to show bare patches. Sludge 
pumps – which were not moving sewage – were shut down at this point, as were the 
clarifier drive mechanisms. 
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By the third day biofilters had been stripped of almost all growth, the comminutor 
(sewage grinder) had completely failed, so was removed from the influent channel. 
Secondary treatment ceased, and by 9am the decision was made to bypass the 
treatment plant completely and pump sewage (after chlorination) directly into the 
Yakima River. A bypass and temporary chlorination facility was quickly constructed 
This took until the morning of Thursday May 22nd (day four). 
 
By day five cleanup operations began – it was at this point that the sludge transfer 
pump failed, due to ash in the bearing grease which stripped the chromium coating of 
the bearings. 
 
Eight days after the eruption, cleaning was initiated on the collection systems. This 
was performed using high pressure water and vacuum trucks - a method that was 
found to be effective. In total the cost of the repairs and cleanup was around $4 
million (White et. al, 1980). 
 
Yakima was not the only locality to have problems with ash in sewerage or 
stormwater systems. Moses Lake received 25 mm of ash, blocking stormwater drains 
and damaging the waste treatment plant sufficiently to render it inoperative (Schuster, 
1981). With only 5 mm of ash in Spokane stormwater drains were again filled with 
ash, but the waste treatment plant remained operative (Schuster, 1981). 3 mm of ash 
in Ellensburg overloaded stormwater systems, but the network was kept operative by 
workers using high pressure water cleaners (Schuster, 1981). 
 
6.2.2 Mt Spurr, Alaska, 1992 
Another example of ash impacting wastewater systems is the 3 mm of volcanic ash 
deposited on Anchorage during the August 1992 eruption of Mt. Spurr volcano. 
Although steps were taken to minimize the amount of ash entering the stormwater 
system, large amounts of ash still had to be removed during the following spring, as 
pipe blockages caused some localised flooding. The ash had by that time formed a 
“hardened deposit” that was more difficult to remove (Johnston, 1997b).  
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6.2.3 Rabaul, Papua New Guinea, 1994 
 
The 1994 Rabaul eruption from Tavurvur and Vulcan resulted in between 100 and 
950 mm of ash being deposited in Rabaul itself (Blong, 2003). The town’s sewage 
system was not extensive; it served about ¼ of the town, and consisted of two pump 
stations and an Imhoff tank treatment plant. Both of the two pump stations and the 
treatment plant were damaged by the amount of ash entering the system and were 
decommissioned (SMEC 1992, p7). The stormwater system was separate to the 
wastewater system, but suffered a similar consequence. It was quickly inundated by 
ash and subsequently buried under 2 metres of ash and mudflows. Five years after the 
eruption more than 65 % of the original road and drainage networks were still covered 
with volcanic debris (SMEC 1992, p7). The extent of the damage in Rabaul makes it 
difficult to extract meaningful information from this eruption about wastewater 
system capabilities and vulnerabilities to ashfall. 
 
6.2.4 El Reventador, Ecuador, 2002 
 
The 2002 eruption of El Reventador Volcano resulted in 4 mm of ash falling on 
Quito. Residents in Quito already had some experience with volcanic ash; the 1999 
eruption of Guagua Pichincha also deposited ash on the city. A rapid cleanup by 
residents and the military (along with a very light rain that stabilised the ash) helped 
to prevent a lot of the ash from entering the stormwater drainage system. Ash that 
entered drains did not cause damage to equipment, but did increase the need for pump 
maintenance (Leonard et al., 2005). In a few barrios (street blocks), enough ash 
moved into storm water systems to cause localised flooding after the eruption (PAHO, 
2003). Local calculations suggest that about 300,000 tonnes of ash was shovelled 
from drains in Quito after the eruption. The lack of wastewater treatment facilities in 
Quito meant there were no impacts in this regard (Alberto Palacios, EMAAP, pers 
comm., 2004). 
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At a distance of 45 km from Reventador, the region of Oyacachi suffered some 
damage to its sewage treatment plant. Pipes in the oxidation lagoon were obstructed 
by ash, causing the oxidation process to fail. This resulted in a strong smell being 
emitted from the lagoon, (PAHO, 2003, p37). 
 
6.2.5 Etna, Italy, 2002 
The 2002 eruption of Mt Etna, Sicily resulted in small amounts of ash being deposited 
on the city of Catania several times over a 3 month period (Barnard, 2004). Combined 
with occasional heavy rain the ash caused many blockages in the local stormwater 
system, causing localised flooding on several occasions (figure 6.1). 
 
Figure 6.1: Ash in Catania during the 2002 Etna eruption. Clockwise from top left, sedimentation 
in open drain, blocked stormwater drain, localised flooding due to ash in drains. 
  171
6.3 Ash ingress to reticulation systems 
 
Ingress of ash into sub-surface sewage networks is unlikely to occur in large 
quantities unless the network is connected to the stormwater collection system. Ash 
from roads, rooftops/drainpipes, driveways, pavements - in short any surface area, has 
the potential to be washed into stormwater drains. This is naturally more problematic 
during wet weather, however significant amounts of water are used in most ash clean 
ups, by officials as well as the general public. The hosing of ash into drains is a 
common occurrence. While actions may be taken to prevent ingress of ash into drains, 
these are usually not 100% successful, and will only serve to lessen impacts rather 
than prevent them.  
There is no sure way to prevent at least some volcanic ash entering stormwater drains. 
Recommendations from the US Geological Survey website on keeping ash out of 
drains are based on lessons learned by F.E.M.A. after the 1980 Mt St Helens eruption. 
Those methodologies are summarized in figure 6.2. The amount entering systems will 
depend not only on the amount of ash falling, but on rainfall, clean up methodologies, 
the presence of any illegal waste connections and care taken to limit ingress into the 
system. 
  172
 
Figure 6.2 Suggested measures for reducing effects of ash to sewage and stormwater systems 
(USGS, 2009) 
 
Determining the potential amount of ash that may enter a shared stormwater and 
wastewater system is extremely difficult given the many parameters needed to create 
an equation to do so. Excluding whether ash is washed into drains during hosing in 
cleanup situations, or prevented from entering drains by sand bagging in other 
instances, the following variables have an influence on the amount of ash that will 
enter the wastewater system. 
 
• The amount (volume) of ash in the catchment area. The thickness is 
measurable but spatially variable. 
• The amount of rainfall during ashfall and while ash is on the ground. This may 
be predicted using meteorological records. 
Suggested measures for reducing effects of ash to sewage and stormwater 
systems  
• Have local ordinances in effect banning connections of downpipes and roof 
drains to the sewer. 
• Instruct the public how to protect stormwater systems (protect manhole 
covers from ash, disconnect downpipes when possible, ash disposal 
instructions). 
• Instruct citizens where to deposit ash cleared from property. 
• Warn citizens against disposing ash down manhole access of both sewer and 
stormwater systems. 
• When hosing streets, place sand bags around or over manhole covers or 
avoid them entirely, because holes in the cover and the areas between the 
cover and the rings allow passage of ash. 
• When possible, disconnect downpipes from the stormwater system until ash 
is removed from the roofs of homes and buildings. 
• Closely monitor the cleanup activities of privately-owned parking areas. 
• Use dry methods, like hand sweeping, prior to flush cleaning with water 
when clearing streets and parking areas that are served by a free-discharging 
or dry-well stormwater systems. 
Note: Shallow deposits of ash in the stormwater or sewerage system will not reduce 
the hydraulic capacity of the pipes by a significant amount; thus expenditure of time 
and money in these circumstances to clean lines may not be warranted. 
Modified from, FEMA, 1984 
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• The amount of rainfall from the catchment entering the system. Some will be 
lost to evaporation, some will fall on permeable areas and soak into the 
ground. Determining this for a given rainfall event is dependant on city 
records of flow through the system – these data may not be measured. This 
would also be affected by drains becoming blocked and any subsequent 
surface flooding. 
• The amount of ash entrained by water. This parameter is in turn dependant on 
the: 
o Grainsize of the ash (measurable). 
o Flow velocities of water on the ground. This is extremely variable in 
hilly areas. The formation of channels in ash deposits will also affect 
this. 
o Degree of cementation of ash – not applicable immediately after 
ashfall, but subsequently after ash has been wet then dried out, or wet 
for over a few hours. 
 
For these reasons any estimate of the volume of ash entering a system is going to be 
extremely vague. However to illustrate the order of magnitude of the amount of ash 
available to be washed into a system, a simple calculation of the surface area of the 
shared network multiplied by an ashfall thickness can be made. Assume a 100km2 
area (which equates roughly to the area served by the shared network in central 
Auckland). 
 
For a 1 mm thickness of ash: 100 km2 x 1 mm ash = 100,000 m3 
 
Even if only 1% of this entered the shared system, this is still 1000 m3 of ash to deal 
with, in addition to the usual volumes of solids. Taking Auckland as an example, 
under normal circumstances 108,000 tonnes of biosolids are removed by the Mangere 
treatment plant annually. This averages out at 296 tonnes per day. 1000 m3 of ash 
would equate to between 1000 and 1600 tonnes of solid material, a significant 
addition to the usual amount of solids entering the system. With a higher amount of 
ashfall, for example 5 mm, and more ash (perhaps 2%) entering the system, the shared 
wastewater and stormwater system could have 10,000 m3 of ash (10000 – 16000 
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tonnes) to cope with. These figures are quite arbitrary, but reflect the degree of 
uncertainty about how much ash may enter a system. 
Given the vast quantities of ash that even a 1 mm covering on a large urban area 
represents, almost any amount of ashfall has the potential to cause widespread 
disruption and/or damage to wastewater reticulation networks and sewerage treatment 
facilities. While the instances of ashfall impacting wastewater systems described in 
section 6.2 give an indication of potential impacts, only the Yakima example gives a 
detailed example of what may happen if ash is carried through a reticulation network 
to a treatment plant. This example however, provides insufficient information to 
derive quantitative data on network vulnerabilities. Some types of impact can be 
satisfactorily predicted with a knowledge of the properties of volcanic ash and an 
understanding of wastewater systems. For example the low pH often associated with 
ash leachates can easily result in lower pH levels of sewage as ash and ash leachates 
enter waste systems. As pH levels in reactor-clarifiers are carefully balanced to allow 
bacteria to break down organic nutrients, it is clear a large influx of acidic sewage will 
cause major problems for this process. However there are also impacts which cannot 
be accurately predicted. Of most importance is the impact of vast quantities of 
volcanic ash passing through effluent pumps. Pumps are essential to the operation of 
any sewerage network and/or treatment facility. Even if treatment plants are bypassed 
to protect plant equipment, pumps are still necessary to move waste through networks. 
Without them working, sewage may back up and spill into built up areas, causing 
significant health hazards. Backups may be alleviated by overflow channels, 
depending on the system and the degree of blockages. 
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6.4 Volcanic ash and pumps 
 
In some cases it has been observed that pumps have become blocked during large 
influxes of ash into the waste water system (e.g. at Yakima during the 1980 Mt St 
Helens eruption). This is due to the large volumes of solid matter (ash) passing 
through the pumps. What is unknown is the amount of ash required to cause such 
blockages and the long term effects on pumps should they keep operating. Pump type 
and rating, required hydraulic head and the sump geometry will all have an effect on 
whether blockages occur, as will the grainsize of the ash. The quantity of ash and the 
amount of water present is the biggest factor in determining whether failure will 
occur. Most wastewater pumps are designed to be able to cope with up to 4-6% solids 
material in waste sludge, some are rated slightly higher (up to 8%) and some lower 
(down to 2%) (B. Park, pers. comm., 2006). Even without blockages occurring, 
abrasion of pump components (e.g. impellers) will increase, as ash is both abrasive 
and often corrosive.  
Testing municipal wastewater pumps to determine how likely they are to become 
blocked with volcanic ash, and how quickly pump components are abraded is not 
feasible. This is dictated by the size of urban wastewater pumps, with some of the 
pumps used being capable of pumping waste volumes of up to 1.125 m3 per second. 
This would require immense quantities of volcanic ash, and a pump set up with a 
large sump that allowed for recirculation of material. With a cost of NZ $25000 just to 
overhaul such pumps, testing on this scale would be an expensive undertaking. 
Variations between pump types (and ash types) would also mean that several tests 
would need to be carried out for precise results.  
The lack of published data on effects of volcanic ash in wastewater reticulation 
networks requires an experimental approach to determining possible impacts of ash 
travelling through the system. Because of this a series of pump tests were undertaken 
on two smaller pumps, to give an indication of the potential impacts of volcanic ash 
on urban wastewater pumps, and determine potential failure mechanisms. 
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6.5 Laboratory work 
 
Two pump types were tested to determine how well they would cope with pumping 
volcanic ash. The lack of availability of fresh, fine-grained volcanic ash necessitated 
the use of crushed volcanic rock. Crushed Port Hills basalt was again selected as a 
proxy for ash, as described in section 3.5.2.1. For these tests samples were passed 
through a 710 µm sieve to remove large particles. As sizeable volumes of ash were 
needed, sediment taken from Mt Ruapehu’s Whangaehu lahar in March 2007 was also 
used in some tests. This andesitic sediment was collected from the later stages of the 
lahar, approximately 25km downstream from source. Lahar material was put through 
a Micromeretics Saturn Digisizer 5200. The grainsize ranged from 0.88 µm to 434.01 
µm, with a modal grainsize of 188.7 µm and a mean of 106.5 µm. The samples were 
quite acidic, resulting in a low pH in the ash mix used in effluent pump testing.  
 
6.5.1 Finsbury vortex pump testing 
 
Preliminary pump testing was undertaken using a Vortex Pool 5000 pump, 
manufactured by Finsbury Pumps, South Australia. This type of pump is designed to 
pump water rather than effluent, and is usually used as a swimming pool pump. While 
significantly different to wastewater pumps in size and materials used for construction 
(e.g. a plastic rather than cast iron or steel impeller), the principals on which it is 
constructed are similar. However pump type was not critical for these tests, as the 
tests conducted using this pump were not intended to establish potential impacts on 
wastewater pumps. They were performed to:  
 
a) Determine potential areas of sedimentation in pump station sumps.  
b) To establish a methodology that would allow for accurate testing when an 
effluent pump was tested.  
 
Testing was conducted by pumping ash-leaden water through the pump, into a sump 
and then circulating back into the pump. The sump was designed with a hemispherical 
cross section, with the pump intake end narrower than the opposite end. Between the 
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wider and narrower ends was a lip as the wide part of the sump narrowed (figure 6.3). 
This mirrored the shape of the sump in pump station 16 (PS16) Orakei, Auckland.  
 
Figure 6.3: preliminary testing using a pool pump and hemispherical sump narrowing at the 
intake end 
Water was pumped through the system to begin the test procedure, and ash was 
gradually added in 1% by volume (total fluid) increments, with any changes noted. 
The first test run used a coarse unsieved mix of crushed basalt. Much ash immediately 
settled out of suspension, despite the highly turbulent water. As expected the turbidity 
of the water immediately increased dramatically, the pump began to work harder. As 
more ash was added the turbulence of the water decreased and the turbidity increased. 
By the time 5% of ash had been added to the water the pump was still performing, but 
much ash had settled on the floor of the sump. Sedimentation was especially prevalent 
where the sump narrowed  
 
The second round of testing used a finer ash, the same crushed basalt as used 
previously, but passed through a 710 µm sieve. Results were largely unchanged from 
the previous test, the exception being that more ash remained in suspension. Testing 
again stopped after the amount of ash in the system reached 5% by volume.  
 
A third test run used crushed basalt with a grainsize < 105 µm. The increased amount 
of ash held in suspension meant the pump had to work harder than previously. Once 
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ash volumes reached 4% of the total fluid the pump quickly overloaded the 10 amp 
power supply, triggering a safety cut-out.  
 
Subsequent to testing, the pump was inspected for signs of wear, but none were 
detected. No detrimental effects appeared to have taken place, aside from the 
increased load. Total run time of each test was approximately 15 minutes, from start 
to finish, including initial operation with clean water. More obvious wear may have 
been apparent after a longer test period. 
 
While these tests did not indicate possible impacts of ash on effluent pumps they did 
indicate that sedimentation is likely to occur in pump station sumps as coarse ash 
accumulates. The tests also indicated load would increase on pumps as the sediment 
load increased.  
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6.5.2 Effluent pump testing 
Effluent pump testing was conducted on a Zenit Draga submersible waste pump, with 
a vortex set-back impeller (figure 6.4). These pumps are normally used in a variety of 
functions. According to the manufacturer these pumps are suitable for: “civil or 
industrial water treatment plants, for use in hospitals, agriculture, sanitary facilities, 
mining, irrigation, marble and stone work, lifting and transfer in industrial and civil 
installations, treatment of low and medium density industrial sludges, and for 
installation in public facilities, hotels, sports facilities, and campgrounds” (Zenit, 
2009). The model used was a DGE 50/2/G50V AOBM-E. This pump is used in New 
Zealand for similar applications to those listed above, especially as an agricultural 
effluent pump. The pump is fully submersible, with a maximum head of 6 metres. The 
casing and impeller are constructed from EN-GJL-250 cast iron. The recessed 
impeller allows for the free passage of solid bodies up to 35 mm.  
Recommended pH levels for the pump to operate in are 6 to 10. While this may be 
practical under usual operating conditions, lower pH levels can be expected in 
wastewater systems after the deposition of volcanic ash. The pH levels of the ash-
water mix used in testing were significantly lower than those recommended, ranging 
between a pH of 2.8 and 5.3.  
 
Figure 6.4: Zenit DGE 50/2/G50V effluent pump pre-testing. With base removed 
(left) and fully assembled (right). 
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6.5.2.1 Methodology 
Prior to testing, the pump was carefully photographed and the impeller was measured 
and weighed. This enabled a comparison of the pump pre and post-testing. In this way 
the amount of wear sustained could be established. Other parameters monitored 
included the output of the pump (litres per second), the pH of the fluid being pumped 
and the concentration and grainsize of the ash. The current drawn by the pump was 
also monitored, but this did not fluctuate beyond normal levels during the course of 
the experiment. As the objective of this test was to determine the effects of effluent 
pumps being subjected to volcanic ash, the shape of the sump was not important. The 
sump simply needed to contain the ash-water mix and allow it to be recirculated. An 
old bath was used, and the effluent pump placed at one end. A pipe leading from the 
outlet directed the water back to the other end of the bath (figure 6.5). As the pump 
displaced approximately 9 litres of fluid per second, most of the ash remained in 
suspension, and only minor amounts of sedimentation occurred.  
 
Figure 6.5: Effluent pump test set up shown during initial clean water test 
Several different tests were performed. During initial tests ash was gradually added to 
the water being pumped to ascertain if there was a threshold at which blockages 
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would occur. Later tests ran the pump for longer at a higher concentration of ash to 
determine further impacts and test for abrasion and corrosion. Finally a long duration 
test was conducted to establish long term impacts.  
 
6.5.2.2 Testing 
Two tests were conducted during which the ash-water ratio was gradually increased. 
These tests differed in that a fine ash was used in one test and a coarse ash in the 
other. The first test used crushed Port Hills basalt, sieved through a 105 µm sieve. 
Concentrated sulphuric acid was added to the mix to more closely simulate an ash 
leachate. Results are given in table 6.1 
Time (min) % Ash 
concentration  
Flow (L/s) Acidity (pH) observations 
0 2 9.1 4.5 - 
10 3 9.0 3.8 - 
20 5 8.9 3.7 - 
30 7 8.9 3.7 - 
40 9 9.0 3.4 - 
50 11 9.1 3.3 - 
60 13 9.0 3.1 - 
70 15 9.0 3.1 - 
80 21 9.1 3.1 - 
Table 6.1: Results of fine ash (<105 µm incremental test, Zenit DGE effluent pump 
As illustrated by table 6.1 initial results indicated no drop off in performance. The 
pump continued to operate well, and pump at the same rate as it had prior to testing. 
Variations in the output are more likely due to small errors in measurement than 
actual changes in flow rate. Figure 6.6 illustrates the experiment in progress.  
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Figure 6.6: Circulating ash laden water through the Zenit effluent pump. 
The second test used a coarser ash, made up of crushed Port Hills basalt and lahar 
sediment from Mt Ruapehu. The measured grainsize of this mix ranged from .9 µm to 
613.06 µm with a mode of 211.7 µm and a mean of 140.4 µm. Similar results to the 
first test were experienced, depicted in table 6.2. Again performance was not affected 
by the increase of ash, no blockages occurred and the flow rate remained the same.  
Time (min) % Ash Concentration  
Flow (L/s) Acidity (pH) observations 
0 2 9.0 3.5 - 
10 3 9.0 3.5 - 
20 5 9.2 3.4 - 
30 7 8.9 3.1 - 
40 10 9.1 3.1 - 
50 12 9.0 3.0 - 
60 15 9.0 3.1 - 
70 18 9.0 3.1 - 
80 22 8.9 3.1 - 
Table 6.2:  Results of coarse ash incremental test, Zenit DGE effluent pump 
The lack of blockages or other apparent impacts indicated that for this type of pump 
any impacts were likely to take place over a longer period of time. During the tests 
already conducted, once a high percentage of ash was reached the pump was only run 
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for a few minutes. For that reason further tests were conducted, with a constant high 
percentage of ash passing through the pump, to determine whether this would cause 
any impacts. The first such test used the same ash as the previously used (mean 
grainsize was 140.4 µm, maximum grainsize of 613.06 µm). This ash made up 15% of 
the total fluid volume being pumped. Once again the pump continued to operate as 
per normal (table 6.3). 
Time (min) Ash Concentration Acidity (pH) observations 
0 3.3 - 
10 3.3 - 
20 3.3 - 
30 3.3 - 
40 3.3 - 
50 3.3 - 
60 3.3 - 
70 3.4 - 
80 
15% 
3.3 - 
Table 6.3:  Results of coarse ash 80 minute test, Zenit DGE effluent pump 
A second test used the same ash, but passed through a 105 µm sieve, and at a higher 
concentration of 21% by volume. This provided similar results to the coarser ash test. 
Time (min) Ash Concentration Acidity (pH) observations 
0 4.6 - 
10 4.6 - 
20 4.5 - 
30 4.6 - 
40 4.6 - 
50 4.5 - 
60 4.6 - 
70 4.5 - 
80 
21% 
4.5 - 
Table 6.4 Results of fine ash (<105 µm) 80 minute test, Zenit DGE effluent pump 
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The effluent pump functioned well in the short term, but needed to be tested for a 
longer period. A 24 hour test was conducted to ascertain whether any impacts would 
occur over a longer timeframe (table 6.5). 
Time (hours) Ash Concentration Flow (L/s) Acidity (pH) observations 
0 9.1 2.8 - 
2 9.0 3.0 - 
4 8.9 3.1 - 
6 8.9 3.3 - 
8 9.0 3.3 - 
12 9.1 3.3 Increased noise from pump 
16 9.0 3.3 - 
20 8.9 3.3 - 
24 
21% 
8.9 3.2 - 
Table 6.5: Results of fine ash (<105 µm) 24 hour test, Zenit DGE effluent pump 
At the end of this test the pump was removed and inspected, to determine if any 
detrimental effects had taken place. It was found that significant corrosion and 
abrasion had occurred, as illustrated in figures 6.7 & 6.8 
 
Figure 6.7: Pump impeller pre testing and after ~29 hours of testing. Impeller blade 
measurements illustrate the extent of abrasion; A-Al was 65 mm pre testing and 62 mm post test. 
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The impeller had been abraded both on its base and blades. Its diameter had decreased 
slightly, from an initial 101 mm to 99.3 mm. The impeller blades had also decreased 
in width, the tips of the blades were especially worn (figure 6.8). The distance 
between each end of the base of each blade was 65 mm pre testing, as illustrated in 
figure 6.7. A-Al was 62 mm after these tests, the other blades measured 62.8 mm and 
63 mm. All paint was worn away from both the impeller and the inside of the housing. 
Pitting was evident on impeller blade surfaces, though it cannot be ruled out that this 
was not present before testing, as in new condition paint obscured the surface.  
 
Figure 6.8 Impeller after ~29 hours testing, note wear on the tips of the blades. 
This level of wear was judged to be consistent with what would normally be seen 
after 1-2 years of pumping cowshed effluent (H Baker, pers. comm., 2008). Total run 
time from new had been just over 29 hours. Therefore while the pump had kept 
functioning it had been subject to extremely accelerated wear.  
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6.5.2.3 Long term testing 
Determining impacts and wear over a longer period required more testing. As such the 
pump was run again for a longer duration test. Ash used was again the mix of crushed 
Port Hills basalt and andesitic material derived from the March 2007 Whangaehu 
lahar (grainsize 0.9 µm to 613.06 µm with a mode of 211.7 µm and a mean of 140.4 
µm). The pH was 5 at the beginning of this test, but increased slightly during the test 
process due to buffering by the ash. This was countered by the addition of small 
amounts of sulphuric acid as required, keeping the pH at 5 ±0.3. This test was 
conducted with a smaller volume of fluids (45 litres), using a large barrel to circulate 
the ash and water within. Five litres of ash were added to the 45 litres of water. The 
pump was left running on a timer, which periodically switched off to allow the pump 
to cool down. This would not usually be necessary, but the small volume of the barrel 
meant that the water warmed up due to the heat generated by the pump, and the pump 
would have run the risk of overheating had it been left to run constantly.  
For this first part of the longer duration test the pump ran for 56 hours. Inspection at 
the conclusion of this test revealed severe abrasion to the impeller, and increased 
levels of corrosion. The impeller blades were again shortened. The initial 65 mm 
length for each of the 3 blades described in figure 6.7 now measured 55.8 mm, 56.3 
mm and 55.1 mm respectively. The serial number of the impeller, which was stamped 
into the cast iron surface, had also been worn away, indicating the base of the impeller 
was also subject to erosion (figure 6.9). 
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Figure 6.9: Impeller after 85 hours testing, note the stamped serial number is now not visible. 
Pitting on the impeller blades had also increased (figure 6.10). It was now obvious 
that the mass of the impeller had decreased, as it was noticeably lighter. It was 
weighed and found to be 310.6 grams. Initial weight before testing was 448 grams. 
This loss of over 30% of it’s mass represents severe wear for such a short length of 
time (total test time was now 85 hours).  
 
 
Figure 6.10: Pitting on the surface of the 
impeller blades 
Figure 6.11: Impeller casing interior, 
showing minor abrasion (smoothed 
internal edges) and increased corrosion. 
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Minor wear was also evident on the interior of the impeller casing, as was increased 
corrosion. Surface rust was visible on both the impeller and the interior of the pump 
housing (figures 6.10 & 6.11). Corrosion and wear were especially noticeable behind 
the impeller, and on the back of the impeller itself. Ash was visible around the shaft of 
the impeller, behind the sleeve around the spring holding the seal ring. This meant 
that ash would be in contact with the seal which separated the motor and electrics 
from the wet impeller area, potentially abrading both shaft and seal (figure 6.12).  
 
Figure 6.12: Arrow indicates ash visible behind the sleeve rubbing against the shaft and seal. 
Impeller removed for inspection and photograph 
 
After inspection and reassembly, testing continued. The pump was run for a further 24 
hours. As expected, increased wear was again seen. Most significantly, the impeller 
base had begun to wear through at the thinnest points. These had started as small 
indentations on the back of the impeller but had increased in size through abrasion 
during testing (figures 6.13-6.14). 
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Figure 6.13: Heavily eroded impeller after 109 hours of testing 
 
 
Figure 6.14: Rear views of the impeller showing the increase in erosion in the rear 
indentation. Images were taken (from left to right): pre testing, after 29 hours, after 109 
hours. 
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The loss of much of the impeller represented a significant decrease in the efficiency of 
the pump. The length of the 3 blades described in figure 6.7 now measured 52.0 mm, 
53.2 mm and 52.9 mm respectively, approximately 80% of their original length. Flow 
rate was again measured, and found to be 7.5 L/s, the original flow rate was ~9 L/s. 
Testing resumed in order to determine how long it would take until complete pump 
failure occurred. This happened only 3 hours later, not because of impeller wear but 
from failure of the seal separating the electric motor from the impeller and wet area. 
The seal itself was made from silicon carbide (9 on Mohs scale of hardness), this 
survived without any signs of wear. The stainless steel impeller shaft however had 
suffered pitting corrosion, especially between the seal and the shaft. This allowed ash 
to work its way past the seal. It then became trapped under the seal ring (situated 
above the mechanical seal), wearing a groove into the metal shaft (figure 6.15). After 
112 hours of testing, ash and water broke through into the electric motor, causing the 
pump to fail (figure 6.16). This failure created an electrical short that blew a fuse in 
the wall socket. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.15: Impeller shaft after 109 
hours of testing. The lower arrow 
indicates the rough pitted surface caused 
by corrosion between the seal and shaft, 
the middle arrow indicates further 
pitting, the groove (left arrow) is caused 
by mechanical abrasion beneath the seal 
ring. 
Figure 6.16: Pump at end of testing. The 
puddle is all from the interior of the 
pump, which should be dry. 
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The failure effectively destroyed the pump. The pump had a design life of 20 years, 
and was designed to handle noxious substances like effluent, but was not robust 
enough to cope with volcanic ash. Even without the failure of the seal, the severe 
abrasion to the impeller would have made the pump inoperative within a few more 
hours of testing. By the end of testing the impeller weighed 273.8 grams; 39% of its 
original mass had been removed by abrasion. 
 
6.5.3 Implications of testing – applying results 
 
The 112 hours that the Zenit effluent pump survived for illustrate some of the 
problems associated with pumping volcanic ash. Test results cannot simply be scaled 
up to approximate a larger urban effluent pump, in any case there is no standard type 
pump used in wastewater systems. However the tests clearly demonstrate that 
pumping volcanic ash will result in vastly increased wear, compared to wear achieved 
under normal circumstances. Urban waste water pumps use similar materials for 
construction to the effluent pump tested, so wear is likely to occur in a similar 
manner. Rapid destruction of the impeller is therefore a likely outcome for any 
wastewater pump. 
 
The failure of the seal as an issue will not translate to all larger pumps, as in many 
cases urban wastewater pump motors are mounted significantly higher than the 
impeller, connected by a long drive shaft. These pumps are not submersed like the 
effluent pump tested. In these instances the failure of a seal would result in some 
spillage of sewage, but no other damage.  
 
The lack of blockages in these tests does not imply that blockages will not occur in 
metropolitan wastewater pumps, as previous instances of ash causing blockages to 
such pumps have been recorded. Whether or not pumps become blocked, ash will be 
extremely problematic; where blockages do not occur, damage to pumps, (particularly 
impellers) will.  
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6.6 Other wastewater system vulnerabilities to volcanic ash 
 
There are several different ways in which volcanic ash may impact 
wastewater/sewerage systems. This is because in addition to ash entering the 
wastewater system through stormwater drains etc, direct ashfall may cause problems 
for associated surface infrastructure. This includes pumping stations and the 
equipment within, power supplies, communications equipment and most significantly 
the treatment plant itself. To accurately determine potential impacts of ashfall on a 
wastewater system, a specific system (Auckland) was selected to have a vulnerability 
analysis conducted on it. Auckland was chosen as an example of a New Zealand city 
with a typical urban wastewater reticulation network, and because it is a city at risk 
from volcanic ashfall from several different volcanic centres (Houghton et al., 2006). 
Furthermore it is New Zealand’s largest city (population 1,303,068), home to over 
32% of New Zealand’s population (Statistics NZ, 2009). This fact, combined with the 
associated industry, infrastructure and presence of the busiest airport in New Zealand, 
make it the most economically significant centre in New Zealand.  
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6.7 The vulnerability of Auckland city wastewater collection system 
and treatment plant to volcanic ash. 
 
Potential impacts of an ashfall in Auckland on stormwater and sewage systems can be 
broadly divided into two sections – impacts on the network and impacts on the 
wastewater treatment plant. Both the network and the treatment plant will be 
vulnerable in some ways to both airfall ash and ash transported through the pipes of 
the wastewater system.  
 
6.7.1 Network impacts 
 
While most suburban areas around Auckland have separate stormwater and sewerage 
networks, Auckland City itself has a shared sewerage/stormwater network, the 
‘Orakei Main Sewer’ and it’s branches (figure 6.17). This means that should an 
ashfall impact Auckland, volcanic ash will enter the sewerage system in the Auckland 
CBD and surrounds, mainly via stormwater drains. The area served by the Orakei 
main sewer creates ~30% of the entire intake of effluent at Mangere treatment plant. 
 
The Orakei Main Sewer feeds into the Eastern Interceptor. It is these lines and their 
pump stations that will be subject to ash entering the network. The amount of ash 
entering the network will depend on not only the amount of ashfall, but also the 
amount of rainfall. Approximately 71% of the Auckland isthmus is covered by 
impermeable surfaces (Auckland City Council 2007b). Because of this, most rainfall 
will end up draining into the stormwater system as opposed to soaking into the 
ground. 
 
 
Figure 6.17: (Overleaf) Auckland Waste water Reticulation Network. The central Auckland 
area served by the Orakei main sewer (orange) uses a shared stormwater and sewerage 
system. Mangere treatment plant is located with an asterisk. Map © Watercare 2005 
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Figure 6.17: Auckland Waste water Reticulation Network. The central Auckland area served 
by the Orakei main sewer (orange) uses a shared stormwater and sewerage system. Mangere 
treatment plant is located with an asterisk. Map © Watercare 2005 
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Figure 6.18: Impermeable surfaces (coloured blue) in Auckland in 2002 (Auckland City 
Council, 2007a) 
Stormwater and sewage reticulation systems constructed in New Zealand after the 
1940’s are generally designed to be self cleansing under most flow conditions 
(Kamer, 1993). The gradient and shape of pipes (narrow at the base) encourage high 
flow velocities, even during dry weather when low amounts of waste are flowing 
through the system (B. Park, pers. comm., 2006). This helps to entrain sediments and 
move them through the system. However accumulations of sediment still occur, even 
without extreme conditions like ashfall taking place. For this reason most systems 
have grit chambers (sediment traps) in place to capture coarse or heavy sediment (e.g. 
grit from roads) rather than transport it through the system. These are typically in the 
order of a few cubic metres capacity. Those in Auckland City range between 1.7 m3 
and 21.1 m3, apart from a large sediment trap at Ngapipi Road, which has a total 
volume of 94 m3 (Kamer, 1993). While under normal circumstances grit chambers are 
cleaned out 2-3 times per year, even a light ashfall will result in rapid accumulation of 
material in the chambers, necessitating markedly increased maintenance and cleaning. 
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A lot of ash will bypass the chambers completely, being carried in suspension through 
the system. As fine components more readily remain in suspension, the grit chambers 
will be more effective in capturing coarser ash – thus a local eruption from the 
Auckland Volcanic Field (AVF) will rapidly deposit ash in the grit chambers, even in 
a small-scale eruption. The time it will take for the traps to reach capacity is very 
difficult to predict, for the same reasons that the amount of ash entering the system is 
unconstrained - the large number of variables include ash grainsize, quantity, and 
fallout rate. It also depends on the amount of rainfall during or after ashfall, 
preventative measures taken to stop ash entering the system, flow velocities at the grit 
chamber, and the size and morphology of each chamber. Emptying grit chambers 
during ashfall may be problematic due to access issues; roads may be closed, and hills 
difficult to climb due to traction problems. Vehicle mobility on ash covered roads is 
discussed in chapter 5. 
During slow or waning flow conditions, ash carried in suspension will begin to settle 
and accumulate. As it dries a limited amount of cementation and hardening may 
begin. In this way blockages can begin to occur. This was observed in the sewerage 
system in Anchorage following the 1992 Mt Spurr eruption (Johnston, 1997b). While 
some of these blockages can be removed with high pressure water, others may require 
mechanical shifting. Other examples of ash deposits hardening after drying (outside of 
wastewater environments) have been observed on several occasions, e.g. Etna 2002 
(Barnard, 2004). Figure 6.19 shows residents cleaning up ash after the May 20 2006 
dome collapse of Soufriere Hills volcano on Montserrat. The hardness of the ash is 
illustrated by the tools used to clean it; hoes rather than brooms. 
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Figure 6.19 Clean up of ash using hoes, Montserrat, 2006 (image from Montserrat-
today.com, 2006) 
6.7.2 Mitigating impacts of ash entering the network  
 
• Preventing as much ash as possible entering the system will reduce further 
impacts. Recommended steps to do this are listed in figure 6.2. 
• In the event of large amounts of ash entering the Orakei main sewer the 
overflow at PS16 (64) may be used to spill sewage into Waitemata Harbour, 
preventing blockages occurring downstream in the network. In this instance a 
dredge will need to be available prior to overflow to keep the outlet clear. 
• Grit traps will quickly fill. Additional staff and equipment to empty these as 
required need to be readied. It should be noted that access to these grit traps 
may be compromised by ash covering the ground and closing roads. Steep 
inclines need to be avoided by maintenance vehicles.  
• Pump station wet wells will quickly become subject to sedimentation (exact 
impacts cannot be predicted as it is unclear how much ash pumps will be able 
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to keep moving). Maintenance staff need to be available to clear blockages if 
possible. This is more of an issue in light ashfall or for small pump stations on 
the Orakei main sewer, as it is likely during heavier ashfall that PS 16 (64) 
will be shutdown.  
• Cleaning wastewater pipes will be necessary after (and possibly during) an 
ashfall. Sufficient equipment and staff need to be available to achieve this 
quickly. 
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6.7.3 Network vulnerability to direct ashfall 
 
Excluding the treatment plant, wastewater infrastructure on the surface is limited. 
Some pipes are occasionally located above ground; such as the pipeline crossing the 
Orakei Basin. (This pipe is soon to be replaced with the newly constructed Hobson 
Bay Tunnel). As surface pipes are sealed they are unlikely to be affected by ashfall, 
aside from minor corrosion on any metal surfaces. Grit traps are covered by steel 
plates, so are unlikely to be greatly affected by ashfall aside from surface corrosion. 
This leaves pump stations, which are housed in purpose built structures. The pump 
stations and associated infrastructure do have some vulnerabilities to direct ashfall, 
which may affect them in several ways. Pump Station 16 (PS16) at Orakei is one of 
Auckland’s major wastewater pumping stations; all of central Auckland’s sewage and 
stormwater passes through this facility (figure 6.20). Upstream of this pump station 
the network is a combined system of sewerage and stormwater. Below it the sewerage 
and stormwater pipes are separate. Almost all ash to pass through the network will 
therefore pass through this pump station. Given it’s importance, this station has been 
used to determine potential impacts of volcanic ashfall directly landing on pump 
stations. It will be retired soon, as a replacement station (PS64) is currently under 
construction, scheduled for completion in December 2009. However PS16 still 
represents a good example of a major pumping station, and will be in service until that 
time. 
 
6.7.3.1 Pump stations 
Tephra loading  
 
These largely flat roofed structures will accumulate ash during ashfall. The danger of 
roof collapse will only be an issue during heavy ashfall. This is most likely in the 
event of a local eruption from the Auckland Volcanic Field. Probabilities of roof 
collapse on different types of structures are examined in section 2.3.1.4. The flat roof 
of PS16 is supported by steel joists, and would fit into the MW (medium-weak) 
category used in the proposed classification of European roof types for tephra fall 
resistance (Spence et al., 2005). This means a 3 kPa load will result in a 50% chance 
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of collapse. This load represents approximately 20 cm of dry ash or 15 cm of wet ash, 
depending on tephra density. These figures assume a (worst case scenario) dry density 
of 1500 kg/m3 and a wet density of 2000 kg/m3 respectively. Roof collapse effects 
will vary depending on what objects are struck, but are potentially catastrophic. 
 
Figure 6.20: Interior of pump room, Pump Station 16, Orakei. 
 
Even without roof collapse, buckling of roofing iron under load may result in the 
ingress of ash and/or rainwater to pump stations. The effects of this will depend on 
where the ingress occurs and whether the ash is wet or dry. In the pump rooms, small 
amounts of ash and water will create a mess, but that may be the extent of any 
damage, as the pumps are located in a wet or at least damp area anyway. Wet ash will 
not remain airborne, and should not therefore cause issues for pump motors. Should 
an ingress of dry ash occur, some ash may accumulate on compressors and pump 
motor air filters. Assuming only minor amounts enter the pump station this is unlikely 
to be problematic.  
 
Pump station control rooms will be more susceptible to damage if buckled roofs allow 
for the ingress of ash or water. Control room electronics will likely be damaged or 
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destroyed if water (potentially including acidic ash leachates and ash particles) is 
directed onto them. Ingress of dry ash into this area is also likely to be damaging for 
electrical components, due to its conductive nature. 
 
Even during light ashfalls of only a few millimetres ashfall can be damaging. The 
corrosive nature of ash will result in accelerated corrosion of roofing iron. Gutterings 
will be susceptible to collapse as rainfall washes heavy ash into them. 
 
These impacts can be mitigated by cleaning ash off roofs where possible. Safety needs 
must be considered, as ash is not only slippery, but already overloaded roofs may be 
further damaged or collapse under the additional load of workers.  
 
Ash ingress 
 
During ashfall the ingress of ash into pump stations will be possible through windows, 
doors and other ventilation openings, even if the roof remains structurally sound. 
Vents allowing air into PS16 have either coarse or no filtration and there are gaps 
around doors (figure 6.21). 
 
Figure 6.21: External and internal vents with either coarse or no filtration at PS16 
 
The entry of ash into this facility has the potential to cause problems for the electronic 
control equipment for the pumps, and to the pump motors themselves. The control 
equipment, including the programmable logic controller (PLC) and switchgear, while 
situated in a separate room from the pumps, also uses vents with either coarse or no 
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filtration. Small amounts of ash may penetrate these openings, especially in windy 
conditions. The conductive properties of fresh ash (especially when damp) give it the 
potential to cause arcing and thus short-circuiting of electrical equipment. Frequent 
inspection will be required to closely monitor any accumulation of ash in such areas, 
unless filtration of vents is improved, and seals are installed around doors and 
windows. This is likely to occur with the current construction of pump station 64, 
replacing PS16. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.22: PS16 control room and switchgear 
 
The air-cooled electric pump motors situated in the main room of the pump station 
also face a hazard posed by the presence of volcanic ash, as do the drive-shafts 
connecting pumps to motors. The abrasive nature of volcanic ash is the main concern, 
since any moving parts on the machinery will be subject to increased wear as ash 
penetrates the equipment. The presence of a small amount of ash inside this room is 
not likely to cause failure of this equipment. 
 
Compressors used to inject bubbles of air into wet-wells should not be used while ash 
is entrained in the air, as an influx of ash into a compressor will cause damage to 
seals, dramatically reducing the effectiveness of the compressor. Air filters on the 
compressors will also be subject to blockages. 
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Whilst filters will quickly block if air is being drawn through them, in the absence of 
constant airflow (there is no fan drawing air inside) filtration should adequately 
provide protection without blocking in the short term. Fine filter (EU6-7) media will 
keep much of the ash out, though should be used in conjunction with a coarser pre-
filter (e.g. EU2-3) to increase the time taken for blockages to occur.  
Communications 
 
Monitoring of the pump station status in Auckland takes place remotely, from a 
control room situated in Newmarket. This is achieved via radio telemetry from the 
pump stations. Communications with the pump stations have the potential to be 
disrupted in a local eruption, as electrically-charged ash in an eruption column can 
cause interference and render radio systems inoperative. This is by no means certain 
to happen, as there are other instances of radio communications continuing to function 
near eruptions and in areas receiving ash falls (refer to chapter 2). The location of the 
telemetry equipment outside of the pump station building is potentially problematic, 
as the system has several vents, which could allow the equipment to be coated with 
conductive volcanic ash. This may cause flashover and possible failure of the 
transmitter, but the equipment has not been tested with ash, the vulnerability of the 
unit is therefore unknown.  
 
Another part of pump stations (and siphons) are the biofilters. They consist of large 
open air beds (up to 90m2) of bark, scoria and organic material, hosting bacteria that 
help to reduce odours. While thin (< 2 millimetre) deposits of ash may not 
significantly impact these structures, thicker deposits have the potential to result in pH 
changes that could affect the bacteria within these filters. Effects are largely unknown, 
however the creation of unpleasant odours is unlikely to be a high priority during 
ashfall. Rapid cleanup will mitigate this occurrence. 
 
Power failure 
A significant immediate impact on wastewater pumping stations during ashfall may 
be power cuts. These are a common occurrence during ashfall, due not just to 
flashovers in substations, but also to the collapse of power lines from both direct ash 
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loading and trees/branches falling under the weight of volcanic ash (Wison et al., 
2009). Traffic accidents and collisions with power poles due to the slippery conditions 
caused by light ashfall may also result in some power failures. Temporary shutdowns 
of pumps stations will result in sewage backing up in pipes. While some storage 
capacity is created by the volume of the pipes themselves, ultimately this will result in 
overflows. An example of this was seen on June 12 2006, where a power cut of a few 
hours resulted in PS16 (among others) shutting down. An overflow channel at Orakei 
would normally discharge into the sea, but in high tide conditions this failed, resulting 
in the flooding of Kelly Tarlton's Antarctic Encounter and Underwater World with 
raw sewage (Beston, NZ Herald, 14/06/06). A more recent example occurred on 
February 3rd 2009, when power cuts for only 2 and a half hours resulted in the 
discharge of sewage into Waitemata harbour at St Heliers and Orakei (due to the 
shutdown of PS16) (NZ Herald, 04/02/2009). A greater temporary storage capacity 
will be available by December 2009 when the new Hobson Bay Tunnel (sewerage 
pipeline) is brought into service, increasing the buffering capacity as pump stations 
are put under pressure.  
 
Once pumps have failed, due to blockage, damage or power failure, waste will begin 
to fill the Hobson Bay Tunnel section of the Orakei main sewer. This section of the 
sewer will act as temporary storage for waste when PS16 (64) pumps cannot keep up 
with wastewater supply. Under normal conditions this would occur when flows 
exceeded 7500 l/s (B Park, pers comm., 2009). The ponding of waste will result in the 
deposition of suspended ash as it settles out of suspension. Sedimentation of ash will 
continue until the overflow level at the top of the pipe is reached, whereupon sewage 
will be spilled into Waitemata Harbour. Once this has occurred, the accumulation of 
ash will be difficult to remobilise. Depending on how much ash is present, and the 
ratio of sewage or effluent to ash, it may be necessary to manually dig out the lower 
reaches of this section of the wastewater system. If the sediment-water ratio of the 
pumps is not exceeded, and they are able to move the sewage-ash mix this will result 
in severe abrasion to the pumps. Ensuing repairs may still be more cost effective than 
manually removing large volumes of sediment. 
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6.7.3.2 Newmarket control room 
 
The Watercare control room in Newmarket is designed to monitor pump station status 
and respond to alarms. Although some pumps can be controlled from here, under 
normal conditions control is automatically managed locally at pump stations by a 
programmable logic controller (PLC). The Newmarket control room is manned 24 
hours a day 365 days per year. In the event of communications failure with the pump 
stations, the control room’s central location would allow for rapid manual assessment 
of any problems.  
 
6.7.3.3 Mitigating impacts of direct ashfall on the network 
Aside from ashfall entering stormwater drains (discussed in section 6.7.1.1), impacts 
of direct ashfall on the network relate to how well pump stations cope with ashfall. 
Procedures to mitigate these effects include: 
• Sweeping pump station roofs clean before ash thicknesses exceed 10 cm to 
prevent roof damage or collapse. 
• Installing filters on air vents to minimise ash ingress (provided the air is not 
fan assisted, in which case filters will quickly block). 
• Sealing gaps around windows/doors.  
• Cleaning communications equipment of excess ash 
• Turning off wet-well bubblers to prevent compressors ingesting ash. 
 
6.7.4 Treatment plant Impacts - Ash arriving through the system 
 
Mangere’s waste water treatment plant processes waste from most of the Auckland 
region from Auckland City to Papakura (see figure 6.17). In the absence of pump 
station failures, large quantities of ash may reach the processing plant through the 
sewage reticulation system, specifically the Eastern Interceptor. Three main sewerage 
lines combine at the Mangere plant in a receiving chamber, before mixing and 
entering the plant. Sewage and ash from the Eastern Interceptor would combine here 
with (largely) ash free sewage from the Western and South Western Interceptors. 
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Processing takes place in three main stages, divided into primary, secondary and 
tertiary treatments.  
 
Primary treatment processes 
 
Primary treatment involves screening any material coarser than 3 mm, before the 
waste flows through 12 aerated grit tanks to reduce flow velocity and lessen the 
buoyancy of particles. This process will remove much of the coarse ash that manages 
to reach the treatment plant; however significant amounts of fine ash will still pass 
this stage, as will the potentially acidic leachates associated with the ash. Furthermore 
the volumes of ash arriving through the system may be sufficient to overload the grit 
tanks faster than they can be emptied, resulting in more ash bypassing this process. 
 
From the grit tanks the effluent progresses to the primary sedimentation tanks, where 
flow velocity is reduced and slowed, allowing solids to settle out of suspension over a 
2 hour period. Sewage sludge (and ash) that are collected at this stage would then be 
scraped into hoppers and discharged into gravity thickener tanks. The sedimentation 
tank scrapers will likely be subject to accelerated wear after scraping large volumes of 
ash off sedimentation tank floors. The fluids pass over outlet weirs, and are pumped 
through the interstage pump station to the reactor/clarifiers. These pumps will also be 
subject to accelerated abrasion from ash (in total there are over 160 pumps on site at 
Mangere, all of which will be subject to accelerated wear).  
 
The gravity thickener tanks mix up the solids, decanting off more fluid to the 
reactor/clarifiers. Settled sludge at a consistency of 6% solids is pumped to the 
anaerobic sludge digesters. Both reactor/clarifiers and sludge digesters are secondary 
treatment processes.  
 
Secondary treatment processes 
 
Anaerobic sludge digesters heat sludge to 37O C to break down organic material, 
eventually converting it into methane. This process takes 15 days, during which the 
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solids content is reduced to 4%. Ash will not break down in this way, and would 
simply take up space in the digesters. 
 
Nine reactor/clarifiers are on site at Mangere, each with a diameter of 77 metres 
(figure 6.23). Within these systems bacteria strip out organic pollutants. This process 
is currently the most widely used sewage treatment process worldwide (Watercare, 
2009). The balance of the pH in this process is critical though; should the pH fall 
below 6.5 bacterial conversion of nitrate(s) into nitrogen ceases. Any influx of ash 
into the treatment plant will likely be accompanied by highly acidic leachates. 
Although Watercare carefully balance pH, as under normal circumstances acidic 
effluent enters the system, ash leachates will potentially have sufficient volume and 
acidity to overwhelm countermeasures taken to increase the pH in the 
reactor/clarifiers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.23: Reactor/clarifiers at Mangere wastewater treatment plant 
 
Solid waste discharged from the reactor/clarifiers is next treated by dissolved air 
flotation, whereby compressed air is mixed with the solids. The resulting bubbles 
cause effluent solids to float on the surface of the tank, where they are collected by a 
rotating arm. This process has not been tested with volcanic ash; its reaction to this 
process is unknown. However, depending on their composition and vesicularity, ash 
grains are likely to be heavier than organic particulates, especially during a localised 
basaltic eruption. Dense particles would inhibit flotation, possibly resulting in an 
accumulation of ash on the floor of the tank. 
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The final secondary process takes place in the dewatering plant. Extracted solids are 
“spun dry” in centrifuges, with the addition of polymers to aid flocculation of 
effluent. How well the flocculation will work in the event of an eruption would 
depend on the ratio of ash to effluent. Solids are removed from this process and 
disposed of as landfill. 
 
Tertiary treatment processes 
 
Tertiary treatment involves 2 processes. Liquid effluent from the reactor/clarifiers is 
pumped to a filtration facility. This consists of beds of granular anthracite, which 
remove particles down to 15 microns. Filters are cleaned daily, backwashing using 
recycled water and compressed air. This would need to occur more frequently if ash 
was to arrive through the system in large volumes. Fine ash will pass through the 
filters, and progress onto the final treatment, ultraviolet disinfection. 
 
The ultraviolet disinfection process involves passing wastewater through 12 parallel 
channels, along which arrays of UV lamps are arranged in rows. The lamps are 
submerged lengthways along the direction of flow, and are encased in quartz tubes 
(figure 6.24).  
 
Figure 6.24: UV disinfection facility at Mangere wastewater treatment plant (left). Quartz 
tubes used to protect UV lights (right) 
 
These lamps are designed to achieve a 10000x reduction in the amount of pathogens 
discharged from the treatment plant. The presence of fine volcanic ash particulates 
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within the effluent at this stage would increase it’s turbidity, reducing the 
effectiveness of the UV disinfection process. Furthermore the tubes are periodically 
self cleaned by a surrounding rubber wiper ring. This cleaning process has the 
potential to scratch the tubes as ash is wiped along them. This is especially so in the 
event of an eruption from the Taupo Volcanic Zone or Taranaki, as these eruptions 
are likely to be andesitic, dacitic (or in a worst case scenario rhyolitic), and thus will 
contain quartz. In the event of a local explosive eruption from the AVF, predominant 
minerals found in the ensuing basaltic volcanic ash will include feldspars, pyroxene, 
and olivine. These minerals are all slightly softer than quartz, though olivine can at 
times be of equal hardness (7). Scratching of the quartz tubes would thus be possible, 
but would take place over a longer term, and would be less intense than if large 
quantities of silicic ash were passing through the system.  
 
6.7.4 Mitigating impacts of ash arriving through the network 
 
Following tertiary treatment the liquid effluent is discharged into Manukau harbour. 
Should large amounts of fine volcanic ash (<15 µm) manage to get this far, this would 
likely result in excess sedimentation at the outflow, which could need dredging. 
However this scenario is more likely to occur if the plant or parts of the plant are 
bypassed. Since at almost all stages of the treatment process ash has the potential to 
disrupt treatment or damage equipment, a partial or complete bypass of the treatment 
plant would be the best course of action. Although bypassing the plant would result in 
raw sewage being discharged into Manukau harbour, it would only be for the duration 
of the ashfall or while ash was present on the ground in central Auckland. If large 
volumes of ash entered the plant, the ensuing damage to plant components would 
likely result in long periods in which the plant would be inoperable, resulting in 
longer term discharge of untreated effluent into the harbour. In the event of a 
complete or partial plant bypass the large amounts of sediment that would enter the 
harbour would need to be moved to deeper water to prevent a large build up of 
sediment and untreated effluent around the outlet.  
Instead of bypassing the treatment plant, sewage and ash could alternatively be 
discharged into Waitemata Harbour at Orakei. This option has significant advantages. 
It would prevent most ash reaching Mangere through the wastewater system, as the 
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network preceding this pump station is the only shared sewerage and stormwater 
network. Untreated sewage would be spilled into Waitemata Harbour, this would 
allow the plant to keep processing waste from other areas of Auckland; those served 
by the Eastern, Western and South Western interceptors – these are not part of the 
shared network of sewage and stormwater. In this way the amount of untreated waste 
to be discharged into the environment would be reduced by 70%.  In this instance 
dredging would be necessary at the overflow point at Orakei to remove ash from the 
outflow area.  
 
If insufficient amounts of ash are coming through to justify discharge into Waitemata 
harbour or bypass into Manukau harbour, there are several courses of action that can 
be taken to ensure damage is minimised or recovery is hastened. Many of these steps 
involve pre-planning, and assume advance warning of an eruption is given. 
 
• Biosolid disposal requires stabilisation with lime. The amount of lime required 
will likely significantly increase due to the potential acidity of volcanic ash. 
Much larger than usual stocks of lime will therefore be required. 
• Reactor/clarifiers are highly sensitive to pH changes, and should be bypassed.  
• Tertiary treatment processes should be bypassed to preserve filters and UV 
light tubes. 
• Excess sedimentation is likely at the discharge point in Manukau Harbour; a 
dredge will need to be ready to clear this if necessary. 
• With ash entering the system abrasion of components such as pumps will 
increase. Abrasion is particularly severe for pump impellers due to the speed 
at which they move. Spare impeller blades kept onsite will minimise repair 
times.  
• Staff availability could be compromised if ashfall has closed roads, or staff 
need to be at home preserving their own property/looking after families. 
Contingency plans are required for this eventuality. 
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6.7.5 Direct ashfall on wastewater treatment facilities  
 
6.7.5.1 Tephra loading 
 
Heavy ashfall landing directly on the Mangere waste water treatment plant could be 
disastrous for many of the flat roofed structures present. Amongst others these include 
the screens building, co-generation plant, UV disinfection plant, biosolids dewatering 
building and alkaline stabilisation plant buildings. Office buildings and the control 
rooms also have flat or only slightly inclined roofs. Collapses of or heavy damage to 
commercial structures of this nature is more likely to occur than residential building 
collapse, due to the large roof spans involved in commercial and industrial buildings. 
This has been seen to occur in the past during medium to heavy ashfalls in various 
eruptions. For example, building damage in Rabaul during the 1994 Rabaul eruption 
was severe, as tephra loads were at times in excess of 7 kPa. Steel framed buildings 
performed particularly poorly, some even collapsed under loads just over 2 kPa, or 
around 150 mm of tephra (Blong, 2003). Collapses of large span buildings following 
ashfall from the 1991 Pinatubo eruption in the Philippines also occurred, with much 
less ash impacting them. Buildings such as hangars and warehouses at Clark air force 
base collapsed under ~150 millimetres of ash, while residential houses nearby 
survived relatively intact (Casadevall et al., 1996). The variety of buildings and 
construction types present at Mangere treatment plant will result in several different 
thresholds for the amount of ash required to damage or collapse roofs and walls. 
Where possible ash should be cleaned off large span roofs before more than 5 
centimetres or so has accumulated. If more than 10 cm has accumulated such 
buildings should not be entered due to the risk of roof collapse.  
 
The primary sedimentation tanks, anaerobic sludge digesters and gravity thickeners 
are all roofed. There is a lack of data on the effects of loading on these types of 
structures. Rapid removal of ash during any ashfall over 5 cm thick would be 
advisable. Due to the irregular shape and corrugations of the gravity thickener roof, 
ash will likely prove laborious to remove from this structure (figure 6.25). 
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Figure 6.25: Gravity thickeners at Mangere wastewater treatment plant (Watercare, 2009) 
6.7.5.2 Ash leachates and acid rain 
 
Acidic ash leachates and acid rain will not only cause corrosion to exposed metal 
infrastructure, but alter pH levels in the 9 reactor/clarifiers. Each of these units is 
made up of a series of eight compartments – four aerobic compartments which are 
aerated, and four anoxic. Under aerobic conditions, biochemical oxygen demand is 
reduced and ammonia is converted to nitrate and nitrites. Under anoxic conditions, 
bacteria convert the nitrate and nitrites into harmless nitrogen gas. Should the pH fall 
below 6.5 bacterial conversion of nitrate(s) into nitrogen ceases, and this type of 
treatment ceases to function. The reactor/clarifiers each have a diameter of 77 metres, 
and are open to the sky. They are therefore capable of collecting a lot of ash or acid 
rain. Once this occurs, pH changes are likely. The pH levels will therefore need to be 
continuously monitored and countered.  
 
  213
6.7.5.3 Ash ingress to structures 
 
The control room for the plant relies heavily on air-conditioning; cool air is essential 
for the operation of the computer systems that control the plant. Research discussed in 
chapter 3 suggests that light ashfall would not be problematic for air-conditioning 
units. The control room cooling should therefore be adequate in light ashfall, however 
the same testing indicated that ashfall reaching a thickness of over 30 mm could 
potentially start to cause air-conditioning failure. This could be avoided by regular 
cleaning of the air-conditioner condensers during ashfall. 
 
Although the control room uses air-conditioning, the interstage pump station 
distributed control system (DCS), and switchgear for the odour control fans are 
housed in other buildings which only use unfiltered fresh air vents and fans. These are 
situated in the ceilings of the rooms that house this equipment, and often directed at 
that equipment (figure 6.26). This creates a vulnerability even to light ashfall, as this 
would result in the ingress of ash into these buildings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.26: Switchgear for the DCS (left) and odour control beds (right). Note the air vents 
directly above the DCS cabinets. 
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Odour control fan switchgear cabinets are well sealed; ash around these would simply 
make a mess, and possibly cause minor corrosion to cabinets. DCS switchgear 
cabinets are vented. Ingress of ash into these cabinets ash will have the potential to 
cause electrical shorts. This is more likely to occur with damp ash, as ash becomes 
conductive when wet (Gordon et al., 2005). As these cabinets generate a lot of heat, 
ash would quickly dry, lessening the chance of shorts occurring. Ash inside the 
cabinets is still not desirable; apart from the (low) chance of electrical shorts, 
corrosion is possible in the longer term, and abrasion or binding of moving parts (e.g. 
switches) will be likely. 
 
Compressed air is used in a variety of functions at Mangere. Grit tanks, dissolved air 
flotation tanks and reactor/clarifiers all require aeration. Ingestion of ash into 
compressors is likely to cause blockages in nozzles and damage seals. In the long 
term it may cause internal corrosion. The amount of damage that occurs depends on 
how well building are sealed, and whether compressors are operated while ash is 
falling. Ideally the processes which use compressed air would be bypassed during 
ashfall, however the primary grit tanks would be far less effective without the 
injection of compressed air, increasing the amount of solids to enter the rest of the 
plant. 
 
Ash entering the reactor/clarifiers will not only alter pH levels, but may either 
accumulate in the base of the units, or be pumped through the system to tertiary 
treatment, depending on its buoyancy (largely an effect of grainsize).  
 
.  
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6.7.5.4 Power failure 
 
In the event of power failure, on site generators can run the plant at up to 50% 
capacity. Some treatments are not used as a result. There are two forms of onsite 
power. Two backup generators run on diesel (figure 6.27) but the plant also has Four 
Jenbacher JMS 616 turbo-charged gas engine/generators. These produce almost 7 
MW in total, and run on biogas produced by the anaerobic digesters. They are also 
able to run on natural gas as a backup. These generators will be useful in the event of 
power failure caused by ashfall in other locations, but may be slightly compromised in 
the event of direct ashfall on the plant. This is due to the need for air for combustion; 
the constant supply of air required means that air filters are likely to be blocked as ash 
is ingested. The generators will require regular maintenance and filter cleaning in this 
instance. 
 
 
Figure 6.27: Back up generator and fuel supplies at Mangere treatment plant 
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6.7.5.5 Mitigating impacts of direct ashfall on the plant 
 
During light ashfall directly on the plant, several operations at the Mangere treatment 
plant may be able to continue functioning, albeit with increased maintenance and 
careful management. Steps taken to ensure the plant keeps running include: 
 
• Generators, pump motors and other machinery (such as the centrifuges) will 
need to be cleaned of ash, preferably with compressed air, but even careful 
brushing will help. Air-filters on motors/engines should be cleaned at least 
daily 
• Compressors should be shutdown during ashfall to prevent the ingestion of ash 
• Reactor/clarifier operation may need to temporarily cease as ash will 
drastically change pH, and subsequent tertiary processes will be subject to 
abrasion and blockages from ash mixed with effluent. If reactors keep 
functioning subsequent processes should be bypassed. In this instance the pH 
will need to be carefully monitored and balanced 
• Air conditioning unit condensers (present at the control room building and 
offices) will gradually block up with ash, causing a drop in performance, and 
ultimately overloading the compressor. Condensers need to be cleaned out 
with compressed air or at least a soft brush when compressed air is 
unavailable. This will need to take place in breaks in ashfall if compressed air 
is used. 
• DCS (distributed control system) cabinets for the interstage pump station may 
ingest some ash as exterior air is blown on to them. Exterior fans should be 
switched off during ashfall to minimise the amount of ash drawn into the 
building. Filters are unlikely to help as they will quickly block up. Any ash 
that manages to enter the cabinets should be removed as soon as possible by 
vacuuming. 
• Exposed metals will be subject to rapid corrosion in the presence of moisture, 
and should be cleaned of ash as soon as possible. 
• Flat and low pitch roofs at the Mangere treatment plant will need to be cleared 
of ash if tephra thicknesses exceed 5 cm. It should be noted that ash is very 
slippery, especially when wet. Large span roofs are especially at risk of 
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collapse from excess load, and should be cleaned first. If more than 10 cm 
thickness of ash is present on large span roofs the danger of collapse will be 
great enough that until inspected and cleared by a suitably qualified engineer, 
the buildings should not be entered. In this situation roof cleaning should not 
take place unless equipment such as cranes or cherry pickers that allow 
cleaning to take place without workers being supported by the roof top is used. 
• Doorways and entrances to buildings that are not in use should be kept closed 
and sealed with duct tape or similar where possible. Using the entrance to the 
control room should be kept to a minimum to prevent excess ash being 
dragged in from outside. 
 
During a light ashfall impacting Mangere, most operations will still be possible, 
theoretically allowing waste treatment to continue in the event of a local eruption. 
This would depend on whether or not ash was arriving through the reticulation 
network from central Auckland. To prevent this from occurring it will be necessary to 
divert sewage from the shared network to overflows at or before pump station 16 
(soon to be replaced with PS 64).  
 
In the event of a heavy ashfall sufficient to cause structural damage to large span 
buildings, it is likely that evacuations would have taken place in Auckland. This 
would greatly reduce the amount of sewage entering the system, and ultimately the 
quantity of untreated effluent being discharged into the ocean. 
 
6.8 Summary 
 
Stormwater systems are subject to influxes of volcanic ash during ashfall, and are 
therefore vulnerable. When stormwater and sewerage systems are shared ash may 
enter wastewater treatment plants though the reticulation network. Analysis of 
Auckland’s wastewater treatment plant at Mangere has identified vulnerabilities in the 
plant that would result in significant damage to processing capability in the event of 
large quantities of ash reaching the plant through the reticulation network. Therefore 
discharge of waste from the shared network at Orakei is recommended in the event of 
significant ashfall. This would result in the comparatively short term discharge of 
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30% of Auckland’s stormwater, ash and untreated sewage into Waitemata harbour. 
Failure to prevent ash reaching the plant would likely result in severe damage to 
treatment facilities from the high ash loads processed. This would result in plant 
shutdown and longer term discharge of all of Auckland’s untreated effluent would 
result until facilities were repaired or replaced.  
 
Bypass of any treatment facility, or at least of secondary treatment facilities is 
recommended for any wastewater plant. Pump testing has illustrated the extreme wear 
possible in a short time from processing volcanic ash. Therefore even if treatment 
facilities are bypassed, damage may still occur within reticulation systems. Blockages 
of stormwater systems and sediment traps will need to be cleared after ashfall, 
whether or not they are shared with sewerage networks. Consequently, even without 
physical damage occurring, financial impacts are inevitable from ashfall, due to the 
requirement for increased maintenance following the event. Careful management of 
the response will minimise these impacts. 
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Summary 
 
Lifelines do not stand alone; they are interconnected components of a functioning 
community. Frequently the extent of this interconnectivity is such that failure of one 
compromises several others. Telecommunications networks, airports, wastewater 
treatment plants, and water supplies are all dependant on electricity. Even transport 
networks are affected by electricity failures as traffic signals, street lighting etc 
require electricity. Temporary backup power in the form of batteries or generators is 
available for most vital infrastructure, but this is usually only sustainable for a number 
of hours, and often at reduced capacity. Roads are necessary for utility providers to 
physically access their distributed, operational infrastructure for maintenance and 
repairs. Airports and aircraft frequently support other lifelines as critical transport 
hubs in the supply of labour, parts and equipment. Telecommunications enable remote 
control and or monitoring of other network components such as wastewater pump 
stations. These examples illustrate how lifelines rely heavily upon each other; failure 
or severely reduced capacity in one sector can place others under strain and may even 
result in a cascade of failures. Consequently, resilience is requisite for all lifelines. 
 
This research sought to assess the risks posed to lifelines infrastructure from volcanic 
ashfall, through a vulnerability analysis of selected infrastructure to volcanic ash. The 
areas researched were selected for the reasons outlined in section 1.2 – they represent 
essential lifelines and services in New Zealand, about which there is insufficient 
knowledge to quantify risk. What they have in common is that they are all types of 
infrastructure whose failure will both directly and indirectly affect everyone in not 
just the afflicted region, but in all of New Zealand.  
 
7.2 Telecommunications and volcanic ash 
 
The vulnerabilities of telecommunications infrastructure have been shown to vary 
depending on the amount of ashfall. Problems associated with light ashfall are not 
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attributable to direct impacts on the telecommunications infrastructure itself, but 
instead from the potential power loss associated with ashfall. However, heavier 
ashfall exceeding ~30 mm does pose problems. These largely relate to the need of 
modern communications equipment for constant cooling. Awareness of the potential 
for certain types of air conditioners to not only lose performance, but possibly fail 
once ashfall has exceeded ~30 mm, is vital for managing the impacts of ashfall on 
urban and cell phone exchanges. The capacity to address this issue during ashfall 
needs to be addressed in any telecommunications company’s response plan. Also 
required is the need to acknowledge that access to infrastructure sites, including the 
ability of staff to get to work, is largely dependant on vehicles having the ability to 
drive over ash covered roads. Planning and mitigation of ash risks is necessary to 
avoid costly damage from ash ingress to equipment. Potential risk management 
activity includes establishing the ability to disable fresh air intakes that would 
otherwise automatically turn on, cleaning air conditioner condensers before failure 
occurs, or getting staff to exchange roofs that are threatened by tephra loading.  
 
The loss of communications networks even for short periods of time cause significant 
social disruption, anxiety and economic loss. The general public becomes effectively 
cut off from access to emergency services. Furthermore other lifelines providers may 
rely on remote access to their infrastructure. By identifying the vulnerabilities to 
ashfall inherent in telecommunications infrastructure, this research enables 
telecommunications providers to increase the resilience of their networks in the event 
of volcanic ashfall. This in turn benefits all end users of telecommunications – 
everyone. The outcomes of this research in the context of the “4 R’s” of emergency 
management are presented in table 7.1. 
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Issue Identified Reduction Readiness Response Recovery 
Vulnerability to 
power loss, & 
likelihood of this 
occurring  
 Network 
providers may 
prepare 
generators or 
extra batteries for 
key sites 
Take backup 
generators or 
batteries to site 
 
Robustness of 
most telecoms 
infrastructure to 
light ashfall 
(excepting power 
loss). 
  Response to 
focus on 
vulnerable 
infrastructure.  
 
Vulnerability of 
cooling systems 
for all exchange 
types 
Identification of 
what one of the key 
issues will be for 
telecommunications 
infrastructure 
providers during 
ashfall 
This knowledge 
allows plans to be 
made by 
infrastructure 
providers for an 
ashfall event 
Creating a small 
shelter directly 
over intakes will 
increase the 
robustness of 
units. Regular 
cleaning of 
condensers will 
enable cooling to 
continue in most 
ashfall events. 
Continued 
cooling during 
ashfall will help 
preserve 
communications 
systems that will 
be necessary 
during and after 
the event. 
Determination of 
threshold for 
failure of cooling 
systems 
 Plans can be 
created for 
different ashfall 
scenarios 
Focus on sites 
receiving > 30 
mm of ashfall. 
 
Automatic 
engagement of 
fresh air fans in 
cell sites 
 
Creating a remote 
override for this 
function will negate 
problem 
If no remote 
override is 
created then plans 
may be made to 
manually turn off 
these fans where 
ashfall is 
imminent. 
Switching off 
these fans will 
preserve internal 
components of 
cell sites from 
direct damage 
from ash. 
Cell sites will be 
functional soon 
after the ashfall 
rather than 
needing lengthy 
repairs. 
Manual reset of 
compressors on 
air-conditioning 
units if 
condensers block. 
 Include 
contingency plans 
for this in ash 
response plans. 
Technicians will 
need to be on site 
at exchanges to 
restart should this 
occur. 
 
Fresh air intakes 
on urban 
exchanges will 
ingest ash then 
filters will block. 
 Reliance on these 
intakes to be 
avoided  
  
Ability of staff to 
reach affected 
sites 
 Plans may be 
made for getting 
staff to affected 
sites in ashfall  
4wd vehicles may 
be required 
 
 
Table 7.1 Key findings of this research for the vulnerability of NZ telecommunications 
infrastructure to volcanic ashfall 
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7.3 Air conditioners and volcanic ash 
 
Although not a lifeline, the widespread dependence of infrastructural components on 
cooling has made air conditioner vulnerability a critical element in assessing lifelines 
resilience. Prior to testing, the few existing accounts of air-conditioner performance 
during ashfall were inadequate to extract meaningful information regarding 
performance under different eruption scenarios. Experimentation has demonstrated 
that airspeed and fan configuration has significant influence on the robustness of air 
conditioners during ashfall. A maximum failure threshold of 30 mm of ash for 
common split system air conditioner types has been established. Exceeding this is 
likely to cause sufficient blockages in the condenser that compressor damage and 
shutdowns may occur. This experimentation is important not only in that it has 
established expected failure thresholds, but more critically it has determined that 
operation remains viable during ashfall, provided monitoring and regular maintenance 
are carried out. Air conditioners may even support continuous operation if regular 
cleaning of units takes place. Consequently, infrastructure that relies on this type of 
cooling need not cease functioning as a result of ashfall (provided back up generators 
are available in the event of power loss). For users of infrastructure such as cold stores 
this means that the costly removal of goods prior to or during an eruption is not as 
urgent a task as previously thought. The main outcomes of this research are presented 
in table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2 Key findings of this research for the vulnerability air-conditioners to volcanic 
ashfall 
 
7.4 Airports, aircraft and volcanic ash 
 
In assessing airport vulnerabilities, the aim of this work was to determine best practice 
methodologies for mitigating the impacts of ashfall on airport infrastructure and 
grounded aircraft, and the potential for corrosion and abrasion on aircraft surfaces, by 
testing aircraft alloys with ash and acidic leachates. This research has augmented 
previously published accounts of ashfall impacts on the aviation sector. The analysis 
Issue Identified Reduction Readiness Response Recovery 
Vulnerability of 
cooling systems / 
failure mechanism 
established 
Identification of this 
issue allows steps to 
be taken to reduce 
future damage – 
through planning 
options or installing 
more robust types of 
unit with faster 
airflow. 
This knowledge 
allows plans to be 
made by 
infrastructure 
providers to protect 
and maintain 
critical air 
conditioners before 
and during an 
ashfall event. 
Creating a small 
shelter directly 
over intakes will 
increase the 
robustness of 
units. Regular 
cleaning of 
condensers will 
enable cooling to 
continue in most 
ashfall events. 
Continued 
cooling during 
ashfall will help 
preserve 
infrastructure 
that relies on 
artificial 
cooling, 
reducing 
recovery time 
Determination of 
threshold for failure 
of split system air 
conditioners. 
 Plans can be 
created for 
different ashfall 
scenarios. 
Focus on sites 
receiving > 30 
mm of ashfall. 
Units can still 
function in light 
ashfall. 
 
Viability of air 
conditioners in light 
ashfall 
  Continue to 
operate units in 
light ashfall 
where required 
Goods and 
infrastructure 
that may have 
been spoiled or 
damaged due to 
air conditioners 
being turned off 
during light 
ashfall need not 
be: less damage 
to recover from. 
Manual reset of 
compressors on air-
conditioning units if 
condensers block. 
 
 Include 
contingency plans 
for this in ash 
response plans. 
Technicians will 
need to be on site 
at exchanges to 
clean condensers 
and restart 
should this 
occur. 
 
Ineffectiveness of 
filtration on fresh air 
vents. 
 
 Reliance on these 
intakes to be 
avoided.  
Turn off fans for 
external air 
vents. 
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of the experiences and procedures of the two airports that have experienced the most 
frequent exposure to ashfall internationally over the last decade has helped to 
establish appropriate practices.  
 
The testing of ash and leachates on aircraft surfaces has quantified a risk that has yet 
to be realised, but is nevertheless a strong possibility following ashfall on airports; 
rapid pitting corrosion on exposed aluminium or alloy surfaces. This research is 
contributing to considered risk management by New Zealand’s aviation sector directly 
through a response plan prepared for Auckland Airport and Air New Zealand 
(included as appendix 2). This research has also contributed to a poster detailing 
appropriate steps to take in the event of an ashfall affecting airports. The poster, 
prepared in conjunction with New Zealand’s Civil Aviation Authority, Air New 
Zealand, Auckland Airport and GNS Science, has been distributed to airports in the 
North Island (included as appendix 3). This provides ready access to mitigation 
options for reducing the impacts of ashfall on airports and aircraft. It also details 
where to look for further information, allowing rapid response to volcanic 
emergencies. 
 
In 2007 Auckland Airport alone was estimated to contribute ~$19 billion to the NZ 
economy, 13.7% of New Zealand’s GDP (Auckland International Airport, 2007). This 
contribution is equivalent to over $50 million per day. Disruptions for Auckland 
Airport due to ashfall would therefore have a significant effect on the New Zealand 
economy, the consequences of which would affect all New Zealand residents – not 
just those directly impacted by ashfall. An increase in the resilience of Auckland 
Airport would thus pay dividends when ashfall impacts Auckland. As demonstrated in 
chapter 4, the financial outlay required to do this is minimal, but the benefits are 
potentially substantial. Implementation of these measures will enable the airport to 
recover more quickly from such an event. The faster resumption of services will 
reduce losses to all airport users, and the greater NZ economy. In addition a 
functioning international airport close to the site of a major catastrophe will allow a 
more direct route for any required overseas aid (ash plumes permitting). The 
outcomes of this research in the context of the “4 R’s” of emergency management are 
presented in table 7.3. 
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Table 7.3 Key findings of this research for the impacts of volcanic ash on airports and 
grounded aircraft. 
 
7.5 Vehicle mobility on ash covered roads 
 
Using vehicles on ash covered roads is necessary during and/or after volcanic ashfall 
in affected areas. Establishing the depths at which ash may become problematic for 
driving different classes of vehicle is a necessary pre-requisite for efficient response 
to any volcanic eruption generating more than a few millimetres of ash fall. Testing 
Issue Identified Reduction Readiness Response Recovery 
Quantification of 
corrosion from ash 
leachates on 
grounded aircraft 
 Plan to remove, or if 
not possible protect 
and quickly clean 
aircraft exposed to 
ashfall 
Concentrate on 
cleaning exposed 
metal surfaces, 
especially if light 
rainfall occurs 
Rapid and 
effective 
response during 
the event will 
prevent the need 
for extensive 
repairs post 
event. 
Protective procedures 
for aircraft exposed to 
ashfall 
 
The current 
methodology of 
covering vulnerable 
parts of aircraft with 
tarpaulins/plastic 
sheeting has been 
shown to be 
effective 
Stockpiling 
appropriate 
materials to cover 
aircraft is advisable. 
The current 
methodology of 
covering 
vulnerable parts 
of aircraft with 
tarpaulins/plastic 
sheeting has 
been shown to be 
effective 
 
Clean up 
methodologies – 
aircraft 
 
Identification of best 
practice 
methodologies for 
removing ash that 
do not damage 
aircraft. 
 Hosing and 
careful sweeping 
of ash will in 
most cases be 
sufficient to 
clean aircraft 
surfaces. 
 
Clean up 
methodologies and 
operational 
procedures – airports 
 
 Equipment required 
and methods for 
cleaning ash from 
airports established. 
More precise 
methods for 
cleaning ash 
from airports 
established. 
Faster recovery 
for an airport in 
an affected site 
allows outside 
aid to reach the 
afflicted area 
sooner. 
Clean up timeframes   Timeframes for 
different methods of 
cleaning runways 
and paved areas 
have been 
established, 
enabling more 
accurate response 
planning. 
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conducted for this thesis has taken steps towards establishing thresholds for ash 
depths that can confidently be driven through, on different slopes and with different 
vehicle types. These findings can assist in determining appropriate vehicle types to be 
used and routes taken by emergency services, lifelines infrastructure providers, and 
other utility companies. They are also useful for evacuation planning, determining 
whether the general public will be able to use their own vehicles in different 
scenarios. Access to this information enables better planning for response to ashfall 
by all road users. For infrastructure management this may involve placement of four 
wheel drive vehicles in strategic locations or with technicians prior to an anticipated 
ashfall. In addition to response planning, entities such as councils, Transit New 
Zealand and roading contractors can also use this information to help prioritise the 
removal of ash from roads and inform the public of the current hazards that ash 
presents along routes. These findings will assist responders to improve their planning 
for ashfall, and will ultimately allow a more efficient response to such an event. The 
main outcomes of this research are presented in table 7.4 
 
Issue Identified Reduction Readiness Response Recovery 
Approximate 
thresholds for safe 
driving on ash 
covered roads in 
different vehicle 
types. 
 Planning for 
evacuation 
methods and 
suitable vehicle 
types enabled. All 
agencies involved 
can consider these 
effects on vehicle 
mobility when 
planning their 
response. 
Use of 4wd 
vehicles will 
improve response 
by emergency 
services and 
infrastructure 
providers. The 
likelihood of 
having vehicles 
stuck is 
decreased. 
 
Approximate 
thresholds for safe 
driving on ash 
covered roads of 
differing gradient 
 Planning for 
evacuation routes, 
methods and 
suitable vehicle 
types enabled. All 
agencies involved 
can consider these 
effects on vehicle 
mobility when 
planning their 
response.. 
The flattest 
possible route 
choice and use of 
appropriate 
vehicles will 
improve response 
by emergency 
services and 
infrastructure 
providers. 
 
 
Table 7.4 Key findings of this research for the impacts of volcanic ash on vehicle mobility 
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7.6 Wastewater systems and volcanic ash 
 
Sewerage systems will only be subject to large influxes of volcanic ash if they share 
reticulation networks with stormwater systems. This is the case in many cities, 
including central Auckland. Testing during this research has demonstrated that pump 
impellers will be subjected to vastly accelerated wear when pumping volcanic ash. 
Analysis of Auckland’s wastewater treatment plant at Mangere has identified many 
more vulnerabilities in the plant itself, such that complete bypass of the plant is 
recommended in the event of significant ashfall. While this would result in the 
discharge of stormwater, ash and untreated sewage into Waitemata harbour, the 
duration would be limited to the period during which ash covered impermeable 
surfaces, and is preferable to the longer term discharge of untreated effluent that 
would result from treatment plant damage by processing high ash loads. Furthermore, 
provided ashfall was not directly impacting the plant itself, treatment of 70% of 
Auckland’s waste could continue in the presence of ash on the ground, as only 30% of 
Auckland’s reticulation system is shared with stormwater, and this can all be diverted 
before reaching the treatment plant. 
 
Awareness of the vulnerabilities of Auckland’s reticulation network and treatment 
plant is vital for Watercare to create a viable response plan for volcanic ash. In 
bypassing the treatment plant or even processes within the plant during ash ingress to 
the system, the damage caused to both infrastructure and the environment can be 
significantly reduced. The likelihood of a significant environmental and health hazard 
occurring due to long duration discharge of untreated waste into the ocean is thus 
reduced considerably. The main outcomes of this research are presented in table 7.5. 
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Table 7.5 Key findings of this research for the impacts of volcanic ash on wastewater systems 
 
7.7 Future Research 
 
A number of future research areas have been identified as a result of the research 
completed in this thesis. Notably, further information is needed in order to more 
accurately quantify some of the vulnerabilities identified. In terms of 
telecommunications infrastructure, testing of rural exchanges in simulated ashfall 
Issue Identified Reduction Readiness Response Recovery 
Plant vulnerability 
to direct volcanic 
ashfall established 
Identification of 
some areas of 
vulnerability (such as 
cooling via fresh air 
vents) allows small 
changes to be made 
to infrastructure that 
will result in a 
significant reduction 
in potential damage. 
Operational 
procedures for 
ashfall can be 
established based 
on the 
vulnerabilities 
identified. 
  
Plant vulnerability 
to ash arriving 
through the 
wastewater 
network 
established. 
When used, bypass 
systems negate the 
issue of ash 
impacting waste 
processing plants. 
Operational 
procedures for 
ash arriving 
through the 
network can be 
established based 
on the 
vulnerabilities 
identified. 
Bypass the 
treatment plant if 
waste is 
contaminated with 
ash to avoid long 
term damage. For 
Auckland it will be 
necessary to 
discharge untreated 
waste into 
Waitemata harbour 
at PS 16/64 in the 
short term. 
Continued 
operation of 
wastewater 
treatment facilities 
post event will 
allow the earlier 
return of evacuees 
and reduce 
environmental 
damage and health 
hazards caused by 
longer duration 
discharge of 
untreated waste 
into the ocean. 
Pump 
vulnerability to 
ash and leachates 
 
Vastly increased 
wear on pump 
impellers and 
components has been 
shown to occur when 
pumping ash even for 
short periods of time. 
Planning to 
avoid use of 
pumps where 
possible is 
advisable, plus 
stockpile spare 
parts/impellers  
for essential 
pumps pre-
eruption. 
  
Sediment trap 
vulnerability 
Sediment traps will 
quickly reach 
capacity 
Plans for 
frequent removal 
of material from 
sediment traps 
are necessary. 
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would better predict performance during a volcanic eruption. For this study, the 
impacts of ashfall on the cooling of these cabinets were calculated by applying the 
results of air-conditioning and filter media testing from urban exchanges. Actual 
testing of this type of equipment would be preferable. Conducting this research would 
depend on the availability of rural exchange equipment. Telecommunications 
equipment in general is continuously evolving and frequently upgraded. Vulnerability 
testing needs to maintain pace with these changes to accurately reflect current risk 
exposure. Ideally radio signal attenuation during ashfall also requires testing, however 
this is not practical in a laboratory, and would need to be addressed during an 
eruption. Even then the differences in grainsize, ash concentration, electrical charge 
and moisture concentration would make comprehensive testing difficult. Access to 
broadcasting equipment that utilises different wavelengths would also be necessary.  
 
Air-conditioner testing could be made more robust by extending testing to a wider 
variety of unit types. This is especially true of small scale air conditioners and heat 
exchangers such as those used in rural exchanges.  
 
Vehicle mobility has been tested on dry ash covered roads, further testing in wet 
conditions would be useful, as would more tests on consolidated ash deposits. This 
needs to take place in the field on actual ash deposits. Grainsize is thought to have a 
significant effect on vehicle mobility in ash, this assertion needs to be tested during an 
eruption. It is unlikely that comprehensive vehicle mobility testing could be achieved 
in one study, but discrete tests and observations can easily be conducted concurrently 
with other field research that takes place during eruptions. A larger variety of vehicles 
will need to be tested in order to achieve more meaningful results. 
 
Research on ashfall impacts on vehicles themselves is also required. Much 
information on this subject draws upon impacts suffered by cars during the 1980 Mt 
St Helens eruption. Automotive technology has changed markedly in the intervening 
decades. For example carburettors have been superseded by fuel injection. Petrol and 
diesel turbo charged engines with increased air intakes are now common, traction 
control systems are standard. Quantitative testing of vehicles in ashfall needs to be 
conducted to improve response planning.  
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7.8 Contributions to risk reduction 
 
The resilience of a community is directly tied to the robustness of the lifelines on 
which the community relies on. Lifeline infrastructure providers therefore have a duty 
to effectively manage the risks faced by any foreseeable hazards. This research has 
been conducted with the support and cooperation of major stakeholders in lifelines 
infrastructure (Auckland Airport, Air New Zealand, WaterCare, Transit, Telecom and 
Chorus). The vulnerabilities quantified in this thesis give these stakeholders the 
necessary tools to develop effective risk management strategies to cope with hazards 
from volcanic ash, and thus increase their resilience. This information is being put to 
further use by being included in fragility functions being created for New Zealand’s 
current RiskScape project, led by GNS Science and NIWA. These functions are used 
to determine potential losses in the event of the realisation of various types of risks. 
The loss information is in turn used to create a support tool to prioritize risk reduction 
measures, and improve risk management in New Zealand.  
 
The outcomes of this work can be measured against the potential impacts of ashfall on 
New Zealand’s lifelines should we fail to act to improve their resilience. These 
contributions to risk reduction are summarized in table 7.6, which describes the 
impacts of different amounts of ashfall on the infrastructure types investigated, 
depending on whether the findings of this thesis are implemented or not. It 
demonstrates that without the implementation of the mitigation methods described in 
this thesis, there is a corresponding increase in negative outcomes as ashfall increases.  
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Table 7.6 Impacts of different levels of ashfall on infrastructural types studied, depending on the implementation of the findings of this thesis 
 1mm Ashfall 10mm Ashfall 50mm Ashfall 
Outcome Research findings implemented No change from present Research findings implemented No change from present Research findings implemented No change from present 
Telecoms Possibility of power loss Possibility of power loss Likely power loss, larger numbers 
of backup generators and batteries 
available to increase exchange 
functionality. Communications 
failure still possible but for less 
time. 
Likely power loss, exchanges run out 
of power in 2-12 hours depending on 
type. Communications failure. 
Likely power loss, but effects 
lessened by increased backup. 
Cooling systems keep functioning, 
allowing exchanges to keep 
operating 
Likely power loss, exchanges run out of 
power in 2-12 hours depending on type, air-
conditioner failure leads to automatic 
exchange shutdowns and subsequent 
communications failures. Ash ingestion into 
cell and urban exchanges through fresh air 
intakes automatically switching on, damaging 
internal components and increasing required 
recovery time. 
Air 
conditioners  
No physical effect No physical effect, unnecessary 
anxiety caused for those relying 
on air conditioners. 
No significant physical effect, 
cleaning units required. 
No significant physical effect, cleaning 
units required. Possibility of 
unnecessary removal of goods from 
cool storage 
Air conditioners can continue to 
function effectively 
Air-conditioner failure for split system type 
units. Cold-store goods spoil, infrastructure 
reliant on cooling fails. 
Airports & 
grounded 
aircraft 
Airport closure while ash plume 
is present and ash is on ground. 
No physical damage expected. 
Economic loss while airport is 
closed. Rapid cleanup ensures 
quick return to business as usual 
(BAU). 
Airport closure while ash plume 
is present and ash is on ground. 
No physical damage expected if 
aircraft are covered. Economic 
loss while airport is closed. 
Cleanup takes longer than if 
operational procedures advised in 
this work are followed, increasing 
economic losses. 
Airport closure while ash plume is 
present and ash is on ground. Little 
physical damage expected. 
Economic loss while airport is 
closed. Rapid cleanup ensures 
quick return to BAU. 
Airport closure while ash plume is 
present and ash is on ground. Little 
physical damage expected if aircraft are 
covered. Some corrosion to aircraft 
skins may occur if cleanup of aircraft is 
not rapid. Cleanup takes longer than if 
operational procedures advised in this 
work are followed, vastly increasing 
economic losses due to airport closure. 
Airport closure while ash plume is 
present and ash is on ground. Some 
physical damage expected to 
infrastructure and possibly minor 
damage to aircraft depending on 
leachate chemistry. Hangars 
preserved from collapse/damage if 
cleaned as ash falls. Economic loss 
while airport is closed. Effective 
cleanup ensures quickest possible 
return to BAU. 
Airport closure while ash plume is present and 
ash is on ground. Physical damage expected to 
infrastructure, hangars may be damaged and 
possibly even collapse. Damage to aircraft. 
skins depending on leachate chemistry may 
occur if cleanup of aircraft is not rapid. 
Cleanup takes longer than if operational 
procedures advised in this work are followed, 
vastly increasing economic losses due to 
airport closure. 
Roads Slippery conditions, road 
markings obscured. Minor 
accidents ensue. 
Slippery conditions, road 
markings obscured. Minor 
accidents ensue. 
Slippery conditions, road markings 
obscured. Minor accidents ensue. 
Routes with steep hills avoided by 
emergency services and 
responders. Evacuation routes 
remain passable. 
Slippery conditions, road markings 
obscured. Minor accidents ensue. 
Possibility of emergency responders 
and evacuees becoming stuck or held 
up on steep roads. 
Slippery conditions, road markings 
obscured. Minor accidents ensue. 
Routes with steep hills avoided by 
emergency services and 
responders. Evacuation routes 
remain passable. 
Slippery conditions, road markings obscured. 
Minor accidents ensue. Possibility of 
emergency responders and evacuees becoming 
stuck or held up on steep roads. 
Wastewater Increased wear to pumps. pH 
changes need addressing in 
reactor – clarifiers if ash not 
diverted. 
Increased wear to pumps, pH 
changes need addressing in 
reactor - clarifiers 
Damage to network pumps pre-
outflow to sea. Large amounts of 
sedimentation in system upstream 
from outflow to sea Treatment 
plant damage avoided from ash 
arriving through network. Short 
term discharge of untreated 
effluent to sea. In Auckland’s case 
30% of the entire city’s waste 
would be discharged without 
treatment while ash was on the 
ground in large quantities in 
central Auckland. 
Damage to network pumps pre-outflow 
to sea. Large amounts of sedimentation 
in entire system, some causing 
blockages. Some treatment plant 
damage, possibly requiring days of shut 
down to effect repairs. In Auckland’s 
case this will result in all of Auckland’s 
waste being flushed into Waitemata 
and Manukau harbours. Many pumps 
require new impellers and seals.  
Damage to network pumps pre-
outflow to sea. Large amounts of 
sedimentation in system upstream 
from outflow to sea Treatment 
plant damage avoided from ash 
arriving through network. Short 
term discharge of untreated 
effluent to sea. In Auckland’s case 
30% of the entire city’s waste 
would be discharged without 
treatment while ash was on the 
ground in large quantities in 
central Auckland. 
Damage to network pumps pre-outflow to sea. 
Large amounts of sedimentation in entire 
system, some causing blockages. Significant 
treatment plant damage, requiring days to 
week of plant closure before repairs can be 
completed. During this time untreated waste is 
flushed out to sea causing environmental 
damage. In Auckland’s case this will result in 
all of Auckland’s waste being flushed into 
Waitemata and Manukau harbours until 
repairs are effected. Most pumps require 
complete overhaul. 
Overall 
Outcome 
Possible power loss may cause 
temporary communications 
interruptions, Brief airport 
closure, minor road accidents 
Possible power loss may cause 
temporary communications 
interruptions, Longer airport 
closure, minor road accidents 
Short term communications 
failures, Short term airport closure, 
minor road accidents, short term 
discharge of untreated effluent to 
sea. 
Increased duration of communication 
failures, longer duration airport closure 
time and subsequent increase in 
economic losses, minor damage to 
aircraft, evacuees stuck on steep ash 
covered roads, response time for 
emergency services increases, damage 
to and temporary closure of wastewater 
treatment plants, longer term discharge 
of untreated effluent to ocean. 
Short term communications 
failures, minor damage to airport 
infrastructure and aircraft, short 
term airport closure while ash is on 
ground, minor road accidents, short 
term discharge of untreated 
effluent to sea. 
Communications failures and infrastructure 
damage, cold-store goods spoil, infrastructure 
reliant on cooling fails. Infrastructure and 
aircraft damage at airports, long duration 
closure time (up to days) post ashfall causing 
significant economic losses for NZ, 
emergency responders and evacuees stuck on 
roads. Significant damage to and temporary 
closure of wastewater treatment plants, longer 
term discharge of untreated effluent to ocean. 
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The findings of this thesis are necessary to arm infrastructure providers with the tools 
to fully evaluate the risks posed by volcanic ash to their respective networks. The 
analyses conducted have identified several vulnerabilities to volcanic ash in our 
critical lifelines and infrastructure. In most cases only small physical or operational 
changes are required to mitigate the hazards caused by volcanic ashfall, recommended 
mitigation strategies have been given where appropriate to facilitate this process. 
Implementation of these changes will improve infrastructure assurance, not just 
increasing the organisational resilience of lifelines providers, but in turn increasing 
the resilience of the communities who rely on such infrastructure, benefiting not just 
infrastructure providers but all inhabitants of New Zealand By identifying 
vulnerabilities to ashfall and subsequent mitigation options in all of the areas studied, 
this research has significantly contributed to volcanic hazard planning and risk 
reduction strategies in New Zealand. 
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APPENDIX 1. RESULTS OF AIR-CONDITIONER 
TESTING UNDER SIMULATED ASHFALL 
 
Mitsubishi MWH 17KV 
 
Unit Cooling Air, Dry Ash Passed Through Condenser 
 
Time Ash Added/rate of fall per hour 
Total ash thickness 
equivalent 
Cold Air 
Temperature (OC) 
0 minutes 0/0 0 mm 10.2 
5 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.2 mm 10.2 
10 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.4 mm 10.4 
15 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.6 mm 10.4 
20 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.8 mm 10.3 
25 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.0 mm 10.4 
35 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.2 mm 10.4 
40 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.4 mm 10.6 
45 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.6 mm 10.6 
50 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.8 mm 10.6 
55 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.0 mm 10.5 
65 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.2 mm 10.6 
70 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.4 mm 10.4 
75 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.6 mm 10.4 
Unit removed from casing, photographed (not cleaned), testing resumed next day. 
80 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.8 mm 10.4 
85 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.0 mm 10.4 
95 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.2 mm 10.4 
100 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.4 mm 10.4 
105 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.6 mm 10.6 
110 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.8 mm 10.5 
115 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.0 mm 10.4 
125 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.2 mm 10.5 
130 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.4 mm 10.4 
135 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.6 mm 10.6 
140 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.8 mm 10.4 
150 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 5.0 mm 10.4 
160 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 5.2 mm 10.4 
165 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 5.4 mm 10.5 
170 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 5.6 mm 10.6 
175 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 5.8 mm 10.4 
180 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 6.0 mm 10.5 
Increase in rate of ashfall to 2.5 mm/hour 
190 minutes 250 ml/2.5 mm 6.5 mm 10.4 
200 minutes 250 ml/2.5 mm 7 0 mm 10.4 
215 minutes 250 ml/2.5 mm 7.5 mm 10.6 
225 minutes 250 ml/2.5 mm 8.0 mm 10.5 
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240 minutes 250 ml/2.5 mm 8.5 mm 10.6 
250 minutes 250 ml/2.5 mm 9.0 mm 10.4 
265 minutes 250 ml/2.5 mm 9.5 mm 10.4 
275 minutes 250 ml/2.5 mm 10.0 mm 10.6 
360 minutes 0 ml/0 mm 10.0 mm 10.5 
480 minutes 0 ml/0 mm 10.0 mm 10.5 
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Unit Producing Cold Air, Damp Ash + Water Spray Passed Through Condenser 
 
Time Ash Added/rate of fall 
per hour 
Total ash thickness 
equivalent 
Cold Air Temperature 
(OC) 
0 minutes 0 ml/0 mm 0 mm 10.4 
5 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.2 mm 10.3 
10 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.4 mm 10.3 
15 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.6 mm 10.3 
20 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.8 mm 10.3 
25 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.0 mm 11.7 
Unit removed from casing, photographed (not cleaned), testing resumed next day. The 
change in temperature is attributed not to ash but to slight differences in the 
reassembly of the unit – the most likely scenario is that the temperature sensor had 
moved slightly in relation to airflow 
30 minutes 0 ml/0 mm 1.0 mm 10.1 
35 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.2 mm 10.2 
40 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.4 mm 10.4 
45 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.6 mm 10.4 
50 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.8 mm 10.3 
55 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.0 mm 10.4 
65 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.2 mm 10.3 
70 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.4 mm 10.3 
75 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.6 mm 10.4 
80 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.8 mm 10.3 
85 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.0 mm 10.5 
95 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.2 mm 10.2 
100 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.4 mm 10.5 
105 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.6 mm 10.2 
110 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.8 mm 10.4 
115 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.0 mm 10.4 
125 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.2 mm 10.3 
130 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.4 mm 10.4 
135 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.6 mm 10.4 
140 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.8 mm 10.5 
150 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 5.0 mm 10.4 
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Unit Warming Air, Dry Ash Passed Through Evaporator 
 
Time Ash Added/rate of fall 
per hour 
Total ash thickness 
equivalent 
Warm Air Temperature 
(OC) 
0 minutes 0/0 0 mm 53.3 
5 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.2 mm 53.3 
10 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.4 mm 53.3 
15 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.6 mm 53.4 
20 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.8 mm 53.6 
25 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.0 mm 53.8 
35 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.2 mm 53.8 
40 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.4 mm 53.9 
45 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.6 mm 53.9 
50 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.8 mm 53.7 
55 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.0 mm 53.6 
65 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.2 mm 53.6 
70 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.4 mm 53.7 
75 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.6 mm 53.6 
Unit removed from casing, photographed (not cleaned), testing resumed 
75 minutes 0 ml/0 mm 2.6 mm 53.7 
80 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.8 mm 53.9 
85 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.0 mm 54.1 
95 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.2 mm 53.7 
100 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.4 mm 53.6 
105 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.6 mm 53.3 
110 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.8 mm 53.5 
115 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.0 mm 53.5 
125 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.2 mm 53.4 
130 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.4 mm 53.3 
135 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.6 mm 53.5 
140 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.8 mm 53.5 
150 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 5.0 mm 53.5 
 
(Note the ambient temperature increase of 1 deg C during the first 30 minutes of this 
testing) 
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Unit Warming Air, Ash + Water Spray Passed Through Evaporator 
 
Time Ash Added/rate of fall 
per hour 
Total ash thickness 
equivalent 
Warm Air Temperature 
(OC) 
0 minutes 0/0 0 mm 53.5 
5 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.2 mm 53.4 
10 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.4 mm 53.1 
15 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.6 mm 53.0 
20 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 0.8 mm 52.6 
25 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.0 mm 52.6 
35 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.2 mm 52.6 
40 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.4 mm 52.6 
45 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.6 mm 52.5 
50 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 1.8 mm 52.4 
55 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.0 mm 52.3 
65 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.2 mm 52.5 
70 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.4 mm 52.8 
75 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.6 mm 52.7 
Unit removed from casing, photographed (not cleaned), testing resumed. 
75 minutes 0 ml/0 mm 2.6 mm 52.6 
80 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 2.8 mm 52.6 
85 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.0 mm 52.9 
95 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.2 mm 52.8 
100 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.4 mm 52.8 
105 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.6 mm 52.6 
110 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 3.8 mm 53.0 
115 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.0 mm 53.0 
125 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.2 mm 52.9 
130 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.4 mm 52.7 
135 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.6 mm 52.9 
140 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 4.8 mm 53.0 
150 minutes 100 ml/2 mm 5.0 mm 53.0 
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Toshiba testing – dry 
 
Time (mins) Room temp 
Celsius 
Amount of 
ash added  
Cold air 
temperature  
degrees 
Celsius 
~ Equivalent 
depth of 
ashfall  
Notes 
0 21.7 0 10.3   
5 21.7 0 10.3   
10 21.7 100ml 10.4   
15 21.7 100ml 10.5   
20 21.7 100ml 10.7   
25 21.7 100ml 10.5 1 mm  
30 21.7 100ml 10.5   
35 21.3 100ml 10.6   
40 21.7 100ml 10.9   
45 21.7 100ml 11 2 mm  
50 21.7 100ml 11.1   
55 21.7 100ml 11.1   
60 22.1 100ml 10.8   
65 22.1 100ml 10.9 3 mm  
70 22.1 100ml 10.8   
75 22.3 100ml 10.8   
80 21.7 100ml 11   
85 21.7 100ml 11.1 4 mm  
90 21.7 100ml 11   
95 21.7 100ml 10.9   
100 21.7 100ml 11.1   
105 21.7 100ml 11.2 5 mm  
110 21.7 100ml 11.1   
115 21.7 100ml 11.2   
120 21.7 100ml 11.1   
125 21.1 100ml 11.1 6 mm  
130 21.1 100ml 11.1   
135 21.7 100ml 11.3   
140 21.7 100ml 11.4   
145 22.1 100ml 11.5 7 mm  
150 22.1 100ml 11.5   
155 21.7 100ml 11.1   
160 21.7 100ml 11   
165 21.1 100ml 11 8 mm  
170 21.2 100ml 11   
175 21.7 100ml 11.3   
180 21.5 100ml 11.3   
185 21.7 100ml 11.2 9 mm  
 End of 
testing for 
day 
Unit 
photographed
  Increased 
temp next day 
due to ash 
settling in 
condenser? 
190 21.7 0ml N/A  Unit turned on 
1 hour before 
testing 
250 21.7 0ml 12.1   
255 21.7 100ml 12.3   
260 21.3 100ml 12.5   
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265 21.7 100ml 12.2   
270 22.1 100ml 12.8 10 mm  
275 22.1 100ml 12.9   
280 22.1 100ml 12.9   
285 22.1 100ml 12.8   
290 21.7 100ml 12.7 11 mm  
295 21.7 100ml 12.3   
300 21.7 100ml 12.5   
305 21.7 100ml 12.6   
310 21.7 100ml 12.6 12 mm  
315 22.1 100ml 12.6   
320 22.1 100ml 12.4   
325 22.1 100ml 12.3   
330 22.1 100ml 12.5 13 mm  
335 21.7 100ml 12.8   
340 21.7 100ml 13.2   
345 21.7 100ml 13   
350 21.7 100ml 13.1 14 mm  
355 21.7 100ml 13.1   
360 21.7 100ml 13.3   
365 21.7 100ml 13.1   
370 21.7 100ml 13.3 15 mm  
 End of 
testing for 
day 
   End of testing 
for day 
375 22.7 0ml N/A  Unit turned on 
1 hour before 
testing 
435 22.7 0ml 13.4   
440 22.7 100ml 13.5   
445 22.7 100ml 13.6   
450 22.7 100ml 13.6   
455 22.7 100ml 13.7 16 mm  
460 22.7 100ml 13.6   
465 22.7 100ml 13.6   
470 22.7 100ml 13.4   
475 22.7 100ml 13.7 17 mm  
480 22.7 100ml 13.4   
485 23.1 100ml 13.5   
490 23.1 100ml 13.3   
495 23.1 100ml 13.4 18 mm  
500  
 
  Top removed, 
unit 
photographed, 
top replaced 
505 22.7 0ml 12.7   
510 23.1 100ml 12.6   
515 22.7 100ml 12.6   
520 22.5 100ml 13   
525 22.7 100ml 12.8 19 mm  
 End of 
testing for 
day 
  N/A 
 
530 22.1 0ml N/A  Unit turned on 
1 hour before 
testing 
590 22.1 0ml 12.2   
595 22.1 100ml 12.1   
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600 22.1 100ml 12.2  Visibly less 
ash is being 
entrained as 
blockages 
cause ash-
laden air to be 
blown out of 
the back of 
the condenser 
605 22.3 100ml 12.3   
610 22.1 100ml 12.5 20 mm  
615 21.9 100ml 12.9   
620 22.1 100ml 12.7   
625 22.1 100ml 12.4   
630 22.1 100ml 12.7 21 mm  
635 22.1 100ml 12.9   
640 22.1 100ml 13.1   
645 22.1 100ml 12.8   
650 21.7 100ml 12.6 22 mm  
655 21.7 100ml 12.7   
660 21.7 100ml 12.8   
665 21.7 300ml 12.6  Note increase 
in ashfall rate 
670 22.3 300ml 12.7 24 mm  
675 22.3 300ml 13.1   
680 22.3 300ml 13.1   
685 22.3 300ml 13.4   
690 22.3 300ml 13.5 27 mm Photographs 
695 22.7 300ml 13.6   
700 22.3 300ml 13.7   
705 22.3 300ml 13.6   
710 22.7 300ml 13.2 30 mm  
715 23.1 300ml 13.3   
720 22.3 300ml 13.6   
725 22.3 300ml 13.4   
730 22.3 300ml 13.2 33 mm  
735 23.1 300ml 13.6   
740 23.1 300ml 13.5   
745 23.1 0ml 13.4  Checking how 
stable 
temperature 
was when no 
ash was 
added 
750 23.1 0ml 13.4   
755 22.3 300ml 13.4   
760 22.3 500ml 13.4   
765 22.1 500ml 13.4   
770 22.1 500ml 13.5 39 mm  
775 22.3 500ml 13.7   
780 22.3 500ml 13.7   
785 22.3 500ml 13.7   
790 22.3 500ml 13.5 44 mm  
795 22.3 500ml 13.9   
800 22.3 500ml 13.7   
805 22.3 500ml 13.6   
810 22.3 500ml 13.6 49 mm  
815 22.3 500ml 13.7   
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820 21.7 500ml 13.7 51.5 mm  
 end of 
testing for 
day 
   Top removed, 
unit 
photographed, 
top replaced 
825 21.7 0ml N/A  Unit turned on 
1 hour before 
testing 
885 21.7 0ml 12.1   
890 22 0ml 12.4   
895 21.7 0ml 5 minute 
shut down 
period 19.1 
 Unit shut itself 
down due to 
compressor 
overheating 
900 21.7 0ml 18.1   
905 21.7 0ml 12.3   
910 21.7 0ml 12.3   
915 21.7 0ml 12.3   
920 21.7 0ml 12.4   
925 21.7 0ml 12.5   
930 21.7 0ml 12.4   
935 21.7 0ml 4 minute 
shut down 
period 19 
 Unit shut itself 
down due to 
compressor 
overheating 
940 21.7 0ml 17.1  3 minutes 
following 
restart to 
reach within 
0.3 degrees of 
previous 
temperature 
945 20.7 0ml 12.4   
950 21.7 0ml 12.5   
955 21.7 0ml 4 minute 
shut down 
period 19.2 
  
960 21.7 0ml 15   
965 21.7 0ml 12.4   
970 21.7 0ml 12.2   
 End of 
testing for 
day 
   End of testing 
for day 
975 21 0ml N/A  Unit turned on 
1 hour before 
testing 
1035 20.7 0ml 11.8   
1040 20.7 500ml 11.8   
1045 20.7 0ml 2 minute 
shut down 
period 18.8 
 Unit shut itself 
down due to 
compressor 
overheating 
1050 21.7 500ml 11.9 54 mm  
1055 21.7 500ml 11.9   
1060 20.9 500ml 12   
1065 20.9 500ml 12.2   
1070 21.7 0ml 2 minute 
shut down 
period 18.6 
 Unit shut itself 
down due to 
compressor 
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Overheating 
1075 21.7 500ml 12.4 59 mm  
1080 22.1 500ml 12.3   
1085 22.3 500ml 12.7   
1090 22.1 500ml 12.4   
1095 22.1 500ml 12.4 64 mm  
1100 22.1 0ml 5 minute 
shut down 
period 19.1 
 Unit shut itself 
down due to 
compressor 
overheating 
1105 21.7 0ml 12.5   
1110 21.7 0ml 12.4   
1115 21.7 0ml 12.5   
1120 21.7 0ml 2 minute 
shut down 
period 18.6 
 Unit shut itself 
down due to 
compressor 
overheating 
1125 21.7 500ml 12.5   
1130 20.9 500ml 12.7   
1135 21.7 500ml 12.6   
1140 21.7 500ml 13 69 mm  
1145 21.7 500ml 12.9   
1150 21.7 500ml 13.1   
1155 21.7 500ml 13.4   
1160 21.7 500ml 13.7 74 mm  
1165 21.7 500ml 13.7   
1170 21.7 500ml 14.1   
1175 21.7 500ml 13.9   
1180 21.7 500ml 14.3 79 mm  
1185 21.7 500ml 14.2   
1190 21.7 500ml 14.5  Photographs 
1195 21.7 500ml 14.6   
1200 21.7 500ml 14.9 84 mm  
1205 21.7 500ml 14.8   
1210 21 0ml 14.8   
1215 21.7 500ml 15.2 86.5 mm  
1220 21.7 0ml 15.1   
1225 21.7 0ml 15.3   
1230 21.7 0ml 15.1   
1235 21.7 0ml 2 minute 
shut down 
period 18.8 
 Unit shut itself 
down due to 
compressor 
overheating 
1240 21.7 0ml 15.1   
1245 21.7 0ml 15.1   
1250 21.7 0ml 15.1   
1255 21.7 0ml 15   
1260 21.7 0ml 15.2   
1265 21.7 0ml 2 minute 
shut down 
period 18.8 
 Unit shut itself 
down due to 
compressor 
overheating 
1270 21.7 0ml 14.9   
1275 21.7 0ml 14.9   
1280 21.7 0ml 14.7   
1285 21.7 0ml 14.9   
1290 21.7 0ml 15   
1295 21.7 0ml 14.7   
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1300 21.7 0ml 14.3   
1305 21.7 500ml 14.4   
1310 21.7 500ml 14.7 89 mm  
1315 21.7 500ml 15.1   
1320 21.7 500ml 15.2   
1325 22.1 500ml 15.4   
1330   1 minute 
shut down 
period 18 
 Unit shut itself 
down due to 
compressor 
overheating 
1335 22.1 500ml 15.1 94 mm  
1337 22.1 0ml 2 minute 
shut down 
period 19.3 
 Unit shut itself 
down due to 
compressor 
overheating 
1340 22.1 0ml 15.1   
1341 22.1 0ml 2 minute 
shut down 
period 19.5 
 Unit shut itself 
down due to 
compressor 
overheating 
1345 22.1 500ml 14.9 >95 mm  
1350 22.1 0ml Unit shut 
down. 
Requires 
manual 
restart  
 Unit shut itself 
down due to 
high pressure 
in 
compressor. 
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Toshiba Testing – Wet 
 
Time 
(minutes) 
Room 
temperature 
Celsius 
Amount 
of ash 
added  
Amount 
of water 
added at 
21 
degrees 
C 
Cold air 
temperature  
degrees 
Celsius 
~ 
Equivalent 
depth of 
ashfall  
Notes 
0 22.1 0ml 0ml 11.2 0 mm Warmer 
temp than 
beginning of 
dry test, due 
to residual 
ash in unit? 
5 22.1 0ml 150ml 11.2   
10 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.3   
15 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.5   
20 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.5   
25 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.7 5 mm  
30 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.7   
35 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.6   
40 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.8   
45 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.7 10 mm  
50 21.7 500ml 150ml 12   
55 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.2  Photographs
60 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.2   
135 20.7 0ml 0ml 12.5  Note break 
in ash 
addition, unit 
still 
operating 
140 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.4 15 mm  
145 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.5   
150 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.7   
155 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.5   
225 22.1 0ml 0ml 13.2  Note break 
in ash 
addition, unit 
still 
operating 
230 22.1 500ml 150ml 13.3 20 mm  
235 22.1 500ml 150ml 13.7   
240 22.1 500ml 150ml 13.2   
245 22.1 500ml 150ml 13.3   
250 22.1 500ml 150ml 12.9 25 mm  
255 22.1 500ml 150ml 12.9   
260 22.1 500ml 150ml 13.4   
265 22.1 500ml 150ml 13.1   
270 22.1 500ml 150ml 13.3 30 mm  
275 22.1 500ml 150ml 13.4   
280 22.1 500ml 150ml 13.6  Photographs 
after this 
reading, top 
removed, 
some ash 
dislodged in 
process 
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310 21.7 0ml 0ml 13.5   
      End of 
testing for 
day 
315 unit started 
up 
0ml 0ml N/A   
375 21.7 0ml 0ml 11.8   
380 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.6   
385 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.6 35 mm  
387 21.7 0ml 0ml 17  External unit 
shut self 
down for 2 
minutes 30 
seconds - 
compressor 
overheating 
390 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.2   
395 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.7   
400 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.9   
405 21.2 500ml 150ml 11.8 40 mm  
410 21.7 500ml 150ml 12   
415 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.7   
420 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.7   
430 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.7 45 mm  
435 21.7 500ml 150ml 12   
440 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.1   
445 21.7 500ml 150ml 12   
450 21.7 500ml 150ml 12 50 mm  
455 21.7 500ml 150ml 12   
460 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.2   
465 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.9   
470 21.7 0ml 0ml 18.5  External unit 
shut self 
down for 4 
minutes 30 
seconds - 
compressor 
overheating 
475 21.7 500ml 150ml 12 55 mm  
480 21.1 0ml 0ml 12.1  No ash 
addition for 
next 2 hours 
to determine 
if unit can 
clear self 
485 21.7 0ml 0ml 12.2   
490 21.7 0ml 0ml 11.9   
495 21.7 0ml 0ml 12.1   
500 21.7 0ml 0ml 12.4   
505 21.4 0ml 0ml 11.9   
510 21.1 0ml 0ml 18.2  External unit 
shut self 
down for 4 
minutes 30 
seconds - 
compressor 
overheating 
515 21.7 0ml 0ml 12.1   
520 21.7 0ml 0ml 12   
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525 21.7 0ml 0ml 12   
530 21.7 0ml 0ml 12.2   
535 21.7 0ml 0ml 12   
540 21.7 0ml 0ml 12   
545 21.7 0ml 0ml 12   
550 21.7 0ml 0ml 12.4   
555 21.7 0ml 0ml 12.1   
560 21.7 0ml 0ml 11.9   
565 21.7 0ml 0ml 18.6  External unit 
shut self 
down for 4 
minutes - 
compressor 
overheating 
570 21.7 0ml 0ml 12.7   
575 21.7 0ml 0ml 12.1   
580 21.7 0ml 0ml 12.3   
585 21.7 0ml 0ml 12.4   
590 21.7 0ml 0ml 12   
595 21.4 0ml 0ml 18.8  External unit 
shut self 
down for 4 
minutes - 
compressor 
overheating 
600 21.1 0ml 0ml 12.4   
605 21.4 500ml 150ml 12.7   
610 21.4 0ml 0ml 20  External unit 
shut self 
down for 4 
minutes - 
compressor 
overheating 
615 21.7 500ml 150ml 11.9   
620 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.1   
625 21.7 500ml 150ml 12 60 mm  
630 21.7 0ml 0ml 18.8  External unit 
shut self 
down for 5 
minutes 30 
seconds - 
compressor 
overheating 
635 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.1   
640 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.1   
645 21.7 500ml 150ml 12   
650 21.7   19.1  External unit 
shut self 
down for 4 
minutes 50 
seconds - 
compressor 
overheating 
655 21.7 500ml 150ml 12 65 mm  
660 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.5   
665 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.6   
670 21.7 0ml 0ml 19.9  External unit 
shut self 
down for 4 
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minutes  - 
compressor 
overheating 
675 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.6   
680 21.7 0ml 0ml 12.9   
685 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.8 70 mm  
690 21.1 500ml 150ml 12.9   
695 21.7 0ml 0ml 20  External unit 
shut self 
down for 2 
minutes  - 
compressor 
overheating 
700 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.9   
705 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.8   
710 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.9 75 mm  
715 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.9   
720 21.7 500ml 150ml 13.1   
725 21.7 500ml 150ml 13.1   
730 21.7 0ml 0ml 20.5  External unit 
shut self 
down for  2 
minutes 40 
seconds  - 
compressor 
overheating 
735 21.7 500ml 150ml 13.2 80 mm  
740 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.7   
745 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.3   
750 21.7 0ml 0ml 20.7  External unit 
shut self 
down for  5 
minutes  - 
compressor 
overheating 
755 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.3   
760 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.6 85 mm  
765 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.3  Photographs
770 21.7 0ml 0ml 21.4  External unit 
shut self 
down for  5 
minutes  - 
compressor 
overheating 
775 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.4   
780 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.5   
785 21.7 0ml 0ml 21.7  External unit 
shut self 
down for  5 
minutes  - 
compressor 
overheating 
790 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.1 90 mm  
795 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.7   
800 21.7 500ml 150ml 13.1   
805 21.7 0ml 0ml 22.1  External unit 
shut self 
down for  4 
minutes 30 
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seconds - 
compressor 
overheating 
810 21.7 500ml 150ml 12.4   
815 21.1 500ml 150ml 12.3 95 mm  
820 21.1 0ml 0ml 22.4  External unit 
shut self 
down for  3 
minutes 50 
seconds - 
compressor 
overheating 
825 21.7 0ml 0ml 12.3   
830 21.7 0ml 0ml 12.4   
835 21.7 0ml 0ml 12.4   
840      External unit 
shut self 
down, unit 
manually 
switched off, 
end of ash 
addition. 
 
Tohiba unit output temperatures 4 hours after the end of ashfall. 
0 m 21.9 
1 m 17.1 
2 m 13 
3 m 12.5 
4 m 12.4 
5 m 12.1 
6 m 12.1 
7 m 12.2 
8 m 12.2 
9 m 12.1 
10 m 12.2 
11 m 12.4 
12 m 12.4 
13 m 12.4 
14 m 12.5 
15 m 12.6 
16 m 12.3 
17 m 12.4 
18 m 12.4 
19 m 12.4 
20 m 15.5 
21 m 19.3 
22 m 22.1 
23 m 22.1 
24 m 22.1 
25 m 19.4 
26 m 14.7 
27 m 12.6 
28 m 12.1 
29 m 12.2 
30 m 12.4 
31 m 12.2 
32 m 12.2 
33 m 12.3 
34 m 12.5 
35 m 12.3 
36 m 12.2 
37 m 12.2 
38 m 12.3 
39 m 16 
40 m 22 
41 m 22 
42 m 22 
43 m 22 
44 m 17.6 
45 m 13.3 
46 m 12.4 
47 m 12.2 
48 m 12.2 
49 m 12.3 
50 m 12.4 
51 m 12.5 
  260
52 m 12.6 
53 m 12.5 
54 m 12.5 
55 m 12.5 
56 m 12.3 
57 m 12.4 
58 m 12.4 
59 m 12.4 
60 m 18.6 
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Introduction 
 
Hazards posed by volcanic ash to airborne aircraft are widely recognised. Flying into 
ash clouds causes abrasion to all forward facing surfaces, ingestion of ash into any 
openings and most importantly, engines. The accumulation of ash in the turbines will 
then melt, possibly fusing on the high pressure nozzle guide vanes and turbine blades, 
eventually causing engine surge, thrust loss and possible flame out (ICAO, 2001). 
From 1973 through 2000, about 100 encounters of aircraft with airborne volcanic ash 
were documented. An average of two reported encounters per year since 1991 have 
occurred (a large number of aircraft-ash encounters occurred in that year due to the 
Pinatubo eruption), further unreported encounters are likely. (Guffanti & Miller, 
2002). However ash may also cause significant physical and economic damage to 
grounded aircraft and airport infrastructure.  
 
The frequency of ashfall actually landing on airports is far less than airborne 
encounters, however disruptions to airports due to volcanic activity are more 
common. These include the closure of airports and/or airspace due to the presence of 
airborne ash, even if the airport itself is not physically impacted. A database of all 
known airports that have been affected by volcanic ash between 1944 and 2006 was 
published as a USGS open file report by Guffanti (2007). This records volcanic 
activity affecting 101 airports on 171 occasions over 28 countries, and involves 
eruptions at 46 volcanoes (figure 4.1) (Guffanti et al., 2007). The database includes 
closures to airports due to ash in nearby airspace, and occasionally volcanic hazards 
other than ashfall (pyroclastic flows, lava flow, gas emissions and phreatic 
explosions).  
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Figure 1 locations of airports impacted by volcanic activity, 1944–2006 (Guffanti et al., 
2008) 
An analysis of the database indicates that between 1944 and 2006 ashfall landed on an 
airport on at least 73 occasions, with thickness ranging from trace amounts to a 
maximum of 50 cm (Guffanti et al., 2007). Since 2006 there have been further 
incidents of this nature. For example the 2008 eruptions of Chaiten Volcano in Chile 
have resulted in disruptions to 5 airports in Chile, 9 in Argentina and 2 in Uruguay 
(Guffanti, M., pers. comm. 2009). Five of these airports are located over 100 km from 
Chaiten; one is over 2000 km away. These disruptions ranged from airport closures to 
cancelled flights.  
 
The physical impacts of ash on airports and grounded aircraft have been addressed by 
several publications. Casadevall (1993), Casadevall et al., (1996), ICAO (2001) and 
Guffanti et al., (2008) all describe many of the ashfall hazards faced by airports and 
grounded aircraft. This report seeks to augment the information from those sources. 
Most existing knowledge on how airport authorities can deal with volcanic ash lies 
with the airports that have experienced ashfall. This report draws on the experience 
gained by two airports that have received significant ashfall in the last few years, 
Aeropuerto Internacional Mariscal Sucre in Quito, Ecuador, and Fontanarossa Airport 
in Catania, Italy. While many of the techniques employed by these two airports 
concur with the strategies given in previous work, their own experiences have 
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provided useful information on best practice methodologies for responding to ashfall. 
Recent laboratory work conducted at the University of Canterbury also provides some 
insight into the potential effects of volcanic ash on aircraft surfaces.  
 
Hazards caused by volcanic ash  
 
Volcanic ash is hazardous for several reasons. It consists of very small fragments (<2 
mm diameter) of volcanic rock and glass. Because of this small size it is difficult to 
prevent it getting into buildings, vehicles, and machinery. The hard nature of volcanic 
ash renders it extremely abrasive, whether it is from a mafic or more silicic source. As 
its small size makes it very penetrative, it can cause much damage by abrading 
moving parts on machinery. It is also respirable, creating a health hazard, potentially 
more so for asthmatics (Horwell & Baxter, 2006). 
 
Ash is heavy, and it can be produced and deposited in large volumes. The weight of 
thick deposits of ash may exceed design loads for structures. Furthermore it may 
absorb up to 50% of it own volume in water, increasing its weight significantly. This 
can lead to building and/or roof collapse, something that has featured in many 
historical eruptions, e.g. Tarawera 1886 (Keam, 1988), Pinatubo 1991 (Casadevall et 
al., 1996), and Rabaul 1994 (Blong & McKee, 1995). Roof collapse may occur with 
as little as ~15 cm of ash, damage may occur with even less. 
Large volumes of ash can cause additional problems in terms of blockages. The usual 
movement of air may be restricted as ash blocks air intakes and filters on machinery, 
vehicles and air handling units (e.g. air conditioners). Water movement is also 
restricted by blocked drains and sewers. This can lead to roofs leaking if ash clogs 
downpipes and spoutings. Flooding and/or sewage overflows from blocked up 
wastewater systems are another potential hazard caused by ashfall. Thick deposits 
over a few centimetres can block roads to traffic, especially on hilly areas. 
 
Aerosols attached to freshly erupted grains of ash are potentially extremely acidic, 
making ash very corrosive, and putting exposed metals at risk. This affects 
machinery, vehicles and many rooftops. The same acidic properties can contaminate 
water supplies if reservoirs are above ground.  
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As well as the problems caused by abrasion, loading, blockages and corrosion, the 
slipperiness of small grains of volcanic ash constitutes a hazard in itself. This has in 
the past caused traffic accidents due to loss of traction (e.g. Barnard, 2004). 
 
Background 
 
Volcanism in New Zealand 
 
New Zealand’s geographic location on the boundary of the Pacific and Australian 
plates makes it a very active place geologically. The North Island hosts several active 
volcanoes, most of which could potentially deposit ash over any parts of the North 
Island, or in rare cases even the South Island (figure 1.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Seismic stations, major volcanic centres and cones of the North Island. (from Scott 
& Travers, 2009) 
  266
The most frequent source of volcanic ash in the New Zealand in the last 150 years is 
the Tongariro Volcanic Centre (Cole & Nairn, 1975; Guffanti et al., 2008) 
Predominant wind directions in the North Island are from west to east, therefore the 
cities and towns of the Eastern North Island have historically been most at risk of 
experiencing ashfall from this source. However the greatest risk in terms of damage 
from ashfall exists in New Zealand’s largest city; Auckland. This is in part due to the 
potential economic consequences of ashfall on Auckland, but also because Auckland 
itself is situated on an active basaltic volcanic field (the Auckland Volcanic Field, or 
AVF). Moreover the active volcanic centres of the Taupo Volcanic Zone have all 
deposited ash on Auckland in the past (Sandiford et al., 2001). Auckland is also at risk 
from Taranaki Volcano; the probability of tephra-induced building damage occurring 
in Auckland from this volcano may be greater than from a local eruption, due to the 
higher probability of an eruption from Taranaki than Auckland (Magill & Blong, 
2005). Local eruptions in Auckland, while statistically less frequent have the capacity 
to cause far more damage. The Rangitoto eruption was not only the most recent, 
occurring approximately 600 years ago, but the largest in this volcanic field (Magill et 
al., 2005). Should a similar magnitude eruption occur in the future, Auckland city 
would be subject to a range of volcanic hazards, such as ballistic ejecta, lava flows 
and base surges. A probabilistic tephra fall simulation for Auckland has calculated 
maximum tephra thicknesses of 150 mm for the AVF, 12 mm for andesitic centres 
and 830 mm for rhyolitic centres (Magill et al., 2006). Given activity to date, and the 
area of the AVF, the most likely scenarios would see Auckland Airport affected by 
ashfall rather than more proximal volcanic hazards (such as large ballistic ejecta or 
lava). 
 
While it can not be accurately predicted when a local eruption from the AVF will 
occur, warning times in the event of an eruption may be short. A rapid onset eruption 
could potentially give only a few days warning (Sherburn et al., 2007). The panic 
likely to ensue in Auckland should a local eruption be predicted would make it very 
difficult to secure the necessary resources to cope with such an event. The volume of 
ash produced by an eruption in Auckland would depend not only on the magnitude of 
the eruption, but on the eruption style. Auckland volcanic field is basaltic in 
composition. Previous activity includes both effusive and explosive eruptions. 
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Strombolian, Hawaiian and phreatomagmatic eruptions have all occurred in the 
Auckland Volcanic Field, with cone building events outnumbering maars and tuff 
rings (Houghton et al., 2006). Given the geography of the greater Auckland region, 
the likelihood of magma encountering water near the surface is high. Ensuing 
phreatomagmatic eruptions may produce large amounts of ash, at least for a short 
time. While the basaltic nature of the Auckland volcanic field indicates a likelihood of 
small amounts of volcanic ash compared to a more silicic eruption, less than 1 mm of 
ash is needed to close airports; the 1995 and 1996 eruptions of Ruapehu illustrated 
this well; pre-event preparedness is essential.  
 
Eruption Warnings 
  
Warnings for the aviation sector about impending or current eruptions will come from 
GNS science and the GeoNet project, via the Wellington Volcanic Ash Advisory 
Centre (VAAC). Standard VAAC data is augmented by an additional service known 
as VAAS (NZ Volcanic Ash Advisory System) established by the NZ Meteorological 
Service and GNS Science after the 1995 and 1996 eruptions of Ruapehu (Scott & 
Travers, 2009). This ensures the rapid dissemination of information such as SIGMET 
and NOTAMs to airlines and airports. 
 
Recommendations for Pre-eruption preparedness for 
Auckland Airport 
 
Required equipment/supplies 
 
A large part of pre-eruption preparedness consists of stocking up on supplies and 
equipment that will be used during and after ashfall occurs. These items include: 
 
Maintenance equipment and spare parts: The abrasive nature of ash may cause 
damage or failure to exposed mechanical equipment and vehicles. Spare parts, oil 
filters, air filters, lubricants, and seals need to be readily available when machinery 
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needs repair. Vehicles working in ash environments will need regular servicing. 
Cleaning and replacement as required of air filters is of particular importance. 
 
Cleaning equipment: Extra cleaning supplies will be required, brooms and vacuum 
equipment will be in constant use. Ash will easily be carried inside buildings as 
people move in and out, so supplies for cleaning the inside as well as outside of 
buildings will be required.  
 
Sufficient tarpaulins and duct tape to cover the windshields, nose cones, pitot tubes, 
engine intakes and wheel assemblies of any aircraft that may be grounded during the 
course of the eruption are needed. While it is a better option to remove aircraft pre-
eruption, this may not be possible if warning times are insufficient to do so. The small 
expense entailed in stockpiling such items will protect grounded aircraft from the 
worst of the damage that may occur with small amounts of ashfall. Tarpaulins and 
duct tape may also be used to cover mechanical or electronic equipment that may not 
otherwise be adequately protected. Where possible, if time permits, essential air 
conditioners should be sheltered from direct ashfall. This will allow them to continue 
to function at near usual levels of performance if ash ingress is inhibited. 
 
Dust or filtration masks for workers involved with ash clean up, or simply working in 
ash affected environments need to be acquired. Recommended masks are described by 
the International Volcanic Health Hazard Network, available at 
http://www.dur.ac.uk/claire.horwell/ivhhn/guidelines/masks/masks.html. Sufficient 
masks to be provided for all involved staff for at least one week should be sourced if 
warning of a distal andesitic eruption is given. In the event of an impending eruption 
in Auckland or in the unlikely event of a large scale rhyolitic eruption (e.g. Taupo 
Volcano) this amount of masks should be significantly increased. Such items are 
likely to be in short supply when an eruption has been predicted. Enough goggles for 
workers cleaning up ash should also be available, ash caught in the eyes is very 
painful, and may scratch the cornea. 
 
Harnesses and ropes are already employed by Auckland Airport for use when workers 
are performing maintenance work on rooftops. These will be especially important 
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when cleaning slippery ash covered rooftops. Adequate numbers of harnesses need to 
be available to ensure terminal and hangar roofs can be quickly cleaned before too 
much ash enters downpipes, damages or even collapses roofs. 
 
Access to sufficient road sweeper/vacuum trucks needs to be established pre-event, if 
the airport itself does not possess adequate machinery. The quantity of trucks 
available will determine the speed at which the airport is made operational again. Past 
experience of ashfall at Fontanarossa airport, Italy suggests that in order to remove 1 
mm of ash from runways, one standard road vacuum/sweeper truck can clean 5000 m2 
in one hour. This may take slightly longer at first if operators are unfamiliar with this 
type of task.  
 
Ash deposited on runways needs to be removed, which in turn entails it being 
deposited somewhere. The location of a dump or temporary storage site should be 
established pre-event. Volumetrically a large amount of ash will be removed from the 
runways and taxiways, even a 1 mm covering will result in over 300 m3 of ash on the 
>300000 m2 of runways at Auckland Airport. Ash on green areas may be ploughed 
into the soil for stabilisation. Access to such equipment as rollers and pulvimixers 
may need to be arranged pre-event. Time required to perform these tasks is again 
estimated from that taken by Fontanarossa. Airport operators SAC (Societa Aeroporto 
Catania) report that 1000 m2 takes approximately one hour for one pulvimixer/roller. 
 
Trucks to take away and dump ash will also need to be sourced pre-eruption, as may 
additional water tankers to dampen ash before removal, to prevent remobilisation into 
the air. 
 
Front-end loaders will be required to load ash onto trucks, especially from piles swept 
off roofs etc; access to this type of machinery should be arranged pre-event. 
 
Should a large scale local event be predicted (one that may result in large amounts of 
volcanic ash), additional machinery may be required. Ash will need to be bladed to 
the side of the runways using snow-plough or grader type equipment, before being 
loaded onto dump trucks using front end loaders. The more machinery available the 
faster clean up will occur. 
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Large amounts of water will be required by the clean-up operation, however it is 
understood that Auckland Airport is self sufficient in this regard. Back-up generators 
and fuel may also be necessary as power-cuts may be caused by ashfall. 
 
Other planning issues 
 
Plans and rosters need to be established for 24-hour maintenance operations. 
Procedures detailing the roles and responsibilities of all teams during and after ashfall 
are required prior to an event, to enable efficient and rapid response. Communications 
may be adversely affected by volcanic ash, as overloading of phones is common in 
emergencies, and power loss exceeding a few hours can result in telecommunications 
exchange failure. Staff may therefore be difficult to reach. It should be noted that 
eruptions can continue for weeks or months. In an eruption in the Auckland Volcanic 
Field this may result in ashfall affecting the airport on numerous occasions.  
 
Deposits of ash over ~15 centimetres may render roads impassable to two-wheel-
drive vehicles, roads are likely to be closed to non essential traffic before this. This 
will have implications for the availability of staff trying to get to and from work, and 
needs to be considered in planning rosters etc. Furthermore in the event of a local 
eruption some staff may be evacuated from their homes, and may therefore be 
unavailable for work. 
 
A list of facilities that are essential to the operation of the airport needs to be 
complied, so that non essential machinery and facilities may be closed down for the 
duration of the ashfall. 
 
Where possible, it is preferable to move aircraft pre-eruption rather than trying to 
cover them up or park in hangars. If an eruption becomes prolonged, or the airport is 
closed for several days, the aircraft may be trapped on the ground. This happened to 
the Ecuadorean airline TAME, during the 2002 Reventador eruption, when 7 of the 
airlines fleet of 11 aircraft were trapped on the ground for the duration of the clean-up 
(figure 2). This caused major financial losses for the airline (Leonard et al., 2005). 
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Communication with GNS Science and the Meteorological service will be critical in 
deciding when an ash cloud is likely to impact the airport or air space.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Boeing 727 with makeshift covers during ashfall, Quito, November 2002, photo 
courtesy Mariscal Sucre Airport. 
 
Eruption Response  
 
Health and safety 
 
Before any activity is undertaken in volcanic ash environments, the safety of 
employees must be taken into account. The most useful safety equipment consists of 
goggles and a dust/filtration mask. These are essential for workers involved with ash 
clean up, or simply working in ash affected environments. Workers with asthma or 
other respiratory conditions should not work in these conditions. 
 
The slipperiness of ash covered surfaces also creates hazards, this is especially 
prevalent on rooftops, where workers must be harnessed at all times. Speed 
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restrictions need to be applied for any vehicles being driven in the ash environment, 
as not only will they stir up ash, but the slipperiness of ash covered surfaces and 
reduced visibility (during ashfall) make driving conditions dangerous.  
 
Grounded aircraft 
 
As soon as possible after the start of an eruption, or after an eruption warning, aircraft 
not able to be flown out of the airport need to either be parked in hangars or protected 
by means of tarpaulins/plastic sheeting. Any vulnerable parts should have these types 
of covers placed over them, using adhesive tape to secure. Parts commonly identified 
as vulnerable include windscreens and nosecones, engine intakes and wheel 
assemblies. Pitot tubes should also be covered. All flaps, spoilers etc should be fully 
closed. If possible any further seams, ports or vents should be sealed with duct tape 
and plastic sheeting. The amount of sealing and covering will depend on available 
time and labour.  
 
Should a significant ashfall (over 5cm or so) be expected, any aircraft with engines at 
the tail, or large surface areas (i.e. horizontal stabilizers) at the rear of the aeroplane 
which may accumulate large amounts of ash should be anchored to the ground at the 
front. This is to prevent the weight of the ash unbalancing the aircraft, rotating it back 
onto it’s tail and damaging the underside of the aeroplane. This happened to a DC-10 
and C130 at Cubi Point Naval Air Station on June 16 1991, following the Pinatubo 
eruption, and several B-25 bombers at Pompeii during the 1944 eruption of Vesuvius. 
 
Due to the potentially corrosive nature of volcanic ash, aircraft need to be quickly 
cleaned after ashfall. Impacts to metal surfaces depend not just on the pH and the 
duration that ash is left on the aircraft, but on the presence of rainfall during or after 
ashfall. Light rain during or after ashfall could result in significant damage to ash 
covered aircraft, but heavy rain is likely to clean aircraft of ash, and is thus less of a 
problem in terms of corrosion. Recent testing has indicated dry ash has no effect on 
any kind of aircraft surface, but wet ash can result in leachates corroding and 
oxidising both clad and unclad surfaces. Tests of unclad 7075-T6 and 2024-T3 alloys 
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with an ash leachate of pH 2.5 resulted in surface pits of 10-30 µm after 24 hours, 
clad surfaces experienced deeper pitting of up to 50 µm (figure 3) (Barnard, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 3: SEM micrograph of clad 2024-T3 aluminium after being exposed to  
a leachate of pH 2.5 for 24 hours 
 
Wet ash from phreatic or phreatomagmatic eruptions will have the capacity to begin 
to cause corrosion immediately upon landing on the aircraft. As it is unlikely that 
leachate pH will be known immediately after ashfall, it will be necessary to treat any 
ash as being highly acidic, removing it from aircraft as soon as possible to prevent 
corrosion. 
 
The amount of surface oxidation and pitting corrosion experienced in these tests 
would not in itself prevent aircraft flying. Oxidation of aluminium and alloy surfaces 
is common on aircraft; repairing oxidised surfaces is dealt with as part of routine 
aircraft maintenance and does not require immediate attention. Pitting is more serious, 
as once pits form they tend to continue to slowly grow over time. In the short term the 
mechanical performance of clad alloy is unlikely to be compromised by the level of 
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pitting seen in these tests, as it is the clad surface that is corroded rather than the 
structural alloy. Pitting directly in alloy is more problematic, in that even aircraft 
skins are structural; pits can eventually lead to fatigue failure if they are located in a 
critical load path (Banis et al., 1999). The 10-30 µm deep pits experienced by the 
unclad 2024 and 7075 alloys amounted to between 1 and 3% of the 1 mm alloy 
thickness. This level of pitting is not sufficient to compromise the structural integrity 
of the alloy, but the corrosion does however need to be quickly removed and the 
surface repaired. Depending on the extent of corrosion this could result in the aircraft 
being out of service for days to weeks. Even without this damage occurring, any 
aircraft subjected to ashfall will require extensive inspection to ensure all ash is 
removed and the plane is safe to fly. 
 
Airport infrastructure  
 
Buildings  
 
One of the most severe problems associated with volcanic ash is loading. Roofs will 
accumulate ash, enough ash can lead to collapse. (This may be in the region of 10cm 
or more for large span roofs). As the amount of ash likely to be produced by an 
eruption is not easy to predict, roofs should be cleaned frequently during the course of 
an eruption to prevent ash accumulating. Prior to collapse damage may be sustained 
such as the bending of roofing iron, resulting in the ingress of ash (and any rainfall) 
into buildings.  
 
Regular cleaning is also important for roofs that drain into downpipes within 
buildings. Blockages of ash are likely, and may result in flooding of the building 
during rainfall. Minimising ash ingress into these downpipes is only realistically 
possible by cleaning ash off roof surfaces regularly.  
 
Buildings that are not essential for the daily running of the airport or not in use while 
the airport is not fully operational should be kept closed. Any movement within 
buildings will mobilise ash that has managed to find its way inside. Buildings that are 
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used should employ as few entries/exits as possible, to keep down the entrainment of 
ash from the outside. 
 
Electronic equipment inside buildings should be covered as fine ash manages to 
penetrate even closed buildings to a certain extent, especially in windy conditions. 
Computers have proved to be surprisingly resilient to dry volcanic ash during 
laboratory tests. However should this ash become damp it becomes conductive, which 
will quickly cause computers and other electronic equipment to short-circuit and fail 
(Gordon et al., 2005).  
 
The use of air-conditioning systems need not be avoided during ashfall. Most units 
will cope with light ashfall. Tests indicate ashfall up to a thickness of ~30 mm will 
not cause air conditioner failure, and only slightly decrease performance. Regular 
maintenance during ashfall is advised, as after ~30 mm of ash most split systems 
condensers will begin to partially block, eventually causing compressor damage, 
resulting in unit shutdowns. Through wall or ‘window rattler’ type units usually have 
a faster fan than split system types. This helps them self clean; these therefore tend to 
be more robust in ashfall. Care must be taken when cleaning ash from condensers as 
the thin aluminium fins easily bend, low pressure water can be used, as water blasting 
is too powerful and will damage condensers. Fresh air systems that pump outside air 
into the inside of buildings should not be used at all while ash is entrained in the 
atmosphere, as large amounts of ash will be sucked into building interiors.  
 
Paved areas 
 
Stormwater drains are easily blocked by large volumes of volcanic ash being washed 
into them. This should be avoided where possible. Sand (or ash if it has already 
fallen) bags may be placed around drains to help prevent this.  
 
Ash is easily remobilised when dry. Wind picks up dry ash and blows it around, 
traffic and human activity will exacerbate this by stirring up ash. Any vehicles driving 
in ash should proceed slowly, not only because of the nuisance caused by re-
entraining ash into suspension, but for safety reasons. Surfaces are slippery in both 
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wet and dry conditions, and visibility is low when thick ash is falling. Headlights 
should be on. Any road/runway markings will also be invisible as the ash covers 
them, even at 0.5 mm thicknesses. Access airside needs to be strictly controlled to 
ensure the re-mobilisation of ash is kept to a minimum. Dampening the ash (with 
water tankers) helps to keep it from being stirred up quite so much. Soaking (as 
opposed to dampening) ash is not a good option, as this can cause ash to harden and 
cake, making it much more difficult to remove. The exact amount of water needed to 
dampen ash enough to stabilise it without caking it will vary depending on the type of 
ash, and can really only be achieved by a process of trial and error. Another option 
used in the past to stabilise ash includes damp sawdust, used in Spokane following the 
Mt St Helens eruption. 
 
Machinery 
 
Any machinery not in use needs to be covered with tarpaulins or put away. This will 
help reduce corrosion and abrasion. Any exposed moving parts will suffer. 
Preventative maintenance is essential, for example should any vehicles operate with a 
torn CV boot, failure of the CV joint is likely to be rapid (i.e. within a few 
kilometres). Brake assemblies will need to be cleaned every 100 to 200 km in heavy 
ash conditions, as will oil filters. Air filters will possibly need to be cleaned, 
(compressed air, blowing from inside to outside) or at least inspected daily. After the 
eruption has ceased and the ash has been cleaned up, vehicles and other machinery 
should undergo a full service, replacing all fluids, filters etc. 
 
Clean-up Operations 
 
Aircraft 
 
Cleaning ash off aircraft surfaces needs to be approached with care to avoid abrasion. 
Recent testing of aircraft surfaces with andesitic ash from Rabaul using both low 
pressure water and brushes resulted in negligible abrasion occurring, however 
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different ash types may give different results. The ash used in testing was a fine 
grained dacite, its high silica content and angular grain shape made this a very 
abrasive ash. Volcanic ash could potentially be more abrasive than this, causing 
damage to surfaces. This could occur with a more silicic rhyolitic ash, or even a 
glassy ash with sharp angular grains. Extreme care should therefore be taken when 
removing ash from aircraft skins. Abrasion to windshields and windows was not 
tested, as experience after the Pinatubo eruption suggests these can easily be scratched 
if rubbed when removing ash (Casadevall, 1992). Ideally windshields should be 
covered in the event of an aircraft being parked outside during an ashfall 
 
Ash should be gently hosed and brushed with soft brushes if it is wet or has been 
wetted on the aircraft. Dry ash can also be vacuumed if time and resources permit. 
The use of fire engines to wash clean aircraft in Quito was employed in 2002. This 
was apparently successful, with no damage reported to aircraft. A timeframe of 10-15 
minutes for a basic hosing clean of a Boeing 737 using a single appliance was given. 
Care must be urged when using this technique, to avoid washing ash into any seams, 
ports or vents. With high pressure water there is a risk of abrasion as ash particles 
move against aircraft surfaces.  
 
After cleaning the bulk of the aircraft, protective coverings on more vulnerable parts 
may be removed and these areas carefully cleaned as required. Windscreens and 
wipers impacted by ash need to be carefully cleaned by hand, without rubbing (dab 
instead) as ash caught under windshield wipers will abrade the windscreen when the 
wipers are used. 
 
Thorough inspection of the aircraft is required afterwards to ensure that intakes/vents, 
and any moving parts are not contaminated with ash. 
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Airport Infrastructure 
 
Buildings 
 
Clean from the top down. Start with rooftops, otherwise ash will be remobilised from 
these areas onto lower surfaces. Cleaning below buildings then sweeping ash off the 
roof will create extra work. Other reasons for cleaning roof tops first include the 
prevention of loading damage should further ashfall occur. Cleaning rooftops can be a 
hazardous business. Care must be taken by workers, due to the slippery nature of both 
wet and dry volcanic ash, harnesses are therefore essential. An exclusion zone should 
be marked on areas underneath the building where ash is likely to be falling off. 
Should a large amount (>5 cm) of ash be present on the roof, extra care is needed as 
the additional weight of workers will stress already overloaded roof tops (especially 
large span hangar/terminal type roofs). 
 
To prevent excess ash being washed into gutterings and downpipes, brooms and 
shovels should be used on rooftops rather than hoses and water. However should 
downpipes become blocked with ash they can be cleaned using high pressure water. 
This method has been employed successfully by Fontanarossa airport. Sweeping ash 
onto lower roofs must also be avoided, the impact of a large volume of falling ash 
may be sufficient to cause lower roofs to collapse. The accumulation of ash in 
overhanging gutterings may cause them to collapse. This may be difficult to avoid if 
trying to rapidly clean roofs by sweeping ash off them onto the ground, in order to 
restore operations as quickly as possible. 
 
Building Interiors  
 
The following suggestions for cleaning building interiors are taken from the USGS 
website, (http://volcanoes.usgs.gov/ash/build/index.html#remove). This website has 
been contributed to by several organisations, including GNS Science, and the 
University of Canterbury. 
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• Cleaning by blowing with compressed air or dry sweeping should be 
minimized.  
• A dustless method of cleaning such as washing with water and an effective 
detergent/wetting agent is recommended. Damp rag techniques should be used 
whenever possible to remove the substance from small surface areas or 
flooring. On those areas where damp rag techniques cannot be implemented 
(for example, carpets) vacuum cleaning methods should be applied.  
• After vacuuming, carpets and upholstery may be cleaned with a detergent 
shampoo. Avoid excess rubbing action because the sharp ash particles may 
cut textile fibres.  
• Glass, porcelain enamel and acrylic surfaces may be scratched if wiped too 
vigorously. Use a detergent soaked cloth or sponge and dab rather than wipe.  
• High-shine wood finishes will be dulled by the fine grit. Vacuum surfaces and 
then blot with a cloth treated to pick up ash. A tack cloth used by furniture 
refinishers should work well.  
• Floor sweepers with side brushes should not be used to clear aisles and floors 
because they may re-entrain dust particles into the air.  
• Ash-coated fabrics should be rinsed under running water and then washed 
carefully.  
• For several months after an ash fall, filters may need replacing frequently. Air 
conditioner and furnace filters need careful attention. Clean refrigerator air 
intakes. Clean any surface that may blow air and re-circulate the ash. Stove 
fans and vents should be cleaned thoroughly.  
• Each employee should be responsible for clean-up of his/her own work area to 
minimize exposure potential during a work shift. This should be accomplished 
at the beginning of each shift. Damp rag or vacuum techniques should be used 
during this operation. 
Electronic equipment should be cleaned using vacuum cleaners. 
Paved surfaces/Runways 
 
To stabilise ash and prevent it from being remobilised, ash may need to be dampened 
with water trucks. This will depend on ash grainsize. For deposits over ~5 mm thick 
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different techniques can be applied; thicker deposits need to be bladed rather than 
swept or vacuumed away. This will remove ash much more quickly. Piles of ash 
pushed to the sides of the cleaned area may then be loaded onto trucks using front end 
loaders. Care needs to be taken not to push ash into stormwater drains.  
 
For thinner deposits of ash, sweeper and vacuum equipped trucks are recommended. 
Again ash may be slightly dampened, but not wetted. The operators of Catania’s 
Fontanarossa airport found the best way for them to operate their trucks is lengthways 
along the runway, starting from the centre, moving to the outside. The timeframe 
given by them to clean up residual ash (~1 mm thick deposits) equates to 5000 m2 per 
hour for a single truck. After sweeper/vacuum trucks had passed by water tankers 
were driven across the runway, cleaning residual ash from surfaces. These techniques 
are based on their experiences with ash from Mt. Etna in 2000, 2001 and 2002.  
 
In the absence of available machinery, or in areas not easily accessed by trucks or 
street sweepers, manual labour may need to be employed. Sweeping up ash with 
brooms and shovels takes time, but is possible. The clean-up of runways at Quito’s 
Mariscal Sucre Airport after the 2002 Reventador eruption was entirely performed by 
labourers in this way. Approximately 4 mm of ash had been deposited over Quito. It 
was found that time taken to sweep up, bag and remove ash equalled only about 5.5 
m2 an hour. While obviously slower than a truck, this timeframe was for a thicker 
amount of ash than the 1 mm or so of ash removed by truck at Fontanarossa, as 
described above. Workers sweeping up ash in Quito were mostly from poor 
communities, and were being paid a small amount per hour. It is probable that faster 
rates of manual clean up could be performed by workers in Auckland. Even so these 
rates do reflect the laboriousness of the task, and the fact that it will take a long time 
to complete. 
 
Cleaning methods used in other eruptions, both successful and unsuccessful are 
summarised in table 1. These may be useful in situations where suggested 
methodologies are not working effectively. 
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Airport Eruption Amount 
of ash 
Distance 
from 
source 
/grainsize
Method used to 
clean 
Other clean-up 
methods tried 
(unsuccessfully) 
Anchorage 
International 
Alaska, USA 
Mt Spurr 
August 
1992 
3-6 mm 
Drifts to 
12 mm 
125km, 
fine 
Complete saturation, 
flotation of finest 
components. Graders 
+ brooms moved 
saturated ash as far as 
possible. Bermed ash 
loaded into trucks. 
Residual ash was 
removed by flushing 
the area with water 
 
Dry sweeping 
caused too much 
remobilization, 
method abandoned. 
Dampening ash 
made a paste that 
was hard to move 
Merrill Field 
Airport, USA 
Mt Spurr 
August 
1992 
6-12 mm 125km, 
fine 
Ash wetted and 
cleaned using a 
vacuum sweeper. 
 
 
Grant county, 
USA 
St Helens 
may 18 
1980 
 
75-100 
mm 
200 km, 
very fine 
A moderate amount 
of water made it like 
balls of clay – easier 
to deal with. Spray 
with water, windrow 
with grader, scoop 
with loader to dump 
truck. 
Saturation with 
water resulted in 
powder-like ash 
behaving like soup, 
difficult to manage 
Cubi Point 
NAS 
(plus Clark Air 
Force Base 
PHILIPPINES 
 
June 15-
16 1991 
Pinatubo 
 
150- 
200 mm 
40km  
(Cubi 
point) 
 25km 
(Clark) 
sand sized 
 
Wet ash ploughed 
into furrows using 
road graders, then 
loaded in to dump 
trucks, final sweeping 
with trucks. Nb 
Heavy rains 
 
Manila Ninoy 
Aquina 
International 
Airport 
(NAIA) 
PHILIPPINES 
June 15-
16 1991 
Pinatubo 
 
0.5 to 1 
cm ash – 
fine sand 
to 
‘Powder” 
sized ash 
~100km 
Fine sand 
to 
powder-
size 
Manual sweeping 
into furrows, 
stabilised with 
emulsified asphalt (to 
bind loose ash) 
Initially furrows of 
ash were collected 
into sacks. After 
filling 30,000 they 
stopped and 
stabilised furrows 
in place with 
emulsified asphalt. 
 
Table 1 major ash impacts on runways, 1980 – 1992, summarized from Casadevall (1993) 
 
To speed up the resumption of normal services aircraft may be towed from areas still 
contaminated with ash to cleaned runways. The APU or engines must not be started 
until the clean runway area is reached.  
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Stormwater drains 
 
Drains blocked with ash will cause surface flooding during subsequent rainfall. While 
some ash may be removed with manual labour (shovels), high pressure water may be 
required to clean harder to reach areas. 
 
Green areas 
 
Thick deposits of ash on green areas may be removed in the same way as on runways, 
using a blade or snowplough to push ash into piles, before being loaded onto trucks 
with a front-end loader. For the residual ash left, ploughing and rolling techniques can 
be utilised to bind the ash with the soil. Fontanarossa Airport uses a pulvimixer to do 
this, taking 1 hour for a pulvimixer to cover about 1000m2. Areas immediately 
adjacent to the runway are addressed first, as ash further from the runways may be 
sufficiently stabilised by water in the short term to begin aircraft operations again. 
Operations will be significantly slowed down if obstacles (such as runway lights) are 
found in these areas. Other possible methodologies include the use of emulsified 
asphalt to stabilise ash on grassed areas. 
 
Runway inspection 
 
A thorough runway inspection should be carried out after clean up operations, prior to 
the resumption of aircraft operations. This is to check for any debris or ash left on the 
runway, and the surface of the pavement itself. Damage may occur during clean up 
operations, especially when snowploughs/blades and front end loaders have been 
used. 
 
Radar and optical systems 
 
Advice on actions to take regarding radar and optical systems is from the ICAO 
Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds, appendix 
B (in italics). 
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Most radar equipment in the heaviest ash-fall areas has to be shut down for the 
duration of severe ash contamination. Thus, few problems are likely aside from clean-
up and control of residual ash. The simplest mitigation tactic is to cease operations. 
Clean-up techniques include: 
 
• Repair and clean high-voltage circuits 
• Wash antenna rotor bearings, re-lubricate, and cover exposed bearings 
• Ash on optical components should be blown away or washed with copious 
amounts of water. Do not wipe or brush as this will abrade the optics 
• Turn off non-essential radar equipment to reduce cooling load and power 
requirements 
• Transfer radar coverage to other facilities, combine sectors 
• Remove and replace camera bearings and clean gear drives  
 
Machinery/Vehicles 
 
Vehicles and other machinery should undergo a full service, replacing all fluids, 
filters etc. Attention should be given to all moving parts, e.g. hydraulics. Brake 
assemblies will need to be cleaned every 100 to 200 km when being used in heavy ash 
conditions, as will oil filters. Air filters will possibly need to be cleaned, (compressed 
air, blowing from inside to outside) or at least inspected every day. After the eruption 
has ceased and the ash has been cleaned up, vehicles and other machinery should 
undergo a full service, replacing all fluids, filters etc. Glass and painted metal surfaces 
should not be wiped as this will cause abrasion. Compressed air or water can be used; 
any use of cloths should be with a dabbing rather than a rubbing motion. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Provided aircraft are adequately protected, and roofs are cleaned before tephra loading 
becomes an issue, physical damage resulting from ashfall can be minimised. However 
impacts to airports and grounded aircraft are not only physical. Financial losses 
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resulting from the costs of airport closure are likely to exceed those incurred from 
damage and cleanup. Pre planning for ashfall is essential to minimise airport closure 
time, facilitating a rapid return to business as usual. A reactive approach to ashfall 
will result in more damage and a longer recovery time, as access to required cleaning 
equipment (including runway cleaning machinery) may not be possible, contacting 
staff may be difficult, and aircraft may be stranded and unnecessarily exposed to 
ashfall. Even seemingly simple omissions like a shortage of personal protective 
equipment such as dust masks may hinder clean up procedures, ultimately costing 
more in airport closure time. The mitigation strategies listed in this report will aid the 
process of effectively managing the risk posed by volcanic ashfall.  
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